Defendant appeals from judgments dated 6 October 2005 by Judge
Michael E. Beale in Davie County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 5 June 2007.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Anne M. Middleton, for the State.
McCotter, Ashton, & Smith, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III,
and Kirby H. Smith, III, for defendant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Randy Greensbury Ridgeway appeals from judgments dated 6
October 2005 consistent with jury verdicts finding him guilty of
first degree (felony) murder, first degree rape, statutory rape,
first degree sex offense, statutory sex offense, sex offense in a
parental role, indecent liberties with a minor and felony child
abuse. For the murder conviction, defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. The remaining charges were
consolidated and defendant was sentenced to a minimum of six
hundred five months and a maximum of seven hundred fifty-four
months imprisonment to run consecutively.
D.K. (Debi)
(See footnote 1)
was a fourteen-year-old high school student who
was raped, sodomized and murdered by defendant, her mother's
live-in boyfriend. Defendant admitted that he murdered Debi by
repeatedly hitting her in the head with a hammer. The State's
evidence tended to show defendant was having sexual feelings toward
Debi in the months prior to murdering Debi. Defendant told
investigators Debi had “come on” to him in the past, that she had
a certain way of flirting, that she had talked to him about her
breasts and wanting to sleep in the same bed with him. Defendant'srelationship with Debi's mother had deteriorated to the point that
defendant slept on the living room sofa and had planned to move
out.
On 21 September 2004, Debi's mother returned home from work at
about 11:20 p.m. to find defendant lying on the couch and he
appeared to be sleeping. Upon entering Debi's room, her mother
found Debi unresponsive, her body felt cold and her blonde hair was
completely red with blood. After attempting to resuscitate Debi,
her mother called 911. EMS responded and transported Debi to the
hospital where she was pronounced dead.
An autopsy was performed on Debi, documenting her significant
injuries. There were multiple human bite marks all over her body,
including her pubic area, chin, upper right thigh, and between her
breasts. According to experts for both defendant and the State,
Debi was alive at the time she was bitten by defendant. Debi's
vaginal area and rectum were severely bruised and torn. DNA
evidence extracted from Debi's vagina and rectum matched
defendant's and a soft tissue analysis revealed Debi was alive when
she sustained these injuries. Although the State's evidence
indicated Debi was alive when she sustained the injuries to her
vagina and rectum, defendant claimed he sexually assaulted Debi
after she was dead in an attempt to make it look as though someone
else had committed the crime. After sustaining multiple injuries,
Debi died of blunt force trauma to the head.
At the crime scene, investigators found evidence indicating an
attempt to sanitize the scene. Evidence found in the masterbedroom included a hammer, a large knife and a partially unrolled
condom. Defendant gave several statements, confessing that he
murdered Debi with a hammer. Additionally, defendant admitted he
left a knife in the master bedroom because he intended to kill
Debi's mother when she got home.
At trial, defendant was acquitted of first degree murder based
upon premeditation and deliberation, but convicted of first degree
murder under the felony murder rule. The jury further convicted
defendant of all remaining charges and recommended sentencing
defendant to life imprisonment without parole on the first degree
murder conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant on the
first degree murder conviction, and arrested judgment on the
felonious child abuse with a deadly weapon conviction pursuant to
the felony murder rule. As to the remaining convictions, defendant
stipulated he was a prior record level II for sentencing purposes.
The trial court consolidated the statutory rape and forcible rape
convictions and sentenced defendant to 288 to 355 months
imprisonment on those charges. The trial court consolidated the
statutory sexual offense and forcible sexual offense convictions
and sentenced defendant to an additional 288 to 355 months
imprisonment. The trial court ordered both the sexual offense and
murder convictions to run at the expiration of the sentence in the
rape cases. The sexual offense in a parental role and indecent
liberties charges were consolidated and defendant was sentenced to
twenty-nine to forty-four months imprisonment, to run at the
expiration of the sentence on the sexual offenses. Defendantappeals.
_________________________
Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (I) denying his
motion for change of venue or special venire; (II) denying his
motion to suppress statements to law enforcement;
(III) admitting
testimony that defendant was in jail on these charges; (IV)
admitting evidence that a knife and condom were found at the crime
scene; (V) denying defendant's motions to dismiss; and (VI)
arresting judgment on only one of the felony convictions used to
support his felony murder conviction.
[1] Defendant has filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR)
with this Court, and states the original judgments appearing in the
record on appeal for second degree rape(04 CRS 3370) and for second
degree sex offense (04 CRS 3372) were correct. Defendant states
the amended copies that later became an exhibit to the record upon
the State's motion, are in error. The State, in its response to
defendant's MAR, concedes that while the transcript indicates
defendant was found guilty and convicted of first degree rape and
first degree sex offense, the trial court's attempt to correct its
clerical error
after this matter was pending on appeal with this
Court was error. We agree. The trial court was clearly without
jurisdiction to change the original judgment, even to correct a
clerical error, while this matter was pending appeal.
See In re
J.L.B.M., 176 N.C. App. 613, 628, 627 S.E.2d 239, 248 (2006) (“Once
the record on appeal has been filed with an appellate court, the
trial court is divested of jurisdiction to correct a clericalerror.”). Accordingly, we allow defendant's MAR and vacate the
amended judgments in 04 CRS 3370 and 04 CRS 3372 and remand for
correction of the clerical error.
Id.
I
[2] Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion for change of venue or special venire. In support of his
argument defendant states there had been six news articles in area
newspapers about the case and a local lawyer had been involved in
a discussion about the case with some of her church members who
felt defendant was obviously guilty.
A trial court must either transfer the case to another county
or order a special venire from another county if there exists so
great a prejudice against the defendant in the county in which he
is charged that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-957 (2005);
State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 502
S.E.2d 563 (1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124, 142 L. Ed. 2d 907
(1999). Defendant must establish that “it is reasonably likely
that prospective jurors would base their decision in the case upon
pretrial information rather than the evidence presented at trial
and would be unable to remove from their minds any preconceived
impressions they might have formed.”
Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 428, 502
S.E.2d at 571 (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, even
when “it is clear that a large number of potential jurors was
exposed to information about the case through the media,” our
Supreme Court “has consistently held that factual news accounts of
the crimes and pretrial proceedings are not sufficient to establishprejudice against a defendant.”
State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481,
512, 528 S.E.2d 326, 346 (2000). Defendant must establish specific
and identifiable prejudice against him as a result of pretrial
publicity by showing,
inter alia, that jurors with prior knowledge
decided the case, that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, and
that a juror objectionable to him sat on the jury.
Id. The
determination of whether a defendant has carried his burden is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a
showing of abuse of discretion, its ruling will not be overturned
on appeal.
State v. Madric, 328 N.C. 223, 226-27, 400 S.E.2d 31,
33-34 (1991).
In this case, the jury selection process effectively screened
out any jurors who might have been influenced by pretrial
publicity. Juror questionnaires were utilized and each potential
juror was questioned about media exposure and potential prejudice.
The record reflects that every juror among those ultimately
selected either indicated that they had no prior knowledge of the
case or, if they had prior knowledge, expressly stated that they
could decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial.
During jury selection, potential jurors were excused for cause each
time they indicated any possibility that they might be influenced
by something they had seen or heard about the case. Jurors were
asked if they could keep an open mind about considering second
degree murder and were dismissed for cause if they indicated that
they would have a hard time considering second degree murder,
rather than first degree.
See Wallace, 351 N.C. at 511, 528 S.E.2dat 345 (Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that the best
and most reliable evidence as to whether existing community
prejudice will prevent a fair trial can be drawn from prospective
jurors' responses to questions during the jury selection process.”)
(citations and quotations omitted). The record reflects that a
fair and impartial jury was selected in this case. Defendant
indicated he was satisfied with the jury at the conclusion of the
jury selection process and did not renew his motion. Defendant has
not demonstrated such “widespread and pervasive prejudice in the
community” that defendant could not receive a fair trial before
jurors selected from that jurisdiction. The trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to change venue or for special venire.
This assignment of error is overruled.
II
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion
to suppress three statements made to law enforcement: defendant's
inquiry about an attorney; statements made while en route to the
dentist; and a written statement.
“It is well established that the standard of review in
evaluating a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is that
the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting.”
State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d
823, 826 (2001) (quotation omitted). Conclusions of law which are
supported by findings of fact are binding on appeal.
State v.
Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409, 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000),
cert.denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001). The trial court's
conclusions of law must be legally correct, reflecting a correct
application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.
Id.
Where the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the
evidence and in turn support its conclusions of law, defendant's
assignments of error should be overruled.
See State v. Jones, 161
N.C. App. 615, 589 S.E.2d 374 (2003),
appeal dismissed and disc.
rev. denied, 358 N.C. 379, 597 S.E.2d 770 (2004).
Inquiry About an Attorney
[3] Defendant contends his right to counsel was not protected
where officers purportedly did not make sufficient inquiry before
resuming questioning after defendant inquired about an attorney.
In the order on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court
made detailed findings of fact based on evidence presented at the
suppression hearing. The trial court also made “findings of
ultimate facts relating to the ultimate issues in these Motions.”
The findings pertinent to this issue were:
That the defendant was fully advised of his
Fifth Amendment Miranda rights by Agent Lloyd
Terry and freely, voluntarily and
understandingly waived those rights. That the
defendant's inquiry about a public defender
during the interview was not an unambiguous,
unequivocal request to talk to an attorney;
that despite being advised that talking to an
attorney was his decision and being given an
opportunity by Agent Terry to make an
unequivocal request, the defendant voluntarily
continued the interview. That all of the
defendant's statements during the interview
were made freely, voluntarily,
understandingly, without any promises,
threats, coercions or inducement by Agent
Terry or Detective Stephens.
None of the trial court's findings of fact have been challenged by
defendant or assigned as error on appeal; these findings of fact
are conclusive on appeal.
See Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543
S.E.2d at 826. The trial court's findings of fact in turn support
its conclusion of law that defendant never unequivocally requested
an attorney during his early custodial interrogation and that none
of defendant's state or federal statutory or constitutional rights
had been violated. This conclusion of law is legally correct and
reflects a correct application of applicable legal principles to
the facts found; therefore, it, too, is binding on appeal.
See
Golphin, 352 N.C. at 409, 533 S.E.2d at 201 (a suspect must
unambiguously request counsel to warrant the cessation of questions
and must sufficiently and clearly articulate his desire to have
counsel present such that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an
attorney).
Statement En Route to the Dentist
[4] Defendant argues the trial court should have suppressed
the brief spontaneous statement defendant made to officers while en
route to have dental impressions made. The trial court's
unchallenged finding of facts as to this statement were:
77. On the way to the dentist's office the
defendant, without any questions being posed
of him by Detective Stephens or Special Agent
Terry stated, “I do not know why you are doing
this, I told you that I did it.”
78. At the time that the defendant made this
statement in the presence of Detective
Stephens and Special Agent Terry, the
defendant appeared to be acting normally andto understand what he was doing and no
promises or threats were made to induce the
defendant's statement. These unchallenged
findings of fact support the trial court's
conclusion of law that none of defendant's
state or federal statutory or constitutional
rights were violated when the statement was
made.
The trial court properly concluded that defendant's spontaneous
statement was admissible.
See State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 47,
347 S.E.2d 783, 793 (1986) (finding an assignment of error to be
feckless where the evidence in the record showed the defendant's
statement was spontaneous and that no interrogation in any form
occurred at that time);
State v. Duers, 49 N.C. App. 282, 286, 271
S.E.2d 81, 83 (1980) (holding appellate court bound by the trial
court's findings, which were supported by the evidence, that
defendant's custodial statement was spontaneously and voluntarily
made by the defendant and therefore admissible),
disc. rev. denied,
302 N.C. 220, 276 S.E.2d 917 (1981).
Written Statement
[5] Defendant was advised and expressly waived his rights
prior to giving officers the statement at issue here. Defendant
argues, however, the statement should have been suppressed because
the detectives “provided the means and opportunity for said
statement to be written prior to the defendant being advised of his
rights.” Defendant maintains that because the officers provided
defendant with writing instruments and put him in a single cell,
they should not have been allowed to accept his written statement,
even though they fully advised defendant of his rights before he
turned it over to them. Defendant cites no authority to supportthis contention; the issue therefore is deemed abandoned.
See
State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 224, 461 S.E.2d 687, 700 (1995)
(holding that an assignment of error is deemed abandoned if the
appellant does not “cite reasonable authority in its support”),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996). These
assignments of error are overruled.
III
[6] Defendant argues the trial court committed plain error in
allowing witness testimony and references during trial to the fact
that defendant had been incarcerated on these charges. We
disagree.
Defendant must show the alleged error caused the jury to
convict defendant when they otherwise would not have.
See State v.
Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987) (explaining
that “plain error” is error “so fundamental as to amount to a
miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury
reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have
reached”),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988).
At trial, defendant admitted he had committed acts sufficient to
constitute second degree murder, rape, sexual offense, and indecent
liberties. Defendant's strategy here was an admission that he
should be convicted of multiple Class B felonies versus first
degree murder. In light of this strategy, any reference to
defendant being in jail during trial could not have amounted to
plain error. This assignment of error is overruled.
IV
[7] Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of a knife and a condom found at the crime scene.
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005). “We
have interpreted Rule 401 broadly and have explained on a number of
occasions that in a criminal case every circumstance calculated to
throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible and
permissible.”
State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559,
562 (1994). The evidence tended to show defendant's relationship
with Debi's mother was ending badly, that defendant had recently
been experiencing sexual tension with Debi and had been asked to
leave the home. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that
defendant decided that he had little to lose by acting on his
impulses toward Debi, and by murdering both Debi and her mother.
This theory was supported by defendant's statements that he had
initially intended to use the condom when he assaulted Debi, and
that he had left the knife in the master bedroom because he
intended to kill Debi's mother when she got home. The knife
further tended to corroborate the State's evidence that the
victim's bra was cut in the front. Defendant has failed to
establish prejudice that the admission of such evidence found at
the crime scene was in error. These assignments of error are
overruled.
V
[8] Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence.
When
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a charged
offense, we must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to
the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable
inferences.”
State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756,
761 (1992). If the evidence supports a reasonable inference of
defendant's guilt based on the circumstances, then it is for the
jurors to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination,
satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
actually guilty.
State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d
178, 191 (1998),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80
(1999). When a defendant commits sex offenses in conjunction with
a murder as part of a continuous chain of events, forming one
continuous transaction, there is sufficient evidence to support the
defendant's sex offense convictions even if it is unclear whether
the victim was alive or dead when the sex offenses were committed.
See State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 215-16, 474 S.E.2d 375,
384-85 (1996). “This Court, on numerous occasions, has held that
to support convictions for a felony offense and related felony
murder, all that is required is that the elements of the underlying
offense and the murder occur in a time frame that can be perceived
as a single transaction.”
State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 434-35,
407 S.E.2d 141, 149 (1991).
In the light most favorable to the State the evidence tended
to show defendant attacked Debi over a period of hours. Defendant's expert testified various wounds were inflicted while
Debi was alive. The evidence showed defendant raped Debi vaginally
and anally while she was alive, leaving semen inside both her
vagina and anus. Defendant's expert indicated the evidence from
Debi's lung tissue showed Debi was alive for a substantial period
of time after the brain injury was inflicted. After hitting Debi
in the head, defendant walked around thinking about how to cover up
the crime, attempted to clean Debi up, and then sexually assaulted
her body -- all part of the same episode. There was sufficient
evidence to support a conclusion the physical abuse, rape, and
sexual offense occurred as part of a single transaction. The trial
court properly allowed the jury to review the evidence of
defendant's commission of the crimes of rape and sexual offense
under both a theory of statutory rape/sexual offense and forcible
rape/sexual offense. These are alternative theories under which
the jury could find defendant guilty of rape and sexual offense.
See State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 560, 572 S.E.2d 767, 770
(2002) (“The crime is first-degree murder. Premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder are theories which the State may
use, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-17, to convict a defendant of
first-degree murder. However, a defendant is convicted of the
crime, not of the theory.”). The prosecutor argued to the trial
court that the State should be allowed to present both theories to
the jury and that “any issues as to double jeopardy and merger
should be considered after the jury has spoken with regard to the
elements which it found on the statutory and forcible sexualoffense and rape charges.” The trial court properly submitted both
theories for the jury's consideration.
[9] However, upon the jury's verdicts of guilty under both
theories, judgment must be arrested on one count of first degree
rape and on one count of first degree sexual offense. In
Etheridge, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Where, as here, a single criminal transaction
constitutes a violation of more than one
criminal statute, the test to determine if the
elements of the offenses are the same is
whether each statute requires proof of a fact
which the others do not . . . . If neither
crime constitutes a lesser included offense of
the other, the convictions will fail to
support a plea of double jeopardy.
State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 50, 352 S.E.2d 673, 683 (1987)
(holding that convictions of three separate offenses all arising
out of the “same criminal transaction” did not violate double
jeopardy and upholding defendant's convictions of statutory rape,
incest, and taking indecent liberties with a child for each episode
of intercourse with his daughter)
(internal citations omitted).
Under the original statutes for rape and sexual offense, a plain
reading of the statutes shows the legislative intent was to provide
alternate methods by which the State can prove the crimes of rape
or sexual offense: intercourse or a sexual act with a child under
13 or intercourse or a sexual act with any person by force and
against the will.
See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.2, 14-27.4 (2005). In
1995, the legislature adopted a new statute extending protection to
children between the ages of 13 and 15 from sexual acts or
intercourse by older persons. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A (2005). Separate convictions for these offenses, even though
consolidated for a single judgment, “have potentially severe
adverse collateral consequences.”
State v. Speckman, 326 N.C. 576,
580, 391 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1990) (citation omitted). “Therefore,
consolidating the two convictions and entering a single judgment
did not reduce the trial court's error to harmless error.”
Id. We
remand for judgment to be arrested on one count of rape and one
count of sexual offense.
[10] Defendant next argues that there was insufficient
evidence defendant took any actions against Debi for the purposes
of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire. “[T]hat the action
was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, may be
inferred from the evidence of the defendant's actions. This is
sufficient evidence to withstand a motion to dismiss the charge of
taking indecent liberties with a child.”
State v. Rhodes, 321 N.C.
102, 105, 361 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1987).
In the present case, the victim had bite marks all over her
body and extensive trauma to both her vagina and rectum. A
reasonable inference, based upon the physical evidence alone, is
that defendant had a sexual purpose in assaulting Debi. Moreover,
defendant told police that he did not remember biting Debi, but
acknowledged that it was possible because he had bitten another
woman before while “making love” with her. There was sufficient
evidence that defendant assaulted Debi for the purpose of arousing
or gratifying sexual desire.
[11] Defendant cites no authority to support his argument thatthe felonious child abuse charges should have been dismissed at the
close of the State's evidence. If there is no citation of
authority in support of an argument, the assignment of error upon
which the argument is based is therefore deemed abandoned.
See
State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (Even
if a defendant raises a constitutional issue at trial and makes
that issue the subject of an assignment of error on appeal, he must
cite authority in support of an alleged constitutional violation.);
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
VI
[12] Defendant argues the trial court erred by arresting
judgment on one of the felony convictions used to support his
felony murder conviction. Defendant asserts that it was plain
error for the trial court to arrest judgment on one but not all of
the felonies that the jury found could support defendant's felony
murder conviction. Defendant did not object on this basis or raise
this issue at trial.
Our Supreme Court stated the felony murder merger rule
requires the trial court to arrest judgment on at least one (but
not all) of the underlying felony convictions if multiple
convictions supported the conviction for felony murder.
State v.
Barlowe, 337 N.C. 371, 381, 446 S.E.2d 352, 358-59 (1994). In
Barlowe, the Supreme Court indicated only one felony is necessary
to support a felony murder conviction, and further that under the
facts of that case, the record was clear that the jury found that
two separate felonies supported the first degree murder conviction.
Id. Although in
Barlowe there was error in the submission to the
jury of a first degree burglary charge, which also was one of the
felonies supporting the first degree murder conviction, the Supreme
Court stated that “[h]ad there been no error in submission of the
first degree burglary charge, the trial court would have been
required to arrest judgment on one of the underlying felony
convictions but could have elected either the discharging a firearm
into occupied property or the first-degree burglary conviction.”
Id. The Supreme Court further stated:
To the extent
dicta in the second opinion in
State v. Pakulski, 326 N.C. 434, 437, 390
S.E.2d 129, 130 (1990), suggests the
conviction for more than one underlying
felony, if found, merges with the murder
conviction thereby mandating that judgment on
the multiple underlying felonies be arrested,
that
dicta is expressly disavowed.
Id. This Court has since followed
Barlowe in addressing a
situation in which the trial court sentenced defendant for first
degree felony murder as well as for the two potential underlying
felonies supporting the felony murder conviction.
See State v.
Dudley, 151 N.C. App. 711, 566 S.E.2d 843,
appeal dismissed and
disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 684, 578 S.E.2d 314 (2003). In
Dudley,
this Court noted that the merger rule requires the trial court to
arrest judgment on “at least one of the underlying felony murder
convictions if two separate convictions supported the conviction
for felony murder.”
Id. at 716, 566 S.E.2d at 847 (remanded the
case with instructions to arrest one of the two felonies supporting
the felony murder conviction). Where the trial court's jury
instructions did not specify which of the multiple felonies were tobe considered as the underlying felony for purposes of the felony
murder conviction, it was within the trial court's discretion to
select which felony conviction would serve as the underlying
felony.
State v. Coleman, 161 N.C. App. 224, 236, 587 S.E.2d 889,
897 (2003) (no error where trial court elected to arrest judgment
on the attempted armed robbery conviction as the underlying felony
for the felony murder conviction and to sentence defendant for
three armed robbery convictions)
.
In the present case, the record was clear that the jury found
that five felonies could support the felony murder charge:
forcible rape, statutory rape, forcible sex offense, statutory sex
offense, and felony child abuse with a deadly weapon. The trial
court elected to arrest judgment on the felonious child abuse with
a deadly weapon conviction. Following
Barlowe,
Dudley, and
Coleman, we find no error.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated herein, we find no error
at trial; the first degree rape and the first degree sex offense
convictions are vacated and remanded.
No error in part; Vacated and remanded in part.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Footnote: 1