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Search and Seizure_investigatory stop_vehicle owned by driver with suspended
license_reasonable suspicion
An officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle when he
knew that defendant was the owner of the vehicle and that defendant's license had been
suspended. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable to infer that defendant
was driving the vehicle, and the judge did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress in
the resulting prosecution for driving while impaired.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Hal F. Askins, for the State.
Haakon Thorsen for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
On 15 May 2004, Officer Jarrett Doty of the Granite Quarry
Police Department was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle. At
approximately 9:32 p.m., Officer Doty pulled his automobile “in
behind a Pontiac vehicle[.]” It was dark and Officer Doty could
not determine the sex, race, or ethnicity of the driver of the
Pontiac, or how many individuals were riding inside. Officer Doty
traveled behind the Pontiac for approximately “[a] mile[,] . . .
[m]aybe two miles” and did not observe the driver of the vehicle
commit any traffic violations or weave in the lane of travel.
Nevertheless, Officer Doty “ran the registration plate that was
attached to the rear of the vehicle” through a computer in hispatrol car. Officer Doty discovered that the vehicle was
registered to Defendant. He then “ran [Defendant's] license number
from the registration information” and determined that Defendant's
license had been suspended. Once he had this information, but
still not knowing whether Defendant was driving the vehicle,
Officer Doty activated the blue lights on his patrol car and
stopped the Pontiac. When he approached the Pontiac, Officer Doty
found that Defendant was operating the vehicle. As a result of the
stop, Defendant was cited for driving while impaired and driving
with a revoked license.
On 10 March 2005, Defendant moved to suppress “any and all
statements and/or evidence which was obtained or received as a
result of Defendant being stopped . . . without reasonable and
articulable suspicion to believe that . . . Defendant was either
committing a crime or about to commit a crime.” A hearing on
Defendant's motion was held before the Honorable Michael E. Beale
in Rowan County Superior Court on 12 July 2006. After the hearing,
in an order dated 14 July 2006, Judge Beale denied Defendant's
motion to suppress. Upon preserving his right to appeal Judge
Beale's decision, Defendant pled guilty to both charges. From the
denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant appeals. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
4. That at 9:32 p.m. on the 15th day of May,
2004, Mr. Doty was on routine patrol in thetown of Granite Quarry in an unmarked patrol
car and was dressed in a regular police issued
uniform.
. . . .
7. That it was dark and he had his headlights
on when he got behind a Pontiac vehicle
operated on Legion Club Road.
8. That Mr. Doty could not determine anything
about the driver from behind that vehicle.
That he was unable to determine either the sex
or the race of the operator of that vehicle or
how many people were in the vehicle.
9. That he observed no traffic violations or
weaving or er[r]atic driving.
10. That he was able to observe the
registration plate and ran the registration
plate and determined that the vehicle was
registered to one Bryan Keith Hess, the
Defendant in this case. That he ran a license
check on the license number that came up for
Mr. Hess and he determined from that check
that Mr. Hess'[s] license had been suspended.
. . . .
12. That upon making the observations found
herein the patrolman initiated the stop by
activating his blue light and the vehicle
pulled over and stopped.
From these findings, Judge Beale concluded “[t]hat Officer Doty had
a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in question and make an
investigatory stop” and “[t]hat none of the Defendant's
constitutional rights, either State or Federal were violated in the
making of this stop.”
The Fourth Amendment protects private individuals from
unreasonable governmental intrusions on the individual's liberty or
property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
However, “[i]t is well-established that a law enforcement officer
may temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes withoutviolating the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App.
222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 375 (citing Terry, supra), appeal
dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369
(2005). “An investigatory stop must be justified by 'a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity.'” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437,
441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)). “When determining whether an
officer had 'a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop'
. . . trial courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances.” Shearin, 170 N.C. App. at 226, 612 S.E.2d at 376
(quoting State v. Willis, 125 N.C. App. 537, 541, 481 S.E.2d 407,
410 (1997)).
The appellate courts of this State have yet to address the
constitutionality of an investigatory stop based solely on an
officer's knowledge that an automobile currently being operated is
registered to an individual with a suspended or revoked driver's
license. We thus find it instructive to examine decisions from
other jurisdictions for guidance.
In Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524, 526
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 455 (Ill. 1992),
the Illinois Court of Appeals held that
[p]olice knowledge that an owner of a vehicle
has a revoked driver's license provides a
reasonable suspicion to stop the owner's
vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the
status of the license of the driver. Common
sense dictates that such information, even
alone, is enough to provide a constitutional
basis for stopping a vehicle or its occupants.
Similarly, in State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held “that the knowledge that the owner of
a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a
'reasonable suspicion of criminal activity' when an officer
observes the vehicle being driven.” However, Minnesota's high
court limited the application of its holding to circumstances
where, based on the information that the police officer was able to
gather about the physical characteristics of the driver, it was
reasonable to infer that the owner of the automobile was also the
driver. Id.
Relying on Village of Lake in the Hills , supra, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that when “an officer observed a
vehicle, which he properly determined to be registered to an owner
who had a suspended driver's license, being driven on a public
roadway” and the “officer observed nothing that would indicate that
the driver was not the owner[,]” it “was reasonable for the officer
to infer” that the owner of the vehicle was driving. State v.
Richter, 765 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2000). Additionally, in People v.
Jones, 678 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that
[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary,
a police officer may reasonably suspect that a
vehicle is being driven by its registered
owner . . . [and that] [w]here information
gleaned from a computer check provides a basis
for the arrest or further investigation of the
registered owner of the vehicle, a police
officer may initiate an investigatory stop to
determine if the driver is the registered
owner of the vehicle.
In sum, our research reveals that when an officer knows that
a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a suspended
or revoked driver's license, the majority of jurisdictions have
held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop, absent evidence that the driver is not the
owner. See, e.g., State v. Tozier, 905 A.2d 836, 839 (Me. 2006)
(holding that “[a]lthough it is possible that a driver under
suspension could register a vehicle and that others . . . could
drive it, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the owner
is driving the vehicle, absent other circumstances that demonstrate
the owner is not driving”); accord State v. Mills, 458 N.W.2d 395,
397 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “[i]t was reasonable to
infer the vehicle was being driven by its owner given the absence
of evidence to the contrary”); accord State v. Panko, 788 P.2d
1026, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if an officer knows
that the owner's driver's license is suspended, “he may make a stop
. . . unless other circumstances put him 'on notice that the driver
is not the vehicle's owner'”).
(See footnote 1)
We are persuaded by the rationale
of the majority of jurisdictions and thus adopt the holding of the
majority of jurisdictions that when a police officer becomes aware
that a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a
suspended or revoked driver's license, and there is no evidence
appearing to the officer that the owner is not the individualdriving the automobile, reasonable suspicion exists to warrant an
investigatory stop.
After careful review of these cases and the facts of the case
before us, we hold that because Officer Doty knew Defendant was the
owner of the Pontiac and that Defendant's license had been
suspended, it was reasonable for Officer Doty, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, to infer that Defendant was driving the
automobile. Based on this inference, reasonable suspicion existed
for Officer Doty to make an investigatory stop to determine if
Defendant was operating the vehicle. Furthermore, because the
unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court support this
conclusion, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's
motion to suppress. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
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