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Criminal Law--election to proceed without counsel--defendant not properly informed
The trial court did not comply with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 during defendant's election to
proceed without counsel on charges of speeding in excess of fifteen miles per hour, and the
matter was remanded for a new trial. The court failed to properly inform defendant of the range
of permissible punishments when it failed to inform defendant that in addition to a maximum 60
day sentence for each charge, he also faced a maximum fine of $1,000 for each charge.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Robert D. Croom, for the State.
Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
On 1 January and 12 January 2006, defendant was issued
citations for speeding in excess of fifteen miles per hour. On 21
and 28 February 2006, defendant was convicted in Lenoir County
District Court on each of the charges. Thereafter, defendant
appealed both convictions to Lenoir County Superior Court.
On 27 March 2006, defendant made an initial appearance before
Superior Court Judge Kenneth Crow and signed a waiver of counsel
form. Following a trial on 8 May 2006 before Superior Court Judge
Thomas D. Haigwood, a jury found defendant guilty of both charges.
On 10 May 2006, Judge Haigwood imposed two consecutive thirty-day
suspended sentences and a total of six months' supervisedprobation. Defendant now appeals his convictions.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by allowing defendant to represent himself without
establishing that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as prescribed by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1242.
At the 27 March 2006 initial appearance, the trial court
inquired as to defendant's desire to be represented by counsel as
follows:
The Court: It appears that you were convicted of a
couple of speeding tickets and appealed
it to Superior Court; is that correct?
Defendant: Yes, I did.
The Court: All right. Both of the cases are class 2
misdemeanors. They carry up to 60 days
in jail. I wouldn't give you any jail
time on them even if the jury convicted
you because they're regular speeding
tickets, do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Have you hired a lawyer?
Defendant: No.
The Court: You can either hire a lawyer or you can
represent yourself, but you wouldn't be
eligible for court appointed counsel. And
the reason is because I wouldn't give you
any jail time even if you were convicted.
Do you understand that, sir?
Defendant: Uh-huh.
The Court: How would you like to proceed on your
charges?
Defendant: I wouldn't _- I'm going to represent
myself.
The Court: You'd like to represent yourself?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: I need you to sign a piece of paper that
says that, sir.
(Bailiff places a document before the defendant and the
defendant appears to sign the document.)
Defendant contends that the trial court's inquiry failed to
comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242, which
governs a defendant's election to proceed without counsel. This
statute provides as follows:
A defendant may be permitted at his election
to proceed in the trial of his case without
the assistance of counsel only after the trial
judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied
that the defendant:
(1) Has been clearly advised of his
right to the assistance of counsel,
including his right to the
assignment of counsel when he is so
entitled;
(2) Understands and appreciates the
consequences of this decision; and
(3) Comprehends the nature of the
charges and proceedings and the
range of permissible punishments.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2005).
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to meet these
statutory requirements when it erroneously informed defendant that
he was not entitled to appointed counsel. Specifically, defendant
asserts that the trial court's intention not to sentence defendant
to any jail time is not relevant to whether defendant is entitled
to appointment of counsel.
While the State asserts that the trial court complied withN.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 such that a new trial is not warranted,
it nevertheless concedes that the trial court improperly imposed
suspended sentences because defendant was not represented by
counsel. See State v. Neeley, 307 N.C. 247, 252, 297 S.E.2d 389,
393 (1982) (holding that where the crime for which the defendant
is charged carries a possible prison sentence of any length, the
judge may not impose an active prison sentence on the defendant
unless defendant has been afforded the opportunity to have counsel
represent him.); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674,
152 L. Ed. 2d 888, 906 (2002) (holding that a suspended sentence
that may result in actual imprisonment may not be imposed unless
defendant was represented by counsel in prosecution for the crime
charged). Accordingly, the State asserts that this Court should
remand for re-sentencing rather than for a new trial.
We agree with the State that the trial court was not permitted
to impose a suspended sentence in this case. Because defendant was
not represented by counsel, the sentencing judge was limited to a
community punishment and a monetary fine. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1340.23(b) (2005). However, we need not reach the issue of
whether defendant was improperly sentenced because we conclude that
the trial court failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242
such that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
First, the trial court failed to properly inform defendant
regarding the range of permissible punishments that he faced.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242(3) (2005). While the trial court
correctly informed defendant of the maximum 60-day imprisonmentpenalty for a Class 2 misdemeanor, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-
141(j1) and 15A-1340.23(c), it failed to inform defendant that he
also faced a maximum $1,000.00 fine for each of the charges. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.23(b) (2005).
Furthermore, the trial court's conclusion that defendant was
not entitled to appointed counsel was also erroneous. An indigent
defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel for [a]ny case in
which imprisonment, or a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00), or
more, is likely to be adjudged. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1)
(2005). Regardless of whether defendant was likely to face a term
of imprisonment in this case, we conclude that defendant did face
a fine of greater than $500.00 for each of the charges. Because
the sentencing options in this case were limited to a community
sentence and a fine for the reasons discussed above, the
possibility of the imposition of such a fine was likely in this
case, especially given that the total maximum possible fine was
$2,000.00 and defendant had been charged with the same speeding
offense not once, but twice on two separate occasions. Given the
likelihood of a fine greater than $500.00, defendant would have
been entitled to the appointment of counsel if it had been
determined that he was indigent. As such, the trial court failed
to properly advise defendant of his right to the assignment of
counsel. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242(1) (2005). Consequently, we
conclude that the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1242.
Although we recognize that defendant signed a written waiver,[t]he execution of a written waiver of the right to assistance of
counsel does not abrogate the trial court's responsibility to
ensure the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 are
fulfilled. State v. Evans, 153 N.C. App. 313, 316, 569 S.E.2d
673, 675 (2002). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand
the cause for a new trial.
Reversed and Remanded.
Judges WYNN and BRYANT concur.
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