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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 February 2007
IRENE MAYO and RONALD MAYO,
Co-Administrators of the
Estate of CHRISTOPHER J.
N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. TA-17544
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Appeal by Plaintiffs from decision and order entered 18 August
2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 21 September 2006.
Law Offices of Wade Byrd, P.A., by Gerald F. Meek, for
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.
On 9 July 1999, Christopher J. Mayo (Decedent) was examined
by Dr. Mohammad Abu-Salha at Duplin-Sampson Mental Health (Duplin-
Sampson) after complaints that he [had] been unhappy and
depressed and having confrontations with the family. Dr. Abu-
Salha diagnosed Decedent with major depression and a family
conflict . . . relational . . . problem[.] As a result of his
diagnosis, Dr. Abu-Salha recommended treatment with Prozac,
counseling, and family therapy. Decedent was treated by doctors atDuplin-Sampson for approximately four months when his family
decided to stop treatment because, [t]hings had gotten normal
again and Decedent had started acting like himself[.]
However, over time, Decedent's problems and the conflict with
his family recurred and, on 9 June 2000, he was examined by Dr.
Ralph Berg at Cherry Hospital. At the conclusion of his
evaluation, Dr. Berg found that Decedent was [m]entally ill;
[d]angerous to self; and [d]angerous to others[;] and
recommended that Decedent be involuntarily committed. Decedent was
treated at Cherry Hospital between 9 June and 15 June 2000. During
this time, staff noted that Decedent was not suicidal, homicidal,
depressed, or manic. Decedent participated in the ward routine,
was involved in groups, and did not display any aggressive or
inappropriate behaviors. During a conference with staff,
Decedent's family agreed that an outpatient commitment was the
desirable plan of treatment. While Decedent was hospitalized at
Cherry, his treatment team developed an Aftercare Plan for
Community Follow Up. This plan recommended that Decedent (1)
receive weekly individual and family therapy, (2) would benefit
from participation in anger management groups, (3) receive weekly
substance abuse treatment, (4) pursue an alternative living
arrangement, and (5) receive case management to ensure the
utilization of all available resources. This plan was signed by
Decedent and his father and was forwarded to the staff at Duplin-
Sampson. On 12 June 2000, after a twenty-minute meeting with Decedent,
Dr. Martin Williams, Decedent's attending psychiatrist, determined
that Decedent denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation, did not
suffer from psychosis, and that an outpatient commitment was
appropriate. Decedent was discharged from Cherry Hospital on 15
June 2000. Once Decedent was discharged from Cherry Hospital and
Duplin-Sampson was made aware of his status, Decedent's care became
the responsibility of Duplin-Sampson.
On 23 June 2000, Decedent became angry and made a reference to
committing suicide. Later that day, Dr. Abu-Salha conducted a
suicide risk assessment on Decedent and determined that removing
him from home would reduce [the] risk [of suicide] greatly. After
staying with family friends for several days, Decedent returned
home. On 8 July 2000, Decedent and his parents had several
arguments regarding Decedent's failure to regularly take his
medication and other family issues. After one argument had
escalated, Decedent's father started to call a hotline to begin the
process to have Decedent involuntarily committed once again.
Before he could place the call, Decedent walked . . . into the
kitchen and . . . pull[ed] out a kitchen knife. Decedent then
stabbed himself in the chest. Although Decedent was immediately
treated by his family and eventually by emergency medical
personnel, he died as a result of the self-inflicted knife wounds.
He was fifteen years old.
On 17 June 2002, Ronald L. Mayo, Decedent's father, filed a
claim against Defendant under the Tort Claims Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 143-291, et. seq., seeking damages in the amount of $1.75 million
as a result of Defendant's alleged negligence in the death of
(See footnote 1)
By an answer signed 2 July 2002, Defendant denied
liability, and the case was heard on 24 March 2004 before Deputy
Commissioner George T. Glenn, II of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission. In a decision and order filed 23 July 2004, Deputy
Commissioner Glenn concluded that [t]here was no negligence on the
part of any named officer, employee or agent of the State . . .
which proximately caused decedent's death. Deputy Commissioner
Glenn therefore denied Plaintiffs' claim for damages. On 3 August
2004, Plaintiffs gave notice of appeal to the Full Commission. The
case was then heard by the Full Commission on 7 February 2005 and,
in a decision and order filed 18 August 2005, the Full Commission
also denied Plaintiffs' claim. For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the decision of the Full Commission.
The standard of review under the Tort Claims Act is well
settled. [W]hen considering an appeal from the Commission, our
Court is limited to two questions: (1) whether competent evidence
exists to support the Commission's findings of fact, and (2)
whether the Commission's findings of fact justify its conclusions
of law and decision. Simmons v. N.C. DOT, 128 N.C. App. 402, 405-
06, 496 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1998) (citing Bailey v. N.C. Dep't ofMental Health, 272 N.C. 680, 159 S.E.2d 28 (1968)). Additionally,
our Supreme Court has held that when this Court reviews a decision
of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, we do 'not have the
right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of
its weight. The court's duty goes no further than to determine
whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the
finding.' Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530
S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co.,
265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965) (citation omitted)).
Findings of fact not assigned as error are presumed to be supported
by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Anderson
Chevrolet/Olds, Inc. v. Higgins, 57 N.C. App. 650, 292 S.E.2d 159
By their first assignment of error, Plaintiffs argue that the
Full Commission erred in finding as fact that Dr. Berg did not
note any suicide risk[.] Plaintiffs argue further that this
finding constitutes reversible error because the Full Commission's
conclusion of law that the conduct of Defendant was not the
proximate cause of Decedent's death was predicated in part on this
alleged erroneous finding. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that
because there was evidence presented at the hearing that Dr. Berg
did note a risk of suicide on Decedent's part, the Full Commission
erred in finding to the contrary. We disagree.
Based on precedent established by this Court and our Supreme
Court, we must determine if the challenged finding of fact issupported by competent evidence presented at the hearing.
Plaintiffs take issue with the finding that Dr. Berg did not note
any suicide risk[;] however, this sentence is only part of the
finding made by the Full Commission. To accurately evaluate the
propriety of the finding, we must examine it in its entirety, which
is as follows: Dr. Berg did not note any suicide risk and no
problems were noticed while decedent was on the ward over the
weekend. (Emphasis added).
To support their position that contrary evidence was offered
before the Full Commission, Plaintiffs direct our attention to Dr.
Berg's initial Examination and Recommendation to Determine
Necessity for Involuntary Commitment[.] After completing the
commitment evaluation, Dr. Berg determined that Decedent should be
admitted to Cherry Hospital, in part because he was [d]angerous to
self[.] Plaintiffs argue that because Dr. Berg marked that
Decedent was [d]angerous to self on the commitment form, he
necessarily noted a risk of suicide. We find this contention
On the Involuntary Commitment form and in accord with N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)a (1999), dangerous to himself is defined
to mean that
[w]ithin the recent past: (a) the individual
has acted in such as way as to show: (1) that
he would be unable without care, supervision,
and the continued assistance of others not
otherwise available, to exercise self-control,
judgement [sic], and discretion in the conduct
of his daily responsibilities and social
relations or to satisfy his need for
nourishment, personal or medical care,
shelter, or self-protection and safety; and(2) that there is a reasonable probability of
his suffering serious physical debilitation
within the near future unless adequate
treatment is given . . . or (b) the individual
has attempted suicide or threatened suicide
and that there is a reasonable probability of
suicide unless adequate treatment is given; or
(c) the individual has mutilated himself or
attempted to mutilate himself and that there
is a reasonable probability of serious self-
mutilation unless adequate treatment is given.
Therefore, Dr. Berg's assessment that Decedent was [d]angerous to
self does not necessarily signify that he believed Decedent was
suicidal. That is, Dr. Berg may have noted that Decedent was
[d]angerous to self based on other statutory criteria.
Moreover, after completing his Initial Psychiatric
Evaluation[,] Dr. Berg reported that Decedent [d]enies suicidal
or homicidal ideations. Has thought about death in the past, [but]
would never hurt himself. The Full Commission's finding is
further supported by Dr. Berg's Initial Treatment Plan which
indicated that Decedent would be admitted to be further evaluated
by [a] [p]sychiatrist in [the] morning for initiation of
medication, which does not appear to be a requisition at this point
in time[,] and his recommendation that the [l]evel of care be
[r]outine. In addition, once Decedent was admitted to the
hospital, there is no evidence that while he was on the ward over
the weekend[,] he exhibited any indications of a risk of suicide.
On the contrary, the evidence showed that while Decedent was
admitted at Cherry Hospital, he was not psychotic nor was he
suicidal or homicidal. There were no symptoms of depression or
mania. Decedent did not display any aggressive or inappropriatebehaviors on the ward. . . . He was not physically [a]ggressive at
all. Therefore, there is competent evidence to support the Full
Commission's finding. As this finding in turn provides support for
the Full Commission's conclusion of law that the conduct of
Defendant was not the proximate cause of Decedent's death, we
overrule this assignment of error.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Full Commission erred in
finding the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Dulmus, as to a
violation of the standard of care by June Waller [Decedent's
treating social worker] to be unpersuasive and not supported by the
greater weight of the evidence. Plaintiffs also challenge the
Full Commission's finding that plaintiffs failed to prove by the
greater weight of the evidence that defendant's officers, agents
and employees deviated from the standard of care in their provision
of services to the decedent. We disagree.
With regard to Dr. Dulmus's testimony, because the Full
Commission made their determination based on the amount of evidence
presented and the weight they assigned to that evidence, we conduct
our review to determine if there is competent evidence in the
record tending to support the finding at issue.
Once again, Plaintiffs have assigned error to only part of the
finding made by the Full Commission regarding its evaluation of Dr.
Dulmus's testimony. In its entirety, Finding of Fact 20 reads:
Plaintiff presented Catherine Norton
Dulmus, Ph.D, CSW, ACSW, as an expert witness
in social work. Ms. Dulmus, however, has never
been licensed as a social worker in the Stateof North Carolina, had never been to Cherry
Hospital, had not reviewed the policies and
procedures for social workers at Cherry
Hospital, and had no knowledge as to whether
or not the adolescent unit at Cherry Hospital
was similar to the facilities at which she
worked in New York. Ms. Dulmus testified that
she believed the bio-social assessments at
Cherry Hospital were below accepted practices
and standards. In the year 2000, when the
assessment for decedent was done, Ms. Dulmus
did not review a psycho-social assessment done
in North Carolina. Ms. Dulmus was not familiar
with the social work policies, practices and
procedures at the adolescent units at Dorothea
Dix Hospital, Broughton Hospital, or John
Umstead Hospital, nor did she review any of
the North Carolina mental health policies and
procedures for social work in its State
facilities. Ms. Dulmus was not aware of any of
the North Carolina policies and procedures on
treatment team planning that were in place in
2000, and specifically was not aware of what
services were available for residential
treatment in North Carolina in June of 2000.
Her social work experience in inpatient
facilities was not done in North Carolina. Ms.
Dulmus was not aware of how many counties fell
within the Cherry Hospital catchment area. The
Commission finds Ms. Dulmus' [sic] testimony
as to a violation of the standard of care by
June Waller to be unpersuasive and not
supported by the greater weight of the
Read in whole, it is clear that the Full Commission found Dr.
Dulmus's testimony to be unpersuasive because of her lack of
familiarity with the practices of social workers in North Carolina
and in particular at Cherry Hospital. The uncontested portions of
Finding of Fact 20 clearly support the Full Commission's ultimate
finding that Dr. Dulmus's testimony was not persuasive. Moreover,
even if the entire finding had been contested, a thorough review of
all the evidence presented at the hearing establishes that theentire finding is supported by the testimony of Dr. Dulmus.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' argument is without merit.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Full Commission erred in not
finding the expert testimony of Dr. Dulmus credible because her
testimony was unopposed. That is, because Defendant presented no
expert witnesses regarding the standard of care applied to social
workers in North Carolina and Ms. Waller's adherence to that
standard, Plaintiffs argue that the testimony of their expert
witness carried their burden. Defendant asserts that it did
present expert testimony rebutting Plaintiffs' expert. However,
even if that were not the case, Plaintiffs' argument in this regard
would fail because [u]ncontradicted expert testimony is not
binding on the trier of fact. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291,
442 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1994). Questions of credibility and weight
still are the province of the Commission, which may accept or
reject all the testimony of a witness. Lineback v. Wake County Bd.
of Comm'rs, 126 N.C. App. 678, 486 S.E.2d 252 (1997).
Although the Full Commission made no findings on the
credibility of Defendant's expert's testimony regarding Ms.
Waller's alleged violation of the standard of care applied to
social workers in North Carolina, the Full Commission nonetheless
determined, as was its prerogative, that Plaintiffs' experts were
not persuasive and, consequently, that Plaintiffs had not met their
burden of proving a violation of the applicable standard of care.
Moreover, while Plaintiffs argue further that the Full Commission
was required to make findings as to why they found Dr. Dulmus'stestimony unpersuasive, this contention is not supported by the law
of our State. See, e.g., Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553
(citation omitted) ([T]he Commission does not have to explain its
findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or
witnesses it finds credible). Nevertheless, Finding of Fact 20,
listed above in its entirety, clearly and thoroughly details the
Full Commission's rationale for discounting Dr. Dulmus's testimony.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' argument is without merit and is
Plaintiffs also argue that the finding of the Full Commission
that plaintiffs failed to prove by the greater weight of the
evidence that [June Waller] deviated from the standard of care in
[her] provision of services to the decedent constitutes reversible
error. We likewise find this contention without merit.
Under the Tort Claims Act, '[t]he burden of proof as to
[negligence is] on the plaintiff. Evidence is usually not required
in order to establish and justify a finding that a party has failed
to prove that which he affirmatively asserts. It usually occurs
and is based on the absence or lack of evidence.' Drewry v. N.C.
DOT, 168 N.C. App. 332, 337, 607 S.E.2d 342, 346 (quoting Bailey v.
N.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 2 N.C. App. 645, 651, 163 S.E.2d 652,
656 (1968)), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 410, 612 S.E.2d 318
As stated above, while the Full Commission made no findings on
the credibility of Defendant's expert's testimony regarding Ms.
Waller's alleged violation of the standard of care applied tosocial workers in North Carolina, Plaintiffs' experts were not
found to be credible. Therefore, acting as the trier of the facts,
it was permissible for the Full Commission to discount the
testimony of Plaintiffs' experts. Melton v. City of Rocky Mount,
118 N.C. App. 249, 256, 454 S.E.2d 704, 709 (The Industrial
Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony) (citing Hilliard v.
Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682 (1982)), disc.
review denied, 340 N.C. 568, 460 S.E.2d 319 (1995). Accordingly,
before the Full Commission, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of proof. This assignment of error is overruled.
By their final assignment of error, Plaintiffs argue that the
Full Commission erred by concluding that Decedent's death was not
proximately caused by any negligence on the part of any named
officer, employee or agent of the State of North Carolina while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, service,
agency, or authority. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the
Full Commission misapplied the concept of proximate causation as
evidenced by their finding that it was not reasonably foreseeable
upon discharging decedent to an outpatient commitment . . . that
decedent would injure himself by committing suicide[.] We do not
agree. On the contrary, because we believe the Full Commission
applied the correct test to determine the issue of proximate cause
and because there were sufficient findings of fact to support theFull Commission's conclusion of law, this assignment of error is
Foreseeable injury is a requisite of proximate cause, which
is, in turn, a requisite for actionable negligence. Barefoot v.
, 270 N.C. 388, 393-94, 154 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1967) (
Osborne v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., Inc.
, 207 N.C. 545, 177 S.E.
North Carolina appellate courts define
proximate cause as a cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
and independent cause, produced the
plaintiff's injuries, and without which the
injuries would not have occurred, and one from
which a person of ordinary prudence could have
reasonably foreseen that such a result, or
consequences of a generally injurious nature,
was probable under all the facts as they
Williamson v. Liptzin
, 141 N.C. App. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 313, 319
(2000) (quoting Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co.
, 310 N.C.
227, 233, 311 S.E.2d 559, 565 (1984) (citations omitted)), disc.
, 353 N.C. 456, 548 S.E.2d 734 (2001)
. The plaintiff
need not prove the defendant foresaw the exact injury which
occurred. Taylor v. Interim Healthcare of Raleigh-Durham, Inc.
154 N.C. App. 349, 354, 574 S.E.2d 11, 15 (2002) (citation
omitted), disc. review denied
, 356 N.C. 695, 579 S.E.2d 102 (2003).
In its Conclusion of Law 2, the Full Commission stated:
Proximate cause is a cause which in the
natural and continuous sequence produced the
plaintiff's injury, without which the injury
would not have occurred and one from which a
person of ordinary prudence could have
reasonably foreseen that consequences of an
injurious nature would result under all the
facts as they existed. Hairston v. AlexanderTank & Equipment Co.
, 310 N.C. 227, 311 S.E.2d
558 (1984). Foreseeability is a requisite of
proximate cause. Nance v. Parks
, 266 N.C. 206,
146 S.E.2d 24 (1966). To prove forseeability,
plaintiffs must show that defendant might
have foreseen that some injury would result
from his act or omission, or that consequences
of a generally injurious nature might have
been expected. Williamson
at 10, 539 S.E.2d
at 319. While the element of foreseeability is
necessary to reach proximate cause, the
defendant is not required to foresee events
which are merely possible but only those which
are reasonably foreseeable. Id.
at 11 (citing
Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co.
). The court in Williamson
If the connection between negligence
and the injury appears unnatural,
unreasonable and improbable in the
light of common experience, the
negligence, if deemed a cause of the
injury at all, is to be considered
remote rather than a proximate
cause. It imposes too heavy a
responsibility for negligence to
hold the [tort-feasor] responsible
for what is unusual and unlikely to
happen or for what was only remotely
and slightly possible.
It is clear that the test applied by the Full Commission meets the
standard to determine proximate cause as established by our
appellate courts. Therefore, the Full Commission did not misapply
the concept of proximate cause, as argued by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs additionally argue that the Commission applied this
test incorrectly by focusing only on whether suicide was reasonably
foreseeable, rather than whether some injury was reasonably
foreseeable. However, in their brief to this Court, the thrust of
Plaintiffs' argument is directed at the foreseeability of suicide.
Therefore, in light of the nature of Plaintiffs' argument, we
cannot conclude that the Commission erred by focusing on theforeseeability of suicide specifically, rather than some injury
Further, as Plaintiffs assign error only to the Full
Commission's conclusion of law that Defendant's alleged negligence
was not the proximate cause of Decedent's death, we need only
determine if the contested conclusion is supported by the Full
Commission's findings of fact. Because Plaintiffs do not assign
error to relevant findings of fact made by the Commission, those
findings are binding on appeal. Anderson Chevrolet/Olds, Inc.
N.C. App. at 653, 292 S.E.2d at 161.
In this case, we believe the following uncontested findings of
fact support the Full Commission's challenged conclusion on
8. The report on decedent was routine without
any indication for suicide precautions. Dr.
Williams did note that decedent cried while on
the telephone, which is fairly common for
adolescents who are admitted. Dr. Williams
spoke with decedent the morning of June 12,
2000 and reviewed with him the information
from Dr. Jennings' commitment and referral, as
well as Dr. Berg's assessment and the
information that one of the hospital nurses
collected. Dr. Williams specifically asked
decedent about Mr. Mayo's allegations that
decedent struck his brother and used drugs.
Decedent responded, Well, they're trying to
get me some help and the only way they can get
me in anywhere is if I'm a danger to myself or
someone else. And I said 'So what would happen
if I punched my brother?' Decedent also
stated, I love my brother and I don't want to
do anything to hurt him, but this is what was
said that we had to do to get some help.
Decedent stated that he tried cocaine five
times over a year before, that he used
marijuana three to four weeks prior to
admission, that he did not drink much, and
that he did not have any alcohol in theimmediate preceding time. Decedent's blood
test results of June 13, 2000, confirmed that
he did not have any cocaine, alcohol, or
marijuana in his system and did not have a
history of heavy alcohol abuse.
9. Dr. Williams performed a suicide risk
assessment of decedent on June 12, 2000.
Decedent denied any suicidal ideations.
Decedent said he made one statement that
others interpreted to be suicidal, but that he
would never hurt himself. Decedent said
several weeks earlier, after an argument with
his father, they will find me by the side of
the road. Neither decedent nor his brother,
who heard this statement, considered it a
suicide threat. In fact, decedent's brother,
Ronald Mayo, Jr., never heard decedent make
any suicidal threats. Decedent never made any
plans for suicide, like saving up medications
or identifying a firearm. Dr. Williams found
decedent had passive thoughts about suicide,
as opposed to active thoughts. Decedent's
only other violent act toward another person
occurred over a year earlier when decedent
pushed his mother onto a bed after she slapped
him during an argument. Decedent also admitted
he broke a window with his fist during an
argument with his father. Dr. Williams
considered decedent's drug use a high-risk
indicator but determined from the blood tests
and decedent's statements that the drug use
indicator was outweighed by other factors,
including decedent's verbalized desire to
continue with treatment, his relationship with
his girlfriend, his lack of physical health
problems, his age and gender, and a mental
health diagnosis of oppositional defiance
disorder as opposed to major depression. Dr.
Williams found that decedent did not meet the
diagnostic criteria for major depressive
disorder, which would be a key risk factor for
10. Dr. Williams met with decedent every day
for 20 minutes from their first meeting on
Monday, June 12, 2000, until decedent's
discharge on Thursday, June 15, 2000. In
addition, Dr. Williams was on the ward four to
five hours per day and was able to observe and
evaluate decedent's actions. Decedent's charts
showed that he was eating and sleeping
normally, was taking care of his personal
needs, and was interacting appropriately withothers. Decedent had one argument with his
father on June 14, 2000 and threw a soda can,
but decedent was easily redirected.
. . . .
12. An Aftercare Plan for Community Follow-up
was developed for decedent and was sent to
Duplin-Sampson. Pursuant to that plan,
decedent was to receive weekly individual
therapy, group anger management therapy,
substance abuse therapy included in the weekly
therapy, and in-home therapy as an option. The
Plan also indicated that there had been a
problem with compliance and that if the Plan
was not working, alternate living arrangements
were to be considered for decedent. Decedent,
his father, and Dr. Williams, June Waller and
Lula Newkirk, the members of decedent's
treatment team, signed the Aftercare Plan. The
Aftercare Plan was then sent to
13. On June 15, 2000, Ms. Waller met with
decedent and his father for a discharge
conference. Ms. Waller discussed the family's
need to work on communication, as well as the
parents' need to pick their battles with
decedent. Based on her contact with decedent,
Ms. Waller did not feel that decedent was a
risk for suicide. While Ms. Waller felt
decedent had some anger management problems,
she could not predict that decedent would
become violent after being discharged. Ms.
Waller hoped decedent and his family would
become involved in therapy, utilize available
services, and develop appropriate methods of
dealing with anger and communicating with each
These findings, uncontested by Plaintiffs, clearly support a
determination that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Decedent
would commit suicide or harm himself in any way. Therefore, the
Full Commission did not err in concluding that Decedent's death
was not proximately caused by any negligence on the part of
Defendant. This assignment of error is overruled. For all of the reasons stated, the decision and order of the
Full Commission is
Judges STEELMAN and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Although Irene Mayo, Decedent's mother, was not named on the
original claim form included in the Record on Appeal, she is listed
as a Plaintiff on every court document thereafter. Therefore, we
will refer to the complaining party in the plural.
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