IN THE MATTER OF:
A.V.
I.V.
S.D. Harnett County
T.T. Nos. 04 J 221-225
C.Y.
E. Marshall Woodall; and Duncan B. McCormick, for Harnett
County Department of Social Services petitioner-appellee.
Peter Wood for Efren V. respondent-father appellant.
Annick Lenoir-Peek for Susan V. respondent-mother appellant.
Elizabeth Myrick Boone for guardian ad litem.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
A.V., I.V., and Z.T. are the minor children of Efren V.
(“respondent-father”) and Susan V. (“respondent-mother). C.T. and
S.D. are the minor children of respondent-mother, and their fathers
are not parties to the instant appeal. On 9 December 2004 the
Harnett County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed juvenile
petitions alleging that the minor children were neglected juveniles
and on 18 March 2005 the children were adjudicated neglected
finding that the children had been exposed to domestic violence and
unsanitary conditions. The court ordered respondents to participatein the services included in the family case services plan and child
medical evaluations, to cooperate with the child support office and
social workers, to complete a psychological evaluation, and to
participate in the Re-entry program and the HALT program.
Respondent-father was further ordered to participate in a sex
offender's class.
On 26 August 2005, the trial court conducted a review hearing
and found that respondents failed to make adequate progress even
though they had the opportunity to do more than they accomplished
and that further efforts would be futile and inconsistent with the
children's safety and need for a safe and permanent home. The court
further terminated visitation between respondents and the children,
finding that the continuation of visitation would be contrary to
the welfare of the children.
Respondents appeal.
Both respondents contend on appeal that the trial court erred
in finding and concluding that DSS should cease reunification
efforts between the parents and their children. We disagree.
We review a trial court's findings of fact to determine
whether they are supported by competent evidence; if so, they are
binding on appeal, even if there is evidence that would support a
finding to the contrary. In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581
S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003). When, as in this case, a respondent has not
assigned error to specific findings of fact, those findings are
deemed supported by competent evidence and are conclusive onappeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731
(1991).
On appeal,
All dispositional orders of the trial court
after abuse, neglect and dependency hearings
must contain findings of fact based upon the
credible evidence presented at the hearing. If
the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by competent evidence, they are
conclusive on appeal. In a permanency planning
hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the trial
court can only order the cessation of
reunification efforts when it finds facts
based upon credible evidence presented at the
hearing that support its conclusion of law to
cease reunification efforts.
Weiler, 158 N.C. App. at 477, 581 S.E.2d at 137 (citations
omitted). “The purpose of the permanency planning hearing shall be
to develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the
juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-907(a) (2005). A trial court may order that reunification
efforts with a child's parents cease when the court finds as fact
that “[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be
inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a
safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2005).
Here the trial court found there is a long history of social
service involvement with this family, including problems in Florida
involving allegations of sexual abuse, domestic violence and
improper care. Respondent-father was ordered by the court to
participate in a sexual offender assessment prior to being allowed
to have any visitation with his children which he has failed to do.Respondents entered into a family services agreement but have
failed to comply with the agreement. Both respondents failed to
regularly attend Re-entry and HALT programs which they were ordered
to attend and the services were subsequently closed to them.
Respondents were required to attend psychological evaluations;
however, while five were scheduled only one was attended and even
then testing was not completed due to failure to cooperate. No
child support has been paid, respondents have failed to obtain a
residence or employment, and since the removal of the children from
the home, respondent-father has been charged and convicted of
domestic violence against the mother.
Respondents contended that the failure to attend the ordered
evaluations and services was due to a lack of transportation and
money; however, respondent-mother was able to find transportation
to all visitations. DSS sustained the cost of the Re-entry program
which respondents failed to attend, and respondent-mother testified
that respondents did not attend evaluation sessions because they
did not need it.
The trial court's findings of fact amply support its
determination that further reunification efforts would be futile.
See In re M.J.G., 168 N.C. App. 638, 649, 608 S.E.2d 813, 820
(2005) (finding reunification efforts futile where the trial court
found the mother failed to utilize offered services); In re D.J.D.,
D.M.D., S.J.D., J.M.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32
(2005) (finding reunification efforts futile where respondent hadnot cooperated with DSS). Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Respondents further argue on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding and concluding that visitation
between the minor children and respondents be ceased. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) (2005) specifically states in part
that:
Any dispositional order under which a juvenile
is removed from the custody of a parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker, or under
which the juvenile's placement is continued
outside the home shall provide for appropriate
visitation as may be in the best interests of
the juvenile and consistent with the
juvenile's health and safety. If the juvenile
is placed in the custody or placement
responsibility of a county department of
social services, the court may order the
director to arrange, facilitate, and supervise
a visitation plan expressly approved by the
court. If the director subsequently makes a
good faith determination that the visitation
plan may not be in the best interests of the
juvenile or consistent with the juvenile's
health and safety, the director may
temporarily suspend all or part of the
visitation plan. The director shall not be
subjected to any motion to show cause for this
suspension, but shall expeditiously file a
motion for review.
Id.
The trial court found, and respondents did not except to such
findings, that the children were progressing well and thriving in
foster care; respondent-father has not visited the children due to
failure to comply with a court order that he attend a sexual
offender's assessment before being allowed to visit the children;
and that respondent-mother has visited the children but hasproblems in being able to meet the needs of all the children during
the visits.
The trial court further found that continuing DSS custody of
the juveniles was in the best interest of the children and that
continuing visitation would be contrary to the welfare of the
children. While these findings of fact do not explicitly state
that ceasing respondents' visitation rights with the minor children
is in the children's “best interest” (the language used by the
above statute), they do clearly imply that such is the case. Thus,
the trial court's conclusion that such visitation be ceased is not
an abuse of its discretion, and this assignment of error is
overruled.
Respondent-father further contends that the trial court erred
in entering an order which failed to comply with the requirements
set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906. We disagree.
Specifically, respondent-father contends that the trial
court's order did not comply with the statutory mandate set forth
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906 where it did not make findings as to
each and every factor set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(c).
However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(c) only requires that a trial
court make written findings regarding the relevant criteria. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(c) (2005). A review of the trial court's order
clearly reveals that the trial court made the necessary findings in
regard to reunification, efforts for a plan for other methods of
care, reports on placements and services offered to the juveniles,the visitation plan, and foster care. Therefore, this assignment of
error is overruled.
The remainder of respondents' assignments of error were not
briefed on appeal; and thus, according to N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)
(2005), they are abandoned.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court ceasing
reunification efforts and visitation rights between respondents and
the minor children is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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