STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Randolph County
No. 04 CRS 52054
GWENDOLYN L. MOOREHEAD
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.
Paul F. Herzog for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Gwendolyn L. Moorehead (“defendant”) appeals a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of first-degree
murder. We find no error.
On 25 March 2004, following an argument, the defendant stabbed
Shelton Little (“the victim”), her live-in boyfriend.
Specifically, defendant stabbed the victim twice _ once in the
lower right calf and once in the chest. As a result, the knife
wound to the victim's chest perforated his heart and he died a
short time later. The defendant and victim had been engaged in a
stormy relationship for approximately one year prior to the
victim's death, and during that time had fought on a number of
occasions. At trial, the State presented evidence that the victim planned
to move from an apartment he shared with defendant because he was
tired of the constant fighting between them. The victim told the
apartment manager he was moving out, and arranged to be picked up
by a friend. On the day he was killed, the victim hosted a dinner
for his twin five-year old grandsons at the apartment. Defendant
arrived home between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. and consumed one beer
and one Canadian Mist drink. The victim had been drinking during
the day and had cooked a spaghetti dinner. After the defendant
arrived home, Vidal Sowers (“Sowers”) and Keisha Coble (“Coble”)
arrived to visit the victim and show him their new baby. The
victim's daughter, Bridgette, arrived shortly thereafter.
Defendant testified that she went into the bathroom after
Bridgette arrived and that the victim followed her there. She
stated that the two argued over the victim's guests. She stated
that the victim accused her of paying too much attention to Sowers.
“I was using the bathroom, and he just kind of, you know, hit me in
the head, just pushed my head back,” defendant stated. Defendant
testified that she then walked out onto the back porch and remained
there until the guests left. She and the victim began arguing
again, and the victim announced he was moving out of the apartment.
Defendant demanded the victim's house key, and he refused to turn
it over. She then said, “[Y]ou ain't going no mother-fucking-
where.” Defendant testified that the victim began beating her, and
that she stabbed him twice in self-defense. Defendant stated that
she then called 911, but hung up at the victim's request. She thendisposed of the victim's bloody clothes. When she returned, the
phone rang, and it was the 911 operator calling her back. “. . . I
told them . . . I meant to call 411,” she stated. Defendant then
went to the bathroom intending to take a bath, but returned to the
bedroom before turning the water on in the bath tub. There, she
found the victim gasping. Defendant again called 911, but this time
she told the operator that a group of Mexicans had stabbed the
victim. When paramedics arrived, the victim was dead.
Tammy Locklear (“Locklear”), who lived next door to the
defendant and the victim, testified that she observed defendant
sitting on her back porch on the evening of 25 March 2005. She
reported hearing an argument between defendant and the victim. She
stated that was not unusual because, “[T]hey fussed a lot. But this
time it was a bit louder,” Locklear stated. Locklear testified
that she heard defendant shouting at the victim in a “hateful”
tone, telling the victim that he was not going anywhere. Locklear
then heard the back door slam. She went inside to check on some
food she was cooking, and when she returned, defendant was sitting
on the back porch. “[N]ormally, it didn't matter how much they
argued, [defendant] always spoke to me or my daughter Joanne,
because my daughter Joanne always spoke to [defendant]. She didn't
even acknowledge we were even in the world, even that the kids were
out even playing.”
Following her trial in Randolph County Superior Court, a jury
found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Judge V. Bradford
Long entered judgment upon the jury verdict, sentencing defendantto life imprisonment without parole in the custody of the North
Carolina Department of Correction. From the judgment entered upon
the guilty verdict, defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant initially argues that the court erred in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that the indictment was constitutionally defective, thereby
depriving the court of jurisdiction to try and sentence defendant.
Specifically, defendant argues that the indictment was insufficient
in that it failed to allege the elements of first-degree murder.
Defendant concedes that this issue is brought forth on appeal as a
preservation issue, as our courts have consistently upheld the
validity of short-form indictments.
The bill of indictment returned by the grand jury in this case
stated: “The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on
or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above
the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously and
of malice aforethought did kill and murder Shelton Henry Little.”
This indictment complies with the statutory demands for a murder
indictment as set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. . 15-144 (2005), which
states:
In indictments for murder and manslaughter, it
is not necessary to allege matter not required
to be proved on the trial; but in the body of
the indictment, after naming the person
accused, and the county of his residence, the
date of the offense, the averment “with force
and arms,” and the county of the alleged
commission of the offense, as is now usual, it
is sufficient in describing murder to allege
that the accused person feloniously,
willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did
kill and murder (naming the person killed),and concluding as is now required by law; and
it is sufficient in describing manslaughter to
allege that the accused feloniously and
willfully did kill and slay (naming the person
killed), and concluding as aforesaid; and any
bill of indictment containing the averments
and allegations herein named shall be good and
sufficient in law as an indictment for murder
or manslaughter, as the case may be.
Id. Our Supreme Court “has consistently held that indictments for
murder based on the short-form indictment statute are in compliance
with both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions.”
State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174, 531 S.E.2d 428, 437 (2000). In
Braxton, the Court rejected the argument that an indictment for
first-degree murder must specifically allege premeditation and
deliberation, determining that N.C. Gen. Stat. . 15-144 did not
violate the constitutional commands articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
(holding that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). In
doing so, the Court rejected the exact argument being advanced by
defendant in the case sub judice. Accordingly, this assignment of
error is overruled.
Defendant lastly argues that the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder at the close of all
evidence due to insufficiency of evidence. Our courts have
established the following practice in reviewing a trial court's
denial of a motion to dismiss:
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial
court must examine the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the State, giving the State
the benefit of all reasonable inferences which
may be drawn from the evidence. State v.
Hodge, 112 N.C. App. 462, 465, 436 S.E.2d 251,
253 (1993). The court must determine whether
substantial evidence supports each essential
element of the offense and the defendant's
perpetration of that offense. State v.
McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 29, 460 S.E.2d 163,
168 (1995). If so, the motion must be denied
and the case submitted to the jury. State v.
Styles, 93 N.C. App. 596, 602, 379 S.E.2d 255,
260 (1989). 'Substantial evidence' is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 87, 277
S.E.2d 376, 384 (1981).
State v. Hairston, 137 N.C. App. 352, 354, 528 S.E.2d 29, 30
(2000).
North Carolina defines first-degree murder as follows, in
relevant part:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means
of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon
of mass destruction as defined in G.S.
14-288.21, poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any
other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex
offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or
other felony committed or attempted with the
use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree, a Class A felony,
and any person who commits such murder shall
be punished with death or imprisonment in the
State's prison for life without parole as the
court shall determine pursuant to G.S.
15A-2000, except that any such person who was
under 17 years of age at the time of the
murder shall be punished with imprisonment in
the State's prison for life without parole.
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-17 (2005). Here, defendant contends that the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, does not support the jury's
finding that she killed the victim after premeditation and
deliberation. We disagree.
Defendant argues that the cases of State v. Corn, 303 N.C.
293, 278 S.E.2d 221 (1981), and State v. Williams, 144 N.C. App.
526, 548 S.E.2d 802 (2001) require this Court to reverse her
conviction. In both cases, the Courts reversed defendant's first-
degree murder conviction after determining that the killings
resulted from emotional volatility and mutual combat. Defendant in
the instant case contends that she too killed her victim in a
highly emotional state and during mutual combat, and that the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State cannot
support a conviction for first-degree murder. Defendant's reliance
on Corn and Williams is misplaced, in that both cases involved
defendants who had no significant history of ill will toward their
victims.
In State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984), our
Supreme Court enumerated six factors that are to be considered in
determining whether there was substantial evidence to support a
finding of premeditation and deliberation:
Premeditation and deliberation relate to
mental processes and ordinarily are not
readily susceptible to proof by direct
evidence. Instead they usually must be proved
by circumstantial evidence. State v. Buchanan,
287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 80 (1975). Among
other circumstances to be considered in
determining whether a killing was with
premeditation and deliberation are: (1) want
of provocation on the part of the deceased;(2) the conduct and statements of the
defendant before and after the killing; (3)
threats and declarations of the defendant
before and during the course of the occurrence
giving rise to the death of the deceased; (4)
ill will or previous difficulty between the
parties; (5) the dealing of lethal blows after
the deceased has been felled and rendered
helpless; and (6) evidence that the killing
was done in a brutal manner.
Id. at 170, 321 S.E.2d at 843.
Here, there was evidence that defendant made statements before
and after the killing that could lead a finder of fact to conclude
that she killed with premeditation and deliberation. This evidence
includes defendant's statement immediately preceding the murder
that the victim was not free to leave and her statements afterwards
when she lied about her role in the killing and blamed it on
Mexicans. Defendant's conduct before and after the killing could
also point to premeditation and deliberation. She admitted to
disposing of evidence, including disposition of the victim's bloody
clothes and wiping blood from the knife.
There was also abundant evidence of significant ill will or
previous difficulty between the parties. Defendant herself
testified that the couple had a history of fighting. This
evidence, when viewed against the six factors set forth in Hamlet,
could support a jury finding that defendant acted after
premeditating and deliberating. As such, this assignment of error
is overruled.
No error.
Judges GEER and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***