IN RE
Johnston County
A.S.W. No. 05 J 176
Leon A. Lucas, P.A., by Leon A. Lucas, for petitioner-
appellee.
Duncan B. McCormick, for respondent-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4) (2005), p
arental rights
may be terminated for the willful failure without justification to
pay for the care, support, or education of a child for a period of
one year, in violation of a judicial decree. Here, Respondent-
mother argues this statute does not apply to the reimbursement of
uninsured medical or extracurricular expenses, but instead only to
necessary costs related to the child's “care, support, or
education.” Because a judicial decree required Respondent-mother
to pay the reimbursements, we affirm the order of termination.
On 14 September 2005, Petitioner-father filed a petition
asking the trial court to terminate the parental rights of his ex-
wife, Respondent-mother, as to the minor child A.S.W. at issue inthis case. Petitioner-father and Respondent-mother were previously
married, then separated in 1995 and divorced in 1996. From that
point until 2002, Petitioner-father and Respondent-mother shared
custody of the minor child, who resided for a week at a time with
Petitioner-father and then a week with Respondent-mother for that
seven-year period. Respondent-mother developed an addiction to
cocaine at some point in 2001 or 2002. On 10 December 2002, a
judicial order was entered granting temporary physical custody of
the minor child to Petitioner-father, with provisions for weekend
and holiday visitation for Respondent-mother. Petitioner-father
waived his claim for child support, but Respondent-mother was
ordered to reimburse him for one-half of costs incurred for
uninsured medical and extracurricular expenses for the minor child,
within thirty days of Petitioner-father's submission of a bill.
Respondent-mother was then incarcerated on 30 December 2002 for
convictions related to forging payroll checks and taking $30,000
from her employer.
Respondent-mother was released from prison on 30 July 2004;
during the nineteen months she was incarcerated, she saw the minor
child one time, with their contact otherwise limited to written
correspondence and a few phone calls. Immediately prior to her
release, Petitioner-father filed a motion for modification of
custody and temporary suspension of visitation, seeking to have
Respondent-mother's visitation suspended. A consent order entered
on 21 September 2004 awarded primary permanent custody to
Petitioner-father, with supervised visitation for Respondent-mother. The order continued the same financial arrangements as the
prior order, namely, Petitioner-father waiving child support and
Respondent-mother ordered to pay one-half of all uninsured medical
and extracurricular expenses for the child.
After her release from prison, Respondent-mother had one
supervised visitation with the minor child at Petitioner-father's
home. She also talked on the telephone with the minor child on
occasion. According to Petitioner-father and his wife, Respondent-
mother had no contact with the minor child from February 2005 until
August 2005. Respondent-mother also failed to reimburse
Petitioner-father for extracurricular and medical expenses incurred
for the minor child in 2003 and 2004, despite being given receipts.
Petitioner-father and his wife did not send any receipts for 2005,
when they had failed to get any payment from Respondent-mother for
the earlier receipts.
On 11 August 2005, Respondent-mother was sent back to prison
for violating her probation by moving out of Johnston County
without permission and by failing to complete her community service
requirement. According to testimony from Petitioner-father's wife
and from Respondent-mother, the minor child and Respondent-mother
exchanged letters in August 2005. Petitioner-father filed a
petition to terminate Respondent-mother's parental rights on 14
September 2005, alleging that Respondent-mother had willfully
neglected the minor child, had failed to provide proper care,
supervision, discipline, medical care, and financial support for
the minor child, and had abandoned the minor child. On 9 January2006, the trial judge entered a written order terminating
Respondent-mother's parental rights on each of the three grounds
alleged by Petitioner-father, and finding termination to be in the
best interest of the minor child.
Before addressing the merits of Respondent-mother's appeal, we
observe that the petition to terminate rights was filed on 14
September 2005, prior to the 1 October 2005 effective date for the
repeal of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1113, which required written notice
of an appeal from an adjudication order to be filed within ten days
of the entry of the order. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1113 (2004)
(repealed by 2005 N.C. Sess. Law 398). Accordingly, Respondent-
mother should have filed her notice of appeal within ten days of
the entry of the trial court's order dated 9 January 2006.
However, counsel for Petitioner-father did not mail a copy of
the order to Respondent-mother's counsel until 2 February 2006.
Even so, more than ten days passed until Respondent-mother filed
her notice of appeal on 17 February 2006. Because this timeline
exceeds the statutory requirement, Respondent-mother filed a
contemporaneous petition for writ of certoriari to this Court,
pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). We find that “appropriate
circumstances” exist to permit our review of the trial court's
order terminating Respondent-mother's parental rights; accordingly,
we grant her petition.
On appeal, Respondent-mother challenges each of the three
separate grounds the trial court found to exist for the termination
of her parental rights. Respondent-mother contends that the trialcourt's conclusions were not supported by the findings of fact nor
by clear and convincing evidence. After careful review of the
record before us, we find that the trial court's conclusion as to
Respondent-mother's failure to pay for the care, support, and
education of the minor child, as required by the September 2004
consent order, was supported by the findings and by clear and
convincing evidence. Because this conclusion is sufficient to
affirm the termination of Respondent-mother's parental rights, we
decline to examine her arguments as to the other two grounds.
See
In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984
) (
“A
finding of any one of the . . . separately enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination.” )
;
see also In re J.A.A., 175
N.C. App. 66, 74, 623 S.E.2d 45, 50 (2005) (“The trial court can
terminate a respondent's parental rights upon the finding of one of
the grounds enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a).”).
North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(4) provides that
The court may terminate the parental rights
upon a finding of one or more of the
following:
. . .
(4) One parent has been awarded custody of the
juvenile by judicial decree or has custody by
agreement of the parties, and the other parent
whose parental rights are sought to be
terminated has for a period of one year or
more next preceding the filing of the petition
or motion willfully failed without
justification to pay for the care, support, or
education of the juvenile, as required by said
decree or custody agreement.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4) (2003). When reviewing
a
termination proceeding, this Court “should affirm the trial court
where the court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent andconvincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of
law.” In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86
(1996). Moreover, findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
they are supported by “ample, competent evidence,” even if there is
evidence to the contrary. In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 674,
373 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1988). If unchallenged on appeal, findings of
fact “are deemed supported by competent evidence” and are binding
upon this Court. In re Padgett, 156 N.C. App. 644, 648, 577 S.E.2d
337, 340 (2003). “So long as the findings of fact support a
conclusion based on [the statute], the order terminating parental
rights must be affirmed.” In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434,
436, 473 S.E.2d 393, 395-96 (1996).
In the instant case, Respondent-mother argues that Petitioner-
father waived child support in the consent order, that he did not
request reimbursement from her for expenses incurred in 2005, and
that her failure to reimburse was not willful in light of her
limited ability to pay support. In essence, she contends that the
consent order requiring her to reimburse Petitioner-father for one-
half of the minor child's uninsured medical and extracurricular
expenses does not constitute “pay[ment] for the care, support, or
education” of the child. We disagree.
Our courts have long recognized that “the rights of the
parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have
assumed.” Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 76, 484 S.E.2d 527, 533
(1997) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 77 L. Ed. 2d
614, 624 (1983)). Thus, “a parent may lose the constitutionallyprotected paramount right to child custody if the parent's conduct
is inconsistent with this presumption or if the parent fails to
shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a
child.” Cantrell v. Wishon, 141 N.C. App. 340, 343, 540 S.E.2d
804, 806 (2000). Included in these responsibilities is the
obligation to provide for the financial support of the child, with
some allowances for a parent's circumstances and actual ability to
pay such support. See Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1, 16-
17, 449 S.E.2d 911, 919-20 (1994), appeal dismissed by 340 N.C.
109, 458 S.E.2d 183 (1995).
Here, the trial court found that, although Petitioner-father
had waived his claim for child support, Respondent-mother was
required by the December 2004 consent order to pay one-half of the
uninsured medical and extracurricular expenses of the minor child.
She was ordered to reimburse Petitioner-father for such expenses
within thirty days of his submission to her of receipts and a bill
of the costs. Moreover, the trial court found that Respondent-
mother failed to pay for any of the expenses incurred during both
2003 and 2004, and that Petitioner-father ceased sending the
receipts at the end of 2004 for that reason. Thus, Respondent-
mother did not pay for any expenses incurred in the first nine
months of 2005, prior to the termination hearing. Respondent-
mother testified that she refused to pay the expenses because she
was being denied visitation with the minor child. She also stated
that she “didn't feel like [she] should have to pay these
outrageous prices if [she] never got to see [her] daughter.” BothPetitioner-father and his wife testified that Respondent-mother was
not denied access to the minor child, but that Respondent-mother in
fact made infrequent attempts to visit or contact the child.
The record shows that Petitioner-father and his wife sent
Respondent-mother a list of expenses totaling $3,519.63 for 2003
and $2,091.00 in 2004. Respondent-mother's share of these expenses
would have been $2,805.31.00. The bulk of these expenses were
related to the minor child's orthodontia and participation in a
softball league. Respondent-mother testified at the termination
hearing that she made roughly two hundred dollars per week cleaning
houses while she was out of prison from July 2004 until August
2005, but put none of that money towards the minor child's
expenses.
The clear language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4) refers
to a parent's “willful[] fail[ure] without justification to pay for
the care, support, or education of the juvenile, as required by
[judicial] decree” for a period of one year or more prior to the
filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. Nowhere is
that requirement mitigated by the fact that the other parent may be
providing for the strict necessities _ food, shelter, clothing,
medical care _ of the child. Rather, the statute reflects the idea
that with parental rights comes the responsibility to provide
financial support for a child's well-being, including for needs
that may not be strictly necessary, such as orthodontia and
participation in extracurricular sports and other activities.
Respondent-mother had the ability to pay some portion of the minorchild's expenses yet refused to do so for over two years prior to
the filing of the termination petition. Even if Petitioner-father
did not submit receipts for the nine months in 2005 prior to the
hearing, Respondent-mother made no effort to provide reimbursement
for the expenses of which she was already aware.
Under such circumstances, we find that Respondent-mother has
attempted to maintain her parental rights while refusing to
acknowledge her attendant parental responsibilities. As stated by
the trial court, we acknowledge that Respondent-mother “still loves
the child.” Nonetheless, we are constrained by the fact that the
record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial
court's findings of fact as to Respondent-mother's failure to pay
support while out of prison. Furthermore, those findings support
his conclusion that Respondent-mother had failed to provide support
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4). Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled, and we affirm the trial court's
termination of Respondent-mother's parental rights on those
grounds.
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to find that it was in the best interest of
the minor child not to terminate Respondent-mother's parental
rights. We disagree.
Upon finding the existence of one of the statutory grounds for
the termination of parental rights, “the court shall issue an order
terminating the parental rights of such parent . . . unless the
court shall further determine that the best interests of thejuvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2003) (amended by 2005
N.C. Sess. Law 398). A determination with respect to whether
parental rights should be terminated is within the discretion of
the trial court.
Allred, 122 N.C. App. at 569, 471 S.E.2d at 88.
Here, testimony at the termination hearing suggested that the
minor child, fifteen years old at the time of the hearing,
approached Petitioner-father about initiating the proceedings, in
part in the hope of being adopted by her stepmother, and that she
did not wish to interact with Respondent-mother. Furthermore,
Petitioner-father and his wife were shown to be providing a good,
stable home for the minor child and that she is well adjusted and
thriving in school. Her guardian ad litem also testified that it
would be in her best interests for Respondent-mother's parental
rights to be terminated.
In light of such evidence, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse his discretion in determining it was in the best interest of
the child to terminate Respondent-mother's parental rights.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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