STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 05 CRS 222035-37
JOHNNIE LEONARD MONTGOMERY 05 CRS 222040-41
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Hal F. Askins, for the State.
Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by Christy E. Wilhelm, for
defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The State presented sufficient evidence that defendant was the
operator of a motor vehicle on the night in question to withstand
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence.
The State's evidence tended to show that on the night of 14
May 2005, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer Thomas Honeycutt
observed a white Ford Mustang with customized tail lights traveling
on Wilkinson Boulevard at an estimated speed of 70 miles per hour
in a 45-miles-per-hour zone near Old Dowd Road in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Honeycutt followed the vehicle and saw it proceed
through a red light while turning onto Sam Wilson Road.
Maintaining its high rate of speed, the Mustang passed two cars ina no-passing zone before traveling onto the on-ramp for Interstate
Highway 85. Honeycutt caught up with the Mustang as it slowed to
merge onto the Interstate. Pulling directly behind the vehicle in
his marked patrol car, he read its tag number RXS-1665 and observed
that the driver was the only occupant of the vehicle. As Honeycutt
came within one to two car lengths of the Mustang to initiate a
traffic stop, it swerved left in front of a tractor-trailer and
took off at a very high rate of speed approaching 130 miles per
hour.
Honeycutt pulled to the side of the road and broadcast a be-
on-the-lookout notice (BOLO) on his police radio. Two to three
minutes later, a dispatcher advised him that a white vehicle had
just wrecked on Little Rock Road, approximately one mile from
where Honeycutt lost sight of the Mustang. He drove to the
intersection of Little Rock Road and Interstate Highway 85 and saw
the Mustang up the embankment on the north bound side of the
intersection. A 538-foot skid mark ran from the Interstate off-
ramp to the wrecked car. The car was unoccupied, but the engine was
warm and leaking fluids. Recognizing the customized tail lights
and license tag number, Honeycutt identified the Mustang as the
vehicle he observed speeding.
Based on his conversation with a bystander, Honeycutt
broadcast a second BOLO for a black male wearing a white cut-off
tee shirt...that had just left the scene of the accident. Five
minutes later, he was notified that defendant had been taken into
custody near the Bada Bing nightclub in the 3000 block of LittleRock Road, one-third to one-half mile from the accident scene.
Another officer arrived at Honeycutt's location with defendant, who
was clad in a white tee shirt and blue jeans. Defendant had the
keys to the white Mustang in his left front pants pocket. Using
defendant's key, Honeycutt opened the car's door and found an open
bottle of brandy in the driver's side floor board. Checking the
car's tag number with the Department of Motor Vehicles, Honeycutt
learned that defendant was the owner of the vehicle. A subsequent
check of defendant's driver's license revealed that his driver's
license had been permanently revoked on 10 March 2005.
Honeycutt observed that defendant had red, glassy eyes, was
unsteady on his feet, and emitted a moderate to strong odor of
alcohol. Defendant refused to perform field sobriety tests, saying
that there was no use. Honeycutt arrested defendant, took him to
the county jail for processing, and administered an Intoxylyzer
which registered defendant's blood alcohol level as .08. Defendant
told Honeycutt that he drank two beers after arriving at the Get-A-
Way Lounge at 10:30 p.m. Honeycutt described the Get-A-Way Lounge
as close to where [he] first observed the [d]efendant's vehicle,
maybe a quarter of a mile away[.]
In Honeycutt's typed incident report, which was offered into
evidence for corroborative purposes, he wrote that defendant
admitted drinking prior to driving. On cross-examination,
Honeycutt was asked whether this portion of his typed report was
accurate, as follows:
Q. ...[O]n the second page of that report,
in the first full paragraph, youindicated that during the post-arrest
interview, [defendant] admitted to
drinking prior to driving; is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Honeycutt then explained why this detail was not included in the
handwritten notes of his interview with defendant:
Q. Okay. However, in your written notes
that you...used to create or prepare this
report, you don't mention anything here
about him admitting to driving, correct?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Is that something you added in as you
were going along?
A. It's something that is easily remembered.
The report was subsequently published to the jury without objection
or a limiting instruction.
Defendant testified that he owned the white Mustang but did
not drive the vehicle on the night of 14 May 2005. His friend,
Clyde Lowery, paid him $250 to borrow the car on 14 May 2005 in
order to race it in a grudge match at a track in Mooresville,
North Carolina. On the afternoon before the race, Lowery, defendant
and Anthony Anderson met at defendant's house. Defendant gave
Lowery a spare set of keys to the Mustang. Lowery drove the car to
the track, and defendant rode to the track with Anderson in
Anderson's car. After the race, the three men agreed to meet at
the Get-A-Way Lounge. Because Lowery had already paid for the
car...for the evening[,] defendant rode with Anderson and allowed
Lowery to continue driving the Mustang. Having Anderson as his
chauffeur, defendant drank three beers at the Get-A-Way Loungebefore the group decided to go to the Bada Bing strip club. Lowery
told defendant and Anderson that he would meet them at the strip
club after he finished talking to a friend. Several minutes after
defendant arrived at the Bada Bing, Lowery called him and said,
Man, I wrecked your car. Anderson drove defendant to a nearby
gas station to meet Lowery before dropping defendant off at the
club to sit for a little bit while he took Lowery to get a tow
truck. Defendant went into the club and came back outside to call
Lowery, who said they were on the[ir] way. Another officer
approached defendant in the parking lot and asked him if he kn[e]w
anything about the white Mustang down the street. Defendant
replied, Yeah, I do, but I wasn't driving. The officer took the
keys from defendant's pocket and arrested him. A second officer
transported defendant to the accident scene and left him with
Honeycutt. Defendant refused to submit to a sobriety test at the
scene, telling Honeycutt that he had not been driving and did not
drink and drive. After he was taken downtown for processing,
defendant submitted to the Intoxylyzer test when Honeycutt said he
could make things worse for defendant if he refused.
Defendant's fiancée, Sherry Surratt Beam, testified that
defendant's cousin Anthony and one of his friends named Clyde
came to their house on the evening of 14 May 2005. Defendant told
her that he was going to the drag strip that night. When the
three men left for the evening, defendant rode with Anderson, and
the other guy was driving...the white Mustang. Neither Lowery nor
Anderson testified at trial. On 28 March 2006, a jury returnedverdicts of guilty on the charges of driving while impaired,
driving while license revoked, reckless driving with wanton
disregard, fleeing to elude arrest with a motor vehicle, and
transporting an open container of alcohol. Defendant was sentenced
to consecutive sentences of 120 days imprisonment on the charges of
driving while impaired and driving while license revoked, and a
minimum of 8 months and a maximum of 10 months imprisonment on the
remaining charges. Defendant appeals.
In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss, absent substantial evidence
that he was driving the Mustang at the time it was observed by
Honeycutt on 14 May 2005. We disagree.
Defendant argues that his operation of the vehicle was an
essential element of each of the five offenses of which he was
convicted. He contends that the statement found in Honeycutt's
incident report, indicating that defendant acknowledged drinking
before driving, was not corroborated when presented at trial,
citing to State v. Mack, 81 N.C. App. 578, 584, 345 S.E.2d 223, 226
(1986). Defendant further contends that evidence of such an
admission to a police officer was not sufficient evidence,
standing alone, to overcome a motion to dismiss.
By offering evidence, defendant waived his motion to dismiss
at the conclusion of the State's evidence. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3);
State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 231, 266 S.E.2d 631, 636, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 960, 66 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1980). Accordingly, we
review the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss at theconclusion of all the evidence. In reviewing the denial of a
motion to dismiss, this Court must determine if the evidence at
trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would
allow a reasonable juror to find each essential element of a
charged offense, including defendant's identity as the perpetrator.
State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434-35
(1997). For purposes of our review, the State is entitled to all
favorable inferences reasonably arising from the evidence. State
v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 450, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994).
Defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence of
his identity as the driver of the white Mustang. The State may
establish that defendant was driving the vehicle through
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Riddle, 56 N.C. App. 701,
704, 289 S.E.2d 598, 599 (quoting Helms v. Rea, 282 N.C. 610, 616,
194 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1973)), appeal dismissed and disc. review
denied, 305 N.C. 763, 292 S.E.2d 16 (1982). For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, it need
not...point unerringly toward the defendant's guilt so as to
exclude all other reasonable hypotheses. The evidence is
sufficient to go to the jury if it gives rise to 'a reasonable
inference of defendant's guilt.' State v. Steelman, 62 N.C. App.
311, 313-14, 302 S.E.2d 637, 638-39 (1983) (internal citation
omitted).
Officer Honeycutt was asked on cross-examination about the
portion of his incident report which stated that defendant
acknowledged driving the vehicle. We believe a jury couldreasonably interpret Honeycutt's response as affirming that
defendant did, in fact, admit to driving his vehicle, as indicated
in the report. Additional evidence showed that the driver was the
sole occupant of the speeding Mustang at the time it ran into the
embankment at the northbound exit ramp of Interstate Highway 85 at
Little Rock Road. After following the Mustang from Wilkinson
Boulevard onto the Interstate, Honeycutt arrived at the scene of
the accident only moments after it occurred. The car was empty and
its doors were locked; but its engine was still warm. Defendant,
the registered owner of the car,
(See footnote 1)
was found five minutes later
alone in a parking lot three to four blocks away from the accident
site. Defendant was intoxicated and had the keys to the car in his
pocket. When Honeycutt searched the Mustang's interior, he found
an open bottle of brandy on the driver's side floorboard. Taken
together and in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
that this evidence was sufficient to support an inference that
defendant was driving the Mustang at the time it was observed by
Honeycutt. See Mack, at 583, 345 S.E.2d at 226; see also State v.
Dooley, 232 N.C. 311, 312-13, 59 S.E.2d 808, 809 (1950); State v.
Dula, 77 N.C. App. 473, 475, 335 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1985); Riddle, at
705, 289 S.E.2d at 600.
In his second argument, defendant contends that the trial
court's erroneously entered judgment on the jury's guilty verdicts,because there was no proof that he was driving the Mustang at the
time it was observed by Honeycutt. We disagree.
Having found the evidence sufficient to withstand defendant's
motion to dismiss and to submit the case to the jury, we further
find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to set
the verdicts aside ex mero motu. See State v. Tuck, 173 N.C. App.
61, 69, 618 S.E.2d 265, 271 (2005); Mack, at 584, 345 S.E.2d at
226-27.
In his third argument, defendant contends the trial court
erred in its response to two questions submitted by the jury during
its deliberations. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by offering
a timely objection in the trial court, as required by N.C.R. App.
P. 10(b)(2). State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 91, 588 S.E.2d 344,
358 (citing State v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 620, 487 S.E.2d 734, 742
(1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1125, 140 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1998)),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971, 157 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2003). The
transcript instead reflects defendant's explicit approval of the
court's proposed response to the jury's questions:
THE COURT: The jury has sent out two
questions. One is the
definition of preponderance of
the evidence, and the second
is, does the defense have the
power to subpoena witnesses. I
don't know where this first one
came from. I would be inclined
to tell them that it's a
concept from the civil law and
has no relevance to this case,
and as to the second one, I
will just tell them that they
are to decide the case based onthe evidence that is before
them. I'll hear what either of
you have to say about it.
[PROSECUTOR]: The State wouldn't ask for
anything different than that,
Your Honor.
[DEFENSE]: Neither would I.
Defendant has not assigned or argued plain error on appeal under
N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). See, e.g., State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243,
292, 595 S.E.2d 381, 413 (2004) (citing State v. Grooms, 353 N.C.
50, 65-66, 540 S.E.2d 713, 723 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838,
151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001)). Accordingly, we dismiss this assignment
of error.
NO ERROR.
Judges McCULLOUGH and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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