STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 05 CRS 27812
ROBERT E. LEE
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Victoria L. Voight, for the State.
Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
On 16 May 2005, defendant Robert E. Lee was indicted on
charges of felonious speeding to elude arrest, possession of stolen
property, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a law
enforcement officer, and one count of assault on a law enforcement
officer
.
On 16 June 2005, defendant Robert E. Lee agreed to plead
guilty by plea agreement to felonious speeding to elude arrest,
possession of stolen property, assault with a deadly weapon on a
law enforcement officer, and assault on a law enforcement officer
.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, one charge of misdemeanor assault
with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer
was reduced to
misdemeanor assault on a law enforcement officer
, and the State
agreed to dismiss a charge of felony larceny.
Sentencing was leftin the discretion of the trial court.
On the same date, defendant appeared in court for sentencing.
The trial court accepted the plea arrangement and began entering
judgment. The trial court announced there would be three
judgments. First, the trial court consolidated the felonies and
sentenced defendant to a term of ten to twelve months imprisonment.
The trial court then began announcing the second judgment, when the
defendant interrupted as follows:
THE DEFENDANT: Hold, hold, hold,
hold,
hold.
No. No. No. No. No, no, no. I better take
this trial. No. No. No, huh-uh, no. I was to
take that plea back. No. No.
The trial court continued entering the final two judgments without
addressing defendant's statements.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.
Assuming arguendo that defendant's comments should be
considered a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and thus further
assuming arguendo that the issue has been preserved for appeal, we
find no error.
Our Supreme Court has stated that:
A fundamental distinction exists between
situations in which a defendant pleads guilty
but changes his mind and seeks to withdraw the
plea before sentencing and in which a
defendant only attempts to withdraw the guilty
plea after he hears and is dissatisfied with
the sentence. This distinction creates the
need for differing legal standards for
adjudicating such motions to withdraw guilty
pleas, a distinction recognized by most
courts.
In a case where the defendant seeks
to withdraw his guilty plea before
sentence, he is generally accordedthat right if he can show any fair
and just reason.
On the other hand, where the guilty
plea is sought to be withdrawn by
the defendant after sentence, it
should be granted only to avoid
manifest injustice.
State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 536, 391 S.E.2d 159, 161
(1990)(citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, prior to the trial court's acceptance
of defendant's plea, defendant indicated that he understood that he
would be sentenced in the judge's discretion. He further indicated
that he understood the total maximum possible sentence in his case
was 60 months plus an additional 300 days. In its discretion, the
trial court consolidated the two felonies and sentenced defendant
to a term of ten to twelve months imprisonment. When the trial
court proceeded to enter the remaining two judgments, defendant
made his purported motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It is clear
that defendant's motion resulted from his dissatisfaction with his
sentences. Thus, his motion to withdraw his guilty plea could only
be granted to avoid manifest injustice. Id. Defendant cites no
injustice that he would suffer should he not be allowed to withdraw
his motion, and none is apparent on the record. Accordingly, the
assignment of error is overruled.
No error
.
Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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