IN THE MATTER OF:
Cleveland County
A.D.C. No. 05-JA-098
HUNTER, Judge.
On 27 May 2004, the Cleveland County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that A.D.C. was
a neglected juvenile in that the child did not receive proper care,
supervision or discipline, and lived in an environment injurious to
his welfare. DSS obtained custody by non-secure custody order. On
24 September 2004, A.D.C. was adjudicated a dependent juvenile. On
11 May 2005, following a permanency planning review hearing, thetrial court entered an order changing the permanent plan for A.D.C.
to adoption. On 10 June 2005, DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights. On 23 January 2006, the trial court
entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights.
Respondent appeals. After a careful review of the record and
briefs, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Respondent first argues on appeal that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter the termination order because
the termination hearing was not held until seven months after the
petition was filed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(a) (2005) provides
that termination hearings should be heard “no later than 90 days
from the filing of the petition or motion unless the judge pursuant
to subsection (d) of this section orders that it be held at a later
time.” Id. However, this Court has stated that “time limitations
in the Juvenile Code are not jurisdictional . . . and do not
require reversal of orders in the absence of a showing by the
appellant of prejudice resulting from the time delay.” In re
C.L.C., K.T.R., A.M.R., E.A.R., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443, 615 S.E.2d
704, 707 (2005), affirmed per curiam, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760
(2006). Thus, the failure of the trial court to follow applicable
timelines did not deprive it of jurisdiction and does not require
reversal in the absence of prejudice.
We further conclude that respondent has failed to demonstrate
prejudice requiring reversal. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(d)
provides that:
The court may for good cause shown continue
the hearing for up to 90 days from the date ofthe initial petition in order to receive
additional evidence including any reports or
assessments that the court has requested, to
allow the parties to conduct expeditious
discovery, or to receive any other information
needed in the best interests of the juvenile.
Continuances that extend beyond 90 days after
the initial petition shall be granted only in
extraordinary circumstances when necessary for
the proper administration of justice, and the
court shall issue a written order stating the
grounds for granting the continuance.
Id. Here, continuances were granted on 28 September 2005 and 16
November 2005. According to the trial court's orders, the
continuances were granted “for good cause shown” and were
“necessary for the proper administration of justice, and [were]
not contrary to the best interest of the juvenile.” Moreover, the
orders state that the continuances were granted upon the agreement
of the parties, including the respondent's attorney and the
guardians ad litem for the respondent and the juvenile. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the termination hearing was erroneously
delayed, respondent can demonstrate no prejudice since both she and
the guardian ad litem for the juvenile agreed to the delay. See In
re D.J.D., D.M.D., S.J.D., J.M.D.,, 171 N.C. App. 230, 243, 615
S.E.2d 26, 35 (2005) (since respondent moved for the continuance,
he could demonstrate no prejudice from any delay in holding the
termination hearing). Accordingly, the assignment of error is
overruled.
Respondent next argues that the petition to terminate her
parental rights did not sufficiently allege specific facts to
support termination as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1104(6)
(2005). Respondent contends that the petition fails to make anyfactual allegations, instead merely summarizing the statutory
grounds for a termination action. Respondent claims prejudice
because she was not properly advised of the allegations against
her.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1104(6) provides that the petition to
terminate parental rights shall state “[f]acts that are sufficient
to warrant a determination that one or more of the grounds for
terminating parental rights exist.” Id. Respondent claims that
the petition fails to state sufficient allegations in accordance
with section 7B-1104(6). However, attached to the petition and
incorporated by reference was the adjudication and disposition
order granting custody to DSS. The order contained a finding that
respondent stipulated that A.D.C. was a dependent juvenile due to
respondent's failure to provide proper care and supervision for the
child. This was based upon a finding of fact that they had been
living in a car, and respondent was unemployed and unable to
provide suitable housing. Thus, sufficient allegations were made
in the petition to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1104(6). See
In re Quevedo, 106 N.C. App. 574, 579, 419 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1992)
(attachment and incorporation of custody award stated sufficient
facts to comply with former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.25(6)).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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