IN THE MATTER OF: Wayne County
No. 05 JT 120
D.W.,
A Minor Child
E.B. Borden Parker, for petitioner-appellee Wayne County
Department of Social Services.
Holly M. Groce for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Susan J. Hall for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
On 2 August 2004, the Wayne County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that D.W. was a
neglected and dependent juvenile. Specifically, DSS alleged that
D.W. was a dependent juvenile in that he had no parent, guardian,
or custodian responsible for his care or supervision. The child's
mother had died in a car accident in June 2004, after which the
child resided with his maternal aunt. DSS further alleged that
D.W. was neglected in that respondent, the child's father, was
“very violent and has a criminal history.” DSS claimed that
respondent did not “have a stable living environment or employment
to care for [D.W.]” On 1 June 2005, the court entered an ordergranting custody of D.W. to DSS, while authorizing DSS to leave him
in the home of his maternal aunt. The court adopted a permanent
plan of termination of respondent's parental rights and adoption by
the maternal aunt.
On 15 June 2005, DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights. DSS alleged that respondent had
neglected and continued to neglect D.W., had not paid any child
support and had abandoned D.W. The court held a hearing on the
petition on 22 February 2006. The trial court concluded that
grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7)
to terminate respondent's parental rights. The court further
concluded that it was in the child's best interest that
respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
After a careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of
the parties, we affirm.
Respondent's sole argument is that the trial court erred by
finding that there were grounds to support the termination of his
parental rights.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for
terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the
separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a
termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the termination must
show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds
authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.” In reYoung, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997) (citing N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30(d) and (e)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that
respondent-father had neglected the juvenile pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Respondent claims that he did not neglect
D.W., citing his incarceration as grounds for his failure to visit
the child. However, this Court has stated that “[a] father's
neglect of his child cannot be negated by incarceration alone.” In
re D.J.D., D.M.D., S.J.D., J.M.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 240, 615
S.E.2d 26, 33 (2005). In D.J.D., the respondent_father argued that
he was unable to visit his child due to his incarceration. This
Court explained that “while we acknowledge that incarceration
limited his ability to show affection, it is not an excuse for
respondent's failure to show 'interest in the children's welfare by
whatever means available.'” Id. (citation omitted).
Similarly, respondent's incarceration alone does not excuse
his neglect. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2005) defines a
neglected juvenile as one “who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline . . . or who has been abandoned[.]” Id.
“A determination of neglect must be based on evidence showing
neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re J.G.B.,
___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 628 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2006) (emphasis
omitted). “Neglect is more than a parent's 'failure to provide
physical necessities' and can include the total failure to provide
love, support, affection, and personal contact.” D.J.D., 171 N.C.
App. at 240, 615 S.E.2d at 33. Here, the trial court found that: (1) respondent never paid
any child support for the benefit of the child; (2) respondent has
been in and out of jail for the majority of D.W.'s life; (3) there
is no stability in respondent's life that would enable him “to care
for and supervise the nurturing and development of the juvenile
being a current and frequent resident of the North Carolina
Department of Correction”; (4) respondent never had custody of
D.W., never sought custody of D.W. either before or after the death
of the mother, and lived with them only during his “short periods
of intermittent freedom from the bonds of incarcerations for
convicted criminal offenses”; (5) respondent knew of the location
of the maternal grandfather's residence, but never inquired of him
of the child's whereabouts; (6) when he last saw D.W. in June 2004,
he informed the maternal aunt that he wanted to see him again on
his birthday, which was not until December; (7) the maternal aunt
gave respondent her cellular telephone number, but he never called
the number nor attempted to make contact with the child prior to
her changing it in December 2004; and (8) respondent has sent no
cards, letters, or gifts to the juvenile. The court based its
findings on evidence in the record, including testimony from the
maternal aunt, as well as from the child's social workers.
Additionally, the trial court specifically found, despite
respondent's contentions to the contrary, that the maternal aunt
has never attempted to hide D.W. from him. Therefore, we conclude
there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record to
support the trial court's findings and conclusion that groundsexist to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1) to support the trial court's order, the remaining
grounds found by the trial court to support termination need not be
reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at
233-34. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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