Appeal by Defendants from judgment entered 15 November 2002 by
Judge Jack W. Jenkins and from judgment entered 15 March 2006 by
Judge A. Leon Stanback in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 8 March 2007.
J. Michael Weeks, P.A., by J. Michael Weeks, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Smith Debnam Narron Wyche Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by W.
Thurston Debnam, for Defendants-Appellants Vicky Gordon Martin
and Danny R. Gordon.
McGEE, Judge.
Little River Soil Farm (Plaintiff), a general partnership,
filed an action for declaratory judgment on 28 November 2000
against, inter alia, Vicky G. Martin and Danny R. Gordon
(Defendants). Plaintiff alleged it owned a thirty-acre parcel ofreal property in Little River Township in Wake County. Plaintiff
alleged Defendants owned a parcel of real property containing more
than eighty acres in Little River Township in Wake County
(Defendants' property). Plaintiff further alleged that its only
means of access from its real property to U.S. Highway 64, a public
right-of-way, was along a road extending through Defendants'
property and several other tracts of land (the easement).
Plaintiff also alleged that the easement had been used for access
to U.S. Highway 64 for more than eighty years by Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's predecessors in title. Plaintiff alleged it could not
obtain a building permit to repair the single family dwelling on
its property until a map was recorded in the Wake County Registry
showing Plaintiff's means of access to a public right-of-way.
Plaintiff further alleged that "[n]one of the parties have denied
that . . . Plaintiff ha[d] a right to use the road within [the
easement] for access from [its property] to U.S. Highway 64."
Plaintiff demanded "[t]hat the Court authorize entry upon the
lands affected by [the easement] for the purpose of having the road
bed of [the easement] surveyed by a Registered Land Surveyor[.]"
Plaintiff also sought the entry of a declaratory judgment defining
the scope and extent of the easement. Plaintiff further requested
that the declaratory judgment and the map of the survey locating
the easement be recorded in the Wake County Registry.
Defendants filed an answer on 1 February 2001, admitting "that
. . . Plaintiff's predecessors in title ha[d] obtained a
prescriptive easement over [the easement]." However, Defendantsdenied that Plaintiff had the right to relocate or expand the
easement or to increase its burden on Defendants' property.
Defendants requested that the trial court "issue an order defining
the scope and extent of the prescriptive easement acquired by
. . . Plaintiff's predecessors in title which specifically
limit[ed] . . . Plaintiff's use to those consistent with prior
usage which consisted of access for a single family [dwelling] and
access for seasonal farming and seasonal farm equipment."
The trial court held hearings 29 - 31 July 2002. Defendants
moved to dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's evidence and at the
close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions and
entered judgment on 15 November 2002. The trial court made
numerous findings of fact and concluded that Plaintiff had acquired
an easement by prescription across Defendants' property and several
other tracts of real property. In its judgment the trial court
further concluded that:
["]Under the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment,
the width of an undefined easement is
determined by considering the purpose of the
easement and establishing a width necessary to
effectuate that purpose. . . .
[']Determination of the necessary width under
the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment
[presents] a question of fact.[']"
quoting Intermount Distrib'n, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co. of N.C.,
Inc., 150 N.C. App. 539, 543, 563 S.E.2d 626, 630 (2002) (quoting
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District v. Dickie, 43 P.3d 1277, 1281
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). The trial court's judgment also stated
the following:
1. . . . Plaintiff has an easement for theright of ingress, egress and regress across
the Hill Tract, [Defendants' property],
Riveredge Tract and Yates Tract for access to
US Highway 64 from . . . Plaintiff's Land [the
easement].
2. The location of [the easement] is generally
along the "Soil and Gravel Path" as shown on
the Williams-Pearce Map.
3. The right of way of [the easement] is 30
feet wide.
4. The existing buildings on [Defendants'
property] do not encroach on [the easement]
and [the easement] shall be located by the
Professional Land Surveyor appointed by this
Court so as not to interfere with the use and
enjoyment of any existing buildings on
[Defendants' property].
5. The Court appoints Williams-Pearce,
Professional Land Surveyors, to survey the
boundaries of [the easement] as located and
defined by this Judgment and to submit a map
of the survey, in such form as may be filed
for recordation in the Wake County Register of
Deeds Office, for review and approval of this
Court.
The trial court also entered judgment on 15 March 2006, in
which it stated that Plaintiff had offered into evidence "a map of
a survey marked 'Plaintiff's Exhibit 1' that was entitled 'Court
Ordered Easement Survey for Little River Soil Farm v. Danny L.
Hill, et al (00 CVS 13543[)], Wake County Superior Court' dated
September 1, 2004." The trial court found, concluded, and ordered
that the map did locate on the ground the easement granted to
Plaintiff by the trial court's 15 November 2002 judgment. The
trial court further ordered the map to be recorded in the Wake
County Registry. Defendants appeal both judgments. However,
Defendants assign error only to the trial court's denial of theirRule 41(b) motions to dismiss and to the trial court's 15 November
2002 judgment.
I.
Defendants argue the trial court committed reversible error by
concluding that the width of Plaintiff's easement should be
determined by application of the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment.
Defendants argue that the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment only
applies to the determination of the extent of an easement by grant
and that the scope of an easement by prescription should be
determined by the character and pattern of the user during the
period of prescription.
While we agree with the principles of law stated by
Defendants, we must nevertheless affirm the trial court's judgment.
Where "a court's ruling [is] based upon a misapprehension of law,
'[but] the misapprehension of the law does not affect the result[,]
. . . the judgment will not be reversed.'"
Smith v. Beaufort
County Hosp. Ass'n., 141 N.C. App. 203, 212, 540 S.E.2d 775, 781
(2000) (quoting
Bowles Distributing Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 69
N.C. App. 341, 348, 317 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984)),
disc. review
denied, 353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 435,
aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C.
212, 552 S.E.2d 139 (2001).
"[A]ppellate review of findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by a trial [court], without a jury, is limited to a
determination of whether there is competent evidence to support
[the trial court's] findings of fact and whether, in light of such
findings, [the trial court's] conclusions of law were proper."
Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Services, 124 N.C. App. 332,
335, 477 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1996).
Moreover, findings of fact by a trial [court]
in a non-jury trial have the force and effect
of a jury verdict; and if the evidence tends
to support the trial court's findings, these
findings are binding on appeal, even though
there may be some evidence to support findings
to the contrary.
Id. However, we apply
de novo review to a trial court's
conclusions of law.
Id. at 336, 477 S.E.2d at 215.
In the present case, the trial court applied the doctrine of
reasonable enjoyment, relying upon
Intermount Distrib'n, Inc., 150
N.C. App. at 543, 563 S.E.2d at 630. However, in
Intermount
Distrib'n, Inc., our Court interpreted an easement by grant which
did not specify the width of the easement.
Id. at 542, 563 S.E.2d
at 629. Our Court held that "when the width of an easement is not
specifically defined in the grant, such as the one in the instant
case, then the 'previously undefined width is then established by
the rule of reasonable enjoyment.'"
Id. at 543, 563 S.E.2d at 630
(quoting
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 43 P.3d at 1281).
Our Court further held: "Under the doctrine of reasonable
enjoyment, the width of an undefined easement is determined by
considering the purpose of the easement and establishing a width
necessary to effectuate that purpose."
Id. (citing
Sunnyside
Valley Irrigation District, 43 P.3d at 1281).
However, this rule does not apply in the context of easements
by prescription. Rather, in
Blevins v. Welch, 137 N.C. App. 98,
527 S.E.2d 667 (2000), our Court recognized that "'[i]n the case ofeasements arising by prescription, the character and pattern of the
user during the whole [prescriptive] period during which the
easement came into being determines its extent.'"
Id. at 104, 527
S.E.2d at 672 (quoting 1 James A. Webster, Jr.,
Webster's Real
Estate Law in North Carolina § 15-22, at 736 (5th ed. 1999)).
Accordingly, the trial court in the present case entered its
judgment under a misapprehension of law.
Defendants argue they were prejudiced because the trial court,
by applying the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment, "gave Plaintiff
. . . the use of more land than it actually took by
prescription[.]" We disagree. The trial court made several
findings regarding the character and pattern of the usage of the
easement during the prescriptive period.
In findings 15 and 16, the trial court found that since the
1950s, Plaintiff's predecessors in title had continuously used the
easement for access to the single family dwelling on the property
and to move farm equipment to and from the property. In findings
17 and 18, the trial court found that from 1980 until 2001, Randy
Angus Gay (Mr. Gay) had rented the property from Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's predecessors in title, and that Mr. Gay had used the
easement to move his farm equipment to and from the property
several times during each farming season. The trial court also
made, and Defendants challenge, the following findings of fact:
20. To provide adequate clearance for the
movement of [Mr. Gay's] farm equipment along
[the easement], at the beginning of each farm
season [Mr.] Gay would clear a 30 foot right
of way along the "Soil and Gravel Portion" of
[the easement] by cutting with a heavy tractormower any bushes, shrubs or undergrowth within
the 30 foot right of way.
. . .
25. For at least 20 years, . . . Plaintiff
and . . . Plaintiff's predecessors in title
have maintained a clearly identifiable 30 foot
right of way along the "Soil and Gravel
Portion" of [the easement] for the seasonal
movement of farm equipment to and from
[Plaintiff's property] via [the easement] to
US Highway 64.
26. For . . . Plaintiff to have reasonable
enjoyment of [the easement] for the seasonal
movement of farm equipment to and from
[Plaintiff's property] via [the easement] to
US Highway 64, . . . Plaintiff requires a 30
foot right of way along the "Soil and Gravel
Portion" of [the easement].
Defendants also challenge the trial court's determination that
"[t]he right of way of [the easement] is 30 feet wide."
Defendants argue that findings 20 and 25 "cannot be upheld on
appeal" because they were made under a misapprehension of law.
Defendants cite
McGill v. Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 3 S.E.2d 324
(1939), where our Supreme Court held that "[f]acts found under
misapprehension of the law will be set aside on the theory that the
evidence should be considered in its true legal light."
Id. at
754, 3 S.E.2d at 326. However, while this is a correct principle
of law, it is also true that where a misapprehension of law does
not affect the result, a judgment will not be reversed.
Smith, 141
N.C. App. at 212, 540 S.E.2d at 781.
Defendants also argue that findings 20 and 25 were not
supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree. These findings
were supported by the testimony of Mr. Gay, who testified asfollows:
Q. And in the last 20 years since 1980,
approximately . . . how wide did you need a
right-of-way in order to get your equipment
through there without tearing it up?
A. If you . . . turn a truck -- everybody
knows what a big truck looks like. If you
turn a truck you know about how much room you
need. There has never been enough room over
there as far as that part.
But from ditch to ditch. That would be
not driving in the ditch, but just the top of
the ditch. From ditch to ditch it needs to be
at least 30 [feet] to turn.
Q. And if it were less than that, would that
-- could that cause damage to the kind of
equipment that you had to drive through there?
A. Definitely.
Mr. Gay also testified that it was his job to maintain the
easement:
Q. Okay. And can you tell us what you would
do to maintain that [easement] from B to A as
shown on this aerial map?
A. Whatever . . . the owner [said]. . . .
Q. And approximately how wide -- did you from
time to time have to use your bush hog in
order to cut back the soil of the roadway in
certain places?
A. The ditches have to be maintained or you
can't have a road.
. . .
Q. And so when it was necessary you would go
in and do what was necessary to cut back so
that you would have that much right-of-way?
A. Whatever . . . the owner [said]. They
. . . were in control. I just satisfied the
owners.
We hold Mr. Gay's testimony was sufficient evidence to support
the challenged findings of fact. We further hold that these
findings of fact, along with findings 15, 16, 17, and 18, were
sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Plaintiff
acquired an easement by prescription over Defendants' property.
The trial court's findings of fact also supported its determination
that the easement was 30 feet wide. Defendants further argue that
finding 26 is irrelevant. We agree. However, even without this
finding, there were sufficient findings to support the trial
court's judgment.
II.
Defendants argue the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to limit the scope of the easement to access for a single
family dwelling and seasonal movement of farm equipment. The trial
court stated its judgment as follows: "Plaintiff has an easement
for the right of ingress, egress and regress across the Hill Tract,
[Defendants' property], Riveredge Tract and Yates Tract for access
to US Highway 64 from . . . Plaintiff's Land [the easement]."
Therefore, the trial court did not limit the permissible uses of
the easement to access to the single family dwelling and to
seasonal movement of farm equipment.
As we stated earlier, "'[i]n the case of easements arising by
prescription, the character and pattern of the user during the
whole [prescriptive] period during which the easement came into
being determines its extent.'"
Blevins, 137 N.C. App. at 104, 527
S.E.2d at 672 (quoting 1 James A. Webster, Jr.,
Webster's RealEstate Law in North Carolina § 15-22, at 736 (5th ed. 1999)).
Therefore, Plaintiff only acquired the easement for the purposes of
access to the single family dwelling and to seasonal movement of
farm equipment. While the trial court's judgment does not specify
these as the only uses of the easement, the trial court's findings
of fact reflect these limitations.
An elementary North Carolina rule in the
interpretation of judgments is that the
pleadings, issues and other circumstances of
the case must be considered. Judgments must
be interpreted like other written documents,
not by focusing on isolated parts, but as a
whole, in light of practicality and the
intention of the court.
White v. Graham, 72 N.C. App. 436, 441, 325 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1985)
(citations omitted). In light of these principles, we interpret
the trial court's judgment to limit Plaintiff's easement to the
uses of access to a single family dwelling and to seasonal movement
of farm equipment. Therefore, we overrule this assignment of
error.
III.
Defendants also assign error to the trial court's appointment
of Williams-Pearce, Professional Land Surveyors, to survey the
boundary of the easement, arguing that the trial court's findings
and the evidence were insufficient to locate the easement.
However, the trial court ordered a survey of the boundaries of the
easement "as located and defined by this Judgment[.]" We conclude
that the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence before the
trial court were sufficient to locate the boundaries of the
easement. The trial court found the following: 10. . . . Plaintiff offered into evidence
without objection a map entitled "Farm Path
Location for Little River Soil Farm" prepared
by Williams-Pearce & Associates, P.A.,
Professional Land Surveyors, (hereafter
"Williams-Pearce Map") that shows [the
easement] as defined by the traveled area of
[the easement].
11. The "Soil and Gravel Portion" of [the
easement] as shown on the Williams-Pearce Map
varies in width from 12 to 26 feet.
12. The "Soil and Gravel Portion" of [the
easement] as shown on the Williams-Pearce Map
does not include shoulders and ditches.
. . .
24. The location of the "Soil and gravel
Portion" of [the easement] as shown on the
Williams-Pearce Map has remained in the same
place and has been clearly identifiable for at
least 20 years.
In finding 25, the trial court also found that "[f]or at least 20
years, . . . Plaintiff and . . . Plaintiff's predecessors in title
have maintained a clearly identifiable 30 foot right of way along
the 'Soil and Gravel Portion' of [the easement][.]" In its
judgment, the trial court stated that "[t]he location of [the
easement] is generally along the 'Soil and Gravel Path' as shown on
the Williams-Pearce Map[,]" and that "[t]he right of way of [the
easement] is 30 feet wide." We conclude that the evidence before
the trial court and the trial court's findings of fact were
sufficient to locate the easement. We overrule this assignment of
error.
IV.
Defendants argue the trial court erred by denying their
motions to dismiss under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b). "Theproper standard of review for a motion for an involuntary dismissal
under Rule 41 is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial
court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the
findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law and
its judgment."
Dean v. Hill, 171 N.C. App. 479, 483, 615 S.E.2d
699, 701 (2005). In support of this assignment of error,
Defendants repeat their argument that the evidence did not support
the trial court's determination that the easement was 30 feet wide.
Because we have already held that the trial court's findings were
supported by the evidence, and that the findings supported the
trial court's conclusion that the easement was 30 feet wide, we
overrule this assignment of error.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***