IN RE:
K.H. Harnett County
D.H. Nos. 04 J 82-83
E. Marshall Woodall and Duncan B. McCormick, for petitioner-
appellee Harnett County Department of Social Services.
Elizabeth Myrick Boone for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Michael J. Reece for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
On 20 April 2004, the Harnett County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that K.H. and D.H. were
neglected and dependent juveniles. Specifically, DSS alleged that
the children had been exposed to an injurious environment which
included domestic violence, drug use, and an attempted suicide by
the respondent-mother. The children had been placed with a
relative following respondent-mother's hospitalization for mental
health and substance abuse treatment, but were later removed and no
alternative child care arrangement existed. Respondent-mother
failed to make significant progress towards addressing the issuesthat led to removal of the children, and had failed to establish a
stable residence for the children. An order for non-secure tenure
was entered and the children remained in DSS custody. On 11 June
2004, the children were adjudicated neglected and dependent
juveniles.
On 1 March 2005, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent-
mother's parental rights. DSS alleged three grounds for
termination: (1) that respondent-mother had neglected the
juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) by allowing
them to live in a household which was injurious to their welfare,
and that the neglect continued and was likely to continue; (2) that
respondent-mother had willfully failed to pay a reasonable cost of
the care for the children although physically and financially able
to do so, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3); and (3) that
respondent was incapable of providing for the proper care and
supervision of the juveniles, such that the juveniles were
dependent juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101,
and there was a reasonable probability that such incapability would
continue for the foreseeable future, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(6).
Hearings were held on the motion to terminate respondent's
parental rights on 17 November 2005 and 13 January 2006. The trial
court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1), (3), and (6) to terminate respondent's parental
rights. The court further concluded that it was in the children's
best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals. After a careful review of the record and
briefs, we affirm.
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court erred by
finding that there were grounds to support the termination of her
parental rights. Respondent-mother further argues that the trial
court's findings of fact were not supported by competent evidence
in the record. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for
terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the
separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a
termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the termination must
show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds
authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.” In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997) (citing N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30(d) and (e)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that
respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The children were removed from respondent-
mother's care due to her abuse of heroin and cocaine, a suicide
attempt, and her hospitalization for mental health issues, which
included bipolar and panic disorders. The adjudication of neglect
required that respondent-mother “attend all mental health
appointments [and] follow recommendations of treatment plan,
including any medication regimen.” However, at the time of the
hearing, said issues continued to exist. See In re Shermer, 156N.C. App. 281, 286, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2003) (citation omitted)
(“[a]lthough prior adjudications of neglect may be admitted and
considered by the trial court, they will rarely be sufficient,
standing alone, to support a termination of parental rights, since
the petition must establish that neglect exists at the time of
hearing. Thus, the trial court must also consider evidence of
changed conditions in light of the history of neglect by the parent
and the probability of a repetition of neglect”).
The trial court concluded that “[t]he acts of neglect of the
juveniles continue up to the date of hearing and the likelihood is
that said neglect would occur in the future if the children were
returned to the mother.” The trial court based its conclusion on
findings that: (1) respondent-mother had failed to consistently
attend mental health appointments and then declared she no longer
needed treatment; (2) had failed to consistently take her
medication for her bipolar disorder; and (3) had been dismissed
from PRIDE, a drug treatment program, for failure to attend. The
court based its findings on evidence in the record, including: (1)
an admission to a foster care social worker, the day before the
first hearing, that she was no longer taking her medication for
bipolar disorder; (2) further testimony from the same social worker
that respondent-mother failed to attend any mental health
treatment; and (3) testimony from the same social worker that
respondent-mother never pursued any drug treatment, and had been
dismissed from drug treatment for failure to attend. Accordingly,
this Court believes there was clear, cogent, and convincingevidence in the record to support the trial court's findings and
conclusion that grounds exist to terminate respondent-mother's
parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1) to support the trial court's order, the remaining
grounds found by the trial court to support termination need not be
reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at
233-34. Furthermore, since we conclude that evidence in the record
supports the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
that grounds exist to terminate respondent-mother's parental
rights, we do not address respondent-mother's remaining assignments
of error regarding other findings of fact.
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by
determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best
interests of the children. Once the trial court has found that
grounds exist to terminate parental rights, “the court shall
determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the
juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005).
The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights at the
disposition stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C.
101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). Here, in light of
respondent-mother's history of drug abuse and mental illness, her
failure to adequately address these issues, and the juveniles' need
for a stable and permanent home, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in
the juveniles' best interest. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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