Converted WP file 061206-1

    Appeal by respondent-mother and intervenor-grandmother from order entered 18 July 2006 by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Catawba County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 January 2007.
    Catawba County Department of Social Services, by J. David Abernethy for petitioner.

    Michael E. Casterline, for respondent-mother.

    Cynthia Philips Goelling, for respondent-father.

D. Shawn Clark, for intervenor-grandmother.

Mary McKay, for Guardian ad Litem.

    LEVINSON, Judge.

    Respondent, the mother of the minor child “Karen,”   (See footnote 1) and intervenor, the child's grandmother, appeal from an order changing the permanent plan for Karen from reunification with her father to adoption. We dismiss grandmother's appeal and, after considering the merits of mother's appeal, affirm the order.
    Karen was born in October 1997. In November 1999 she was adjudicated dependent, based on a petition filed 17 September 1999 by petitioner, Catawba County Department of Social Services (DSS).At the adjudication proceeding, respondent stipulated that her substance abuse and alcohol abuse rendered her unable to parent Karen. At the dispositional hearing, the court allowed respondent to retain custody of Karen, and in September 2000 the court ceased further reviews of the situation.
    In April 2004 respondent began serving a six month prison term for violation of probation. Karen was initially placed with the intervenor. However, on 19 August 2004 a second petition was filed, stating that respondent had an extensive criminal record and was incarcerated for violation of probation. It also alleged that DSS had substantiated a report of neglect and dependency, on the grounds that intervenor allowed her son (Karen's uncle) to care for the child and to drive her to school when he had been drinking alcohol. A nonsecure custody order was issued, placing Karen in the custody of DSS. In May 2005 Karen was adjudicated neglected and dependent, and her custody was continued with DSS. On 28 June 2005 the trial court granted intervenor's motion to be joined as a party to the proceeding in the role of “caretaker.”
    After several continuances, the trial court issued an initial permanency planning order on 21 November 2005. The order found, inter alia, that a psychological evaluation of respondent had resulted in a diagnosis of narcissism and an arrogant attitude; and that respondent had no drivers' license and did not “comprehend[] how her actions led to the child's removal.” The trial court also found that the adult members of Karen's family “continue to assert their needs rather than the child's.” The trial court directedthat the permanent plan for Karen be reunification with her father. Permanency planning review orders were entered on 13 February 2006 and 25 April 2006, continuing custody with DSS, allowing visitation by respondent and intervenor, and keeping the permanent plan as reunification with the father.     On 18 July 2006 the trial court entered a permanency planning review order that changed the permanent plan from reunification with Karen's father to adoption. This order also changed mother's visitation with the juvenile. From this order respondent and intervenor appeal.

    After careful review, we dismiss intervenor's appeal for significant violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Under N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4), an appellant's brief must include a “statement of grounds for appellate review.” Intervenor's purported “Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review” simply cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-26, the statute that grants appellate courts general jurisdiction over appellate matters. If this were sufficient, then Rule 28(b)(4) would serve no purpose. Intervenor fails to state the grounds for her right to appeal from the specific order at issue, in violation of Rule 28.
    Significantly, intervenor fails to cite any case law in support of any of her arguments. Indeed, intervenor cites only three authorities: (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-26, granting appellate courts general jurisdiction over appellate matters; (2) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(18), stating the definition of the term “reasonableefforts”; and (3) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907, which sets out procedures to be followed in a permanency planning hearing. These generalized citations fall far short of supporting any of the specific positions advanced by intervenor in her brief.
    N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) states in relevant part that “[t]he argument shall contain a concise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for each question presented[.]” Here, intervenor sets forth five separate arguments in her brief. The first two assert that certain findings of fact are “not supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” The third and fourth arguments assert that certain conclusions of law “are not supported by the Findings of Fact or by the evidence in the record.” The fifth argument asserts that the trial court committed “plain error or abused its discretion” by eliminating intervenor as a placement option and by decreeing that adoption be the permanent plan. In an apparent effort to comply with Rule 28(b)(6), intervenor makes the singular assertion that the “standard of review is abuse of discretion[]” without setting forth any statutory or common law authority to support this standard of review. Of course, plain error review does not apply to civil proceedings, In re L.M.C., 170 N.C. App. 676, 678, 613 S.E.2d 256, 257 (2005). And the clear and convincing standard only applies to findings for adjudications pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807 (2005) (adjudicating petitions alleging abuse, neglect and/or dependency), and for findings related to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2005) (adjudicating petitionsto terminate parental rights). In short, intervenor has not set forth an accurate standard of review for each question presented.
    As a result of intervenor's violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, particularly her failure to set forth legal authority in support of her arguments, review by this Court would require us to construct intervenor's appeal. “It is not the role of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an appellant.” Viar v. N.C. Dep't. of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361, reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005) (citations omitted). “The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and 'failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal.'” Id. at 401, 610 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)).
    Intervenor's appeal is dismissed.

    Respondent's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to make certain findings of fact required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 (2005).
    Under Section 7B-907(b), at “the conclusion of the [permanency planning] hearing, if the juvenile is not returned home, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding those that are relevant:
    (1)    Whether it is possible for the juvenile to be returned home immediately or within the next six months, and if not, why it is not in the juvenile's best interests to return home; . . . .
    (3)    Where the juvenile's return home is unlikely within six months, whether adoption should be pursued and if so, any barriers to the juvenile's adoption;

        . . . .
    Respondent argues that the trial court failed to make “specific written findings” required by Section 7B-907(b)(1) as to “why it was not in the child's best interest to return home,” and failed to make findings about any “barriers” to Karen's adoption as required by Section 7B-907(b)(3). We disagree.
    Regarding the reasons why it was not in Karen's best interest to return home, we note that the trial court's findings of fact included, in pertinent part, the following:
        The mother has reported that she works from 7:30 to 5:30 Monday through Thursday, and from 7:30 to 3:30 on Fridays, but no other details are known. She is no longer attending classes at CVCC. . . . She has no driver's license. She has completed parenting classes but is unable to demonstrate lessons taught. She scored low on tests for understanding of the subject matter. The mother continues to display narcissistic behavior. She admitted that she relapsed and used cocaine in March of 2006. Her drug and alcohol screens have been negative except for her most recent test in which she tested at 0.48% and 0.44 % blood alcohol. . . . [She] is dependent on others for every aspect of everyday life and is unable to care for the child. Further efforts with her to prevent or eliminate the need for placement clearly would be futile and inconsistent with the child's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.

(emphasis added). Respondent's assertion, that the trial court failed to state any reasons why it was not in Karen's best interestto return home, is simply erroneous in light of this and other findings.
    Respondent also asserts that the trial court failed to make findings regarding “any barriers to the juvenile's adoption.” However:
        by changing the permanent plan . . . to adoption, the trial court necessarily determined it was not in the children's best interests to return home within the next six months, pursuant to § 7B-907(b)(1); . . .[and] that adoption should be pursued despite the presence of potential barriers thereto, pursuant to § 7B-907(b)(3)[.] . . . After a careful review of the permanency planning order, we conclude that . . . the trial court has made sufficient findings of ultimate facts concerning each of the § 7B-907(b) factors. While the permanency planning order does not specifically identify any of these findings as being made pursuant to any of the § 7B-907(b) factors, we do not read Harton to so require, as long as the trial court makes findings of fact on the relevant § 7B-907(b) factors[.]

In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 154, 161 (2004) (citing In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003)). This assignment of error is overruled.
    For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the intervenor's appeal must be dismissed, and that the trial court's order changing the permanent plan for Karen from reunification with her father to adoption should be affirmed.
    Dismissed in part; affirmed in part.
    Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

Footnote: 1