v
.
Davidson County
No. 05 CVD 1656
MONTE JOHNSON,
Defendant.
Willie M. Kennedy, for defendant-appellant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Monte Johnson (defendant) appeals an order denying his motion
to modify child support. Defendant executed a Voluntary Support
Agreement (VSA) that was entered by the court 31 August 2005. This
VSA required him to pay $416.00 monthly beginning 1 July 2005. On
2 November 2005 defendant filed a motion to decrease his child
support obligation, asserting that he had to change jobs because
the job I had at the time the support calculation was made has laid
me off two times which made job security uncertain. My new job .
. . pays less and provides lower benefits, but it is a secure
position. After a contested hearing on this motion, the trial
court, in an order entered 28 April 2006, denied the motion to
decrease. The trial court made the following findings of fact: 1. That at the time of the entry of the
Voluntary Support Agreement on August 31,
2005, the Defendant was gainfully employed at
Johnson Controls.
2. The Defendant has an embalming license and
fork lift certification. He was also working
at Johnson Home of Memory at the time the
Order (VSA) was entered.
3. The Defendant was laid off from Johnson
Controls where he had been employed for
approximately nine (9) years. The Defendant
was then called back. A few weeks later, the
Defendant voluntarily left his employment with
Johnson Controls and went to work at a lower
paying job. . . . During the approximately
nine (9) years with Johnson Controls, there
had been only two or three layoffs.
Upon these findings, the trial court concluded that
defendant's separation from his previous employment with Johnson
Controls was a voluntary separation and denied the motion to
decrease.
On appeal, defendant's central contention is that the trial
court misapplied the law in that it did not consider whether his
reduction in income was done with the purpose of deliberately
depressing his income. Defendant further asserts that the trial
court erroneously imputed income to him based upon his capacity to
earn because it did not find that he depressed his income to avoid
his child support obligation. We disagree.
This Court has summarized the pertinent law as follows:
A substantial and involuntary decrease in a
parent's income constitutes a changed
circumstance, and can justify a modification
of a child support obligation, even though the
needs of the child are unchanged. A voluntary
decrease in a parent's income, even if
substantial, does not constitute a changed
circumstance which alone can justify a
modification of a child support award. Avoluntary and substantial decrease in a
parent's income can constitute a changed
circumstance only if accompanied by a
substantial decrease in the needs of the
child. In determining whether the party has
sustained a decrease in income, the party's
actual earnings are to be used by the trial
court if the voluntary decrease was in good
faith. If the voluntary decrease in income is
in bad faith, the party's earning capacity is
to be used by the trial court in determining
whether there has in fact been a decrease in
income. The burden of showing good faith
rests with the party seeking a reduction in
the child support award.
Mittendorff v. Mittendorff, 133 N.C. App. 343, 344, 515 S.E.2d 464,
466 (1999) (citations omitted); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a)
(2005)(modification of child support obligation upon showing of
changed circumstances).
Here, defendant concedes that his decrease in income was
voluntary. The record reveals that defendant made no showing
whatsoever before the trial court that the needs of the child had
decreased or changed in any way. On appeal, defendant does not
address the requirement that the child's needs changed where child
support obligors seek a decrease based upon a voluntary decrease in
income. Even assuming that the reduction in defendant's income is
considered substantial and in good faith, there has been no showing
that the needs of the child have decreased. Consequently,
consistent with the holding in Mittendorff, supra, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion
to decrease.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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