IN RE: J.P.M.,
A Juvenile. Mecklenburg County
No. 05 JB 230
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Letitia C. Echols, attorney for the State.
Bryan Gates, attorney for respondent-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Respondent juvenile appeals from an order of the district
court finding him in violation of his probation and committing him
to a Youth Development Center.
On 10 March 2005, a juvenile petition was filed alleging that
respondent had committed breaking and entering. On 4 April 2005,
respondent was adjudicated as delinquent upon his admission to the
breaking and entering charge. Respondent was sentenced at a Level
1 disposition and given six months of probation. On 11 May 2005,
additional juvenile petitions were filed against respondent
alleging injury to personal property, larceny and possession of
stolen goods. The charges of injury to personal property and
larceny were dismissed, but respondent admitted to the charge ofpossession of stolen goods. The trial court ordered a Level 2
disposition, imposed a suspended fourteen-day sentence, continued
respondent's probation for nine months and ordered respondent to
pay restitution.
On 10 October 2005, the State filed a motion for review
alleging that respondent had violated his probation by failing to
attend school for seven days and for violating his curfew. Upon
respondent's admission to the alleged probation violations, the
trial court, imposing a Level 2 disposition, changed his curfew to
6:00 p.m. and required him to serve seven days detention with seven
days suspended.
On 15 December 2005, another juvenile petition was filed
alleging that respondent had committed larceny and possession of
stolen goods. Upon respondent's admission to the charges, the
trial court imposed a Level 2 disposition, imposed a suspended
sentence of fourteen days of detention and extended respondent's
probation by three months.
On 4 May 2006, the State filed a motion for review alleging
that respondent had again violated his probation by missing seven
days of school. Following a hearing on 15 May 2006, the trial
court found that respondent had violated his probation based on
respondent's admissions. While the State recommended a Level 2
disposition in its predisposition report, the trial court entered
a Level 3 disposition and committed respondent to placement in a
training school. The period of time for which respondent was
committed is not included in either the order on the motion forreview or in the disposition and commitment order. However, the
trial court did state at the hearing that respondent was to be
committed “for an indefinite period of time up to his eighteenth
birthday.” On 24 May 2006, respondent filed a notice of appeal
from these 15 May 2006 orders.
On 6 June 2006, the trial court ordered that respondent remain
committed at the Youth Development Center pending his appeal. This
order also stated that the period of time for respondent's
commitment was to be “no less than six months and no more than his
18th birthday.”
Respondent contends on appeal that the trial court's written
orders fail to comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-2512. Specifically,
respondent asserts that the trial court failed to make adequate
factual findings and conclusions of law to support its
determination that he violated his probation or to support its
decision to impose the Level 3 disposition of commitment to
training school.
We first address respondent's contention that findings in the
order on the motion for review are insufficient to support the
trial court's conclusion that respondent violated the terms of his
probation. In the order, the trial court made the following two
findings of fact:
1. The juvenile, appearing with counsel,
freely and voluntarily ADMITS the allegations
in the following Motion(s) for Review:
MOTION(S) FOR REVIEW: Filed: 10/10/2005.
2. As a result of the juvenile's admission
and the Court finding a factual basis for the
admission, the Court further finds by thegreater weight of the evidence that the
juvenile has violated his/her probation.
In the State's motion for review referenced by the trial court, the
State alleged that respondent's failure to attend schools violated
a condition of his probation.
This Court has previously held that a finding that a juvenile
has violated his probation in the manner set forth in the State's
verified motion for review, constitutes a sufficient finding of
fact to support a conclusion that the juvenile had violated his
probation. See In re D.J.M., __ N.C. App. __, __, 638 S.E.2d 610,
611 (2007) (affirming probation revocation where trial court found
that a delinquent juvenile had admitted the allegations of
probation violation “as alleged” in State's motion for review); see
also State v. Henderson, __ N.C. App. __, __, 632 S.E.2d 818, 822
(2006) (holding that in adjudicating allegations of probation
violation, trial court's findings of fact are sufficient when they
“incorporate[ ] by reference” State's probation violation report);
In re O'Neal, 160 N.C. App. 409, 412-13, 585 S.E.2d 478, 481
(holding that the trial court is required to find only that the
juvenile violated the conditions of his probation), disc. review
denied, 357 N.C. 657, 590 S.E.2d 270 (2003). Accordingly, we hold
the trial court's findings and conclusions were sufficient to
support its determination that respondent violated probation.
We next turn to respondent's argument that the trial court
failed to enter adequate findings and conclusions of law in support
of its decision to enter a Level 3 disposition and commitrespondent to training school. Specifically, respondent asserts
that the trial court was required to include in its written
disposition order “appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of
law” in accordance with N.C.G.S. §7B-2512. Respondent further
asserts that, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(c), these findings
must reflect the trial court's selection of a disposition designed
to protect the public and to meet the needs and best interests of
the juvenile, based upon:
(1) The seriousness of the offense;
(2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable;
(3) The importance of protecting the public
safety;
(4) The degree of culpability indicated by the
circumstances of the particular case; and
(5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of
the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs
assessment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501(c). The State responds that probation
violation proceedings are governed exclusively by N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2510 and that the requirements of §§ 7B-2501(c) and 2512 apply only
to “initial disposition orders.”
The State is correct that the statutory provisions that govern
juvenile probation violations are found at N.C.G.S. § 7B-2510(d)-
(f). Upon a finding of a probation violation, § 7B-2510(e)
authorizes the trial court to:
continue the original conditions of probation,
modify the conditions of probation, or, except
as provided in subsection (f) of this section,
order a new disposition at the next higher
level on the disposition chart in G.S.
7B-2508. In the court's discretion, part ofthe new disposition may include an order of
confinement in a secure juvenile detention
facility for up to twice the term authorized
by G.S. 7B-2508.
Thus, upon finding that a juvenile has violated the conditions of
his probation, the statute authorizes the trial court to select
from several options, including the entry of a new disposition.
The State has failed to cite, nor do we find, any authority
for its position that a disposition entered upon a probation
violation is not subject to the general statutory provisions
governing juvenile delinquency dispositions. We have consistently
held that juvenile probation revocation proceedings are
dispositional. See, e.g., In re O'Neal, 160 N.C. App. at 412-13,
585 S.E.2d at 480-81 (holding that issues of double jeopardy did
not apply to a probation violation hearing because they are
dispositional hearings); see also In re D.J.M., __ N.C. App. at __,
638 S.E.2d at 613 (holding that a juvenile probation violation
hearing is a form of dispositional hearing such that the statute
setting out conditions under which a court may accept admissions by
a juvenile did not apply to admission by juvenile that he violated
conditions of probation). It is often the case that a trial court
is faced with a series of dispositional decisions in a single
juvenile case. Frequently, as in the case sub judice, such
subsequent dispositional determinations must be made in response to
the juvenile violating the conditions of his probation. The
purpose of Article 25 of the Juvenile Code which governs
dispositions is “to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve
the objectives of the State in exercising jurisdiction, includingthe protection of the public. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2500.
Moreover, the trial court is charged with developing a disposition
in each case that:
(1) Promotes public safety;
(2) Emphasizes accountability and
responsibility of both the parent,
guardian, or custodian and the juvenile
for the juvenile's conduct; and
(3) Provides the appropriate consequences,
treatment, training, and rehabilitation
to assist the juvenile toward becoming a
nonoffending, responsible, and productive
member of the community.
Id. Such purposes are no less applicable in a disposition
following a probation violation than in an initial disposition
immediately following a delinquency adjudication. Accordingly, the
State has failed to support its contention that the provisions of
N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-2501(c) and 2512 do not apply to a trial court's
disposition following a probation violation. See, e.g., In re
T.B., __ N.C. App. __, __, 631 S.E.2d 857, 859 (2006) (noting that
the trial court did not make any findings in accordance with
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2512 to support a Level 3 disposition of commitment
following the juvenile's probation violation).
While we acknowledge that the trial court has discretion in
determining the proper disposition, the trial court must “select
the most appropriate disposition both in terms of kind and duration
for the delinquent juvenile,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501(c), and
this choice must be adequately supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2512; In re Ferrell, 162
N.C. App. 175, 177, 589 S.E.2d 894,895-896 (2004) (holding that thetrial court abused its discretion in failing to make findings of
fact in the dispositional order supporting the change of custody
from mother to father).
Here, neither the trial court's order on the motion for review
nor the disposition and commitment order satisfy the statutory
requirements. With the exception of the two factual findings
related to respondent's probation violation set out in our
discussion above, the form order entered by the trial court
following the hearing on the motion for review contains only one
additional finding:
The Court finds that the criteria for secure
custody has been met according to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1903(b), (c) or (d) and the Court
is directing the following person(s) to assume
custody of the juvenile: Department of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Aside from these three, pre-printed factual findings marked by the
trial court, the only other substantive entry states that “juvenile
is committed to Level 3 training school.”
Further, the “Juvenile Level 3 Disposition and Commitment
Order” entered by the trial court contains only two findings: “The
juvenile's delinquency history is high” and “[t]he Court received
and considered a predisposition report.” This form order contains
no further factual findings, nor did the trial court check the box
indicating that it was incorporating the factual allegations in the
predisposition report.
Not only does this disposition order fail to make appropriate
findings of fact, the remaining space on the form allocated toconclusions of law and the entry of the order provisions are
completely blank. As such, this order not only fails to set forth
legal conclusions, but even fails to specify the terms of the
order, including the duration of respondent's commitment.
In conclusion, neither of the trial court's orders contain
appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2512 such that this Court can determine whether the
trial court adequately considered the relevant factors specified by
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(c). Consequently, we affirm the trial court's
order finding that respondent violated his probation, but reverse
the dispositional order and remand for a new dispositional hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for a new
dispositional hearing.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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