IN RE: T.B.J.B. and Z.C., Mecklenburg County
Minor Children Nos. 05 JT 20-21
Thomas B. Kakassy, for respondent-mother appellant.
Mecklenburg County Attorney's Office, by Tyrone C. Wade, for
petitioner appellee.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court's order
terminating her parental rights to the minor children T.B.J.B.
(“T.B.”) and Z.C. We affirm.
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) was awarded non-secure custody of respondent-mother and her
two children on 17 July 2002. Respondent-mother was sixteen years
old; her son, T.B., was thirteen months old; and her daughter,
Z.C., was one and one-half months old. All three juveniles were
placed in foster care. T.B. and Z.C. were adjudicated dependent
juveniles on 10 September 2002. Respondent-mother attained majority
in January of 2004.
DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent-mother's parental
rights to T.B. and Z.C. on 12 January 2005, asserting as groundsfor termination that she (1) neglected the juveniles, (2) willfully
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the
juveniles for more than six continuous months immediately prior to
the filing of the petition, and (3) willfully left the juveniles in
a placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without
reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that necessitated
the placement under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3) (2005). The
petitions further sought termination of the unknown father's
parental rights, based on the aforementioned grounds as well as the
father's failure to legitimate the juveniles, establish paternity,
or provide substantial financial support of consistent care to
respondent-mother and the juveniles.
After a hearing, the district court entered the following
findings of fact pertinent to respondent-mother:
8. [Youth and Family Services (“YFS”)] has
been involved with the respondent mother
since 1991, initially as a juvenile and
subsequently as a parent.
9. The respondent mother was five-years-old
when YFS began receiving reports of abuse
or neglect [of] her.
10. The respondent mother's own life . . . as
[a] child involved being exposed to drug
use and an unsafe environment created by
her mother.
11. The respondent mother's lack of any
history of having a stable home as a
child has not allowed her to develop
appropriate parenting skills and she
learned the behavior of inappropriate
parenting skills and discipline as the
norm.
12. When these children were placed in the
department's custody, YFS entered into a
case plan with the respondent mother
which was appropriate considering [her]
age. . . .
13. In that case plan, [respondent mother]
agreed to: engage in counseling, complete
parenting education, complete her GED
and, at an appropriate time, to obtain
appropriate housing and employment, as
well as to attend medical appointments
with the children.
14. The respondent mother procrastinated with
respect to parenting education. She
ultimately completed parenting classes on
January 10, 2005. When the respondent
mother began working with the parent
educator, however, she was unable to
complete that service and, on July 12,
2005, the mother threw a tantrum. During
a fit of rage she cursed and screamed at
the parent educator along with others who
were present, including the children.
After that incident, the mother had
little or no contact with YFS.
15. The respondent mother has not been able
to establish patience with the children,
although there has been some improvement
since she turned 18.
16. The mother has gained insight with
respect to her anger management issues
but has not reached a level in which she
can apply those skills while in
situations in which she becomes angry.
She has not learned to set boundaries
with the children.
17. While the respondent mother has . . .
matured somewhat, she remains saddled
with an 8th grade education and
destructive character habits to the point
where she cannot put lessons learned into
practice and control her anger issues
before they appear.
18. The respondent mother engaged in therapy
with Desiree Rew
(See footnote 1)
for anger management,
after many false starts with another
therapist whom the mother said she did
not like. The respondent mother saw Ms.
Rew for approximately two years for anger
management; however, she missed as many
as one out of every four therapist
appointments with Ms. Rew during her most
consistent period of attendance.
19. The respondent mother testified . . .
that despite the altercation between
herself and the parenting educator in the
summer of 2005 and the fact that she had
not attended further therapy since that
altercation she no longer needed to be in
therapy.
20. The respondent mother has obtained
subsidized housing for which she pays
$25.00 per month.
21. . . . She has obtained employment and has
been working for the last four months at
approximately 35 hours per week at the
rate of $5.50 per hour.
22. She testified that her only expenses were
rent, food and telephone. Her current
housing is a three bedroom apartment. It
was initially furnished but the friend
. . . took the furniture back.
23. YFS has spent $45,000.00 in caring for
the children since they've been in the
department's custody as well as providing
Medicaid benefits.
24. The respondent mother was never ordered
to pay child support; however, she has
paid nothing toward the children's cost
of care. She has provided several items
of clothing for the children.
25. During the six months preceding the
filing of the petitions to terminate therespondent mother's parental rights the
respondent mother was employed at the
Airport in the housekeeping department.
26. Since the incident in July 2005, the
respondent mother has only provided one
outfit for the children.
27. After the mother was placed in the
Department's custody she . . . on July 8,
2003 went AWOL with the children. Since
taking the children without permission in
July 2003 the children have thereafter
been placed in a separate residence from
the respondent mother.
28. The mother has not completed the
components of her GED.
. . . .
31. The children have specific educational
needs that require consistent parenting
and are doing well in their placements
and have been there for one and a half
years. They are currently in a foster to
adopt home.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that three grounds for
terminating respondent-mother's parental rights had been
established, as follows:
2. The respondent [mother has] neglected
these juveniles as that term is defined
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) in that
[she has] failed to provide proper care,
supervision and discipline for the
juveniles . . . .
3. The children have been placed in the
custody of [DSS,] and the respondent
mother, for a continuous period of more
than six (6) months next preceding the
filing of the petition, has willfully
failed for such period to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care
for said child[ren] although physically
and financially able to do so.
4. The respondent [mother has] willfully
left the juveniles in foster care or
placement outside the home for more than
twelve (12) months without showing to the
satisfaction of the Court that reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been
made in correcting those conditions which
led to the removal of the juveniles.
. . . .
6. The court concludes that despite the
mother's age when she and the children
were placed in the department's custody
she has to bear the responsibility for
her own actions over the last several
years, including her lack of maturity.
The mother's own lack of maturity and
behavioral issues from her childhood are
not something the court or DSS can
eliminate . . . . The only way to ensure
permanence for these children in a
reasonable amount of time is through
termination of parental rights.
7. The best interests of the above-named
juveniles would be served by the
termination of parental rights of both
parents with respect to these juveniles.
In light of its findings and conclusions, the court terminated both
parents' parental rights. Respondent-mother filed timely notice of
appeal.
Respondent-mother challenges the court's Findings of Fact 11
and 31 on the ground that they were based on a parenting capacity
evaluation that was not introduced into evidence at the termination
hearing. In her second claim, she avers that the court improperly
based its decision to terminate her parental rights, “at least in
part, upon her age at the conception and birth of the children.”
Finally, respondent-mother asserts that the court abused itsdiscretion in determining that termination of her parental rights
served the best interests of her children.
A proceeding to terminate parental rights involves distinct
adjudicatory and dispositional stages. At the adjudicatory stage,
the district court must determine whether the petitioner has
established one or more grounds for termination under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. If
the court finds at least one statutory ground for termination, it
proceeds to the dispositional stage. In selecting an appropriate
disposition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2004) (amended
1 October 2005), the court must terminate the respondent's parental
rights unless it finds that doing so would be contrary to the best
interests of the child. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613,
543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001).
In reviewing an order terminating parental rights, our task is
to determine whether any contested findings of fact are supported
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the court's
findings of fact, in turn, support its conclusions of law. See In
re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal
dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9
(2001). A finding of fact that is not challenged by a properly
briefed assignment of error is binding on appeal. See Koufman v.
Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Although
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, In re J.S.L., __ N.C. App.
__, __, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006), any single ground for
termination is sufficient to support a termination of parentalrights. In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89,
93-94 (2004). Accordingly, once we find a valid ground for
termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a), we need not review
any additional grounds included in the termination order. Huff,
140 N.C. App. at 293, 536 S.E.2d at 842. We review the district
court's disposition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 only for abuse
of discretion. See In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 744, 535 S.E.2d
367, 373 (2000).
Respondent-mother has not assigned error to any of the
findings of fact related to her failure to provide a reasonable
portion of the cost of the children's care under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(3); nor has she assigned error to the court's
conclusions of law that grounds for termination exist under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) based on her failure to defray any of
their cost of care. Because these findings and conclusions are
binding on appeal, we need not review either of the remaining
grounds found by the court. In re J.M.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 635
S.E.2d 916, 919 (2006) (“Since the unchallenged grounds are
sufficient to support the trial court's order of termination, we
affirm without examining [r]espondent-mother's arguments as to the
other grounds.”); accord In re C.D.A.W., 175 N.C. App. 680, 686,
625 S.E.2d 139, 143, disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 638 S.E.2d
464 (2006). We note, however, that respondent-mother has not
assigned error to the court's conclusions that grounds for
termination exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). In light of their potential impact on the court's evaluation
of the children's best interests, we will review respondent-
mother's challenge to Findings of Fact 11 and 31.
Respondent-mother claims that no evidence supported the
court's finding that her “lack of any history of having a stable
home as a child has not allowed her to develop appropriate
parenting skills and she learned the behavior of inappropriate
parenting skills and discipline as the norm.” We disagree. YFS
social worker Belinda McLaughlin testified that respondent
“need[ed] to learn skills in parenting” and that her initial case
plan required her to learn parenting skills. Shymia Neal, who
provided in-home family education services to respondent-mother
from April to July of 2005, testified that respondent-mother needed
to learn how to apply the lessons from her parenting classes, and
“to learn and apply positive discipline techniques for parenting
the child.” When Neal first observed respondent with her children,
respondent was unable to respond effectively to her children's
behavior problems. By the time Neal began in-home instruction with
respondent, the children's behavior had “gotten worse . . . and
[respondent] wasn't overall able to redirect them or handle them in
a positive manner.” On “several occasions” during the in-home
sessions, respondent-mother displayed “a negative way of coming
across[,]” used “inappropriate language” and was “very loud and out
of control.” On 12 July 2005, the police were called to Walton
Plaza after respondent “started cussing, just going out of control”
and threatened to hit Neal in front of her children. Neal ceasedworking with respondent after this episode because respondent
failed to attend a scheduled meeting with her supervisor.
Respondent was terminated from the program when she failed to
reschedule the meeting. Neal testified that respondent made no
progress on any of the three goals of her parenting education.
Respondent-mother's former therapist, Desiree Rule Johnson,
testified that she worked with respondent from 2003 until June of
2005 in the areas of anger management, her “strained relationship”
with her own mother, and “helping her develop some appropriate
ways, better ways to deal with frustrating situations, . . . as
well as to kind of process her life and how it impact[ed] and was
impacting her decisions at the time.” In observing respondent with
her children on five occasions ending in July of 2004, Johnson
found that she was “very caring” but had difficulties establishing
boundaries with the children. Counsel for respondent-mother
elicited the following testimony from Johnson as to the effect of
respondent's upbringing:
I think [her] upbringing, her background
impacted her tremendously in terms of um, a
lot of her behavior was pretty much learned.
It was, she dealt with situations the way she
had seen situations dealt with. Um, she and
she didn't really know at the time other ways
to do things. Just what she had been brought
up, the things that were going on around her.
That's pretty much how she dealt with life and
so I think it did have a great impact on her.
She did not have a, she did not grow up in a
stable environment um, and I think that had a
lot to do with her inability to get stable.
Because I don't think that [respondent] really
knows what that looks like, what a stable
environment looks like.
When asked to assess whether respondent had developed insight into
her anger management issues, Johnson replied that “she does realize
the problem but when she is face to face with it at the time, she's
not able to put it in practice.” Asked why her therapy ended,
Johnson testified that respondent grew inconsistent with her
attendance and “just kind of made a few and missed a few and never
followed up.” Respondent called Johnson for an appointment after
the incident with Neal on 12 July 2005, but respondent failed to
show up for the appointment.
The evidence set forth above amply supported the court's
finding that respondent-mother's difficulty in developing effective
parenting skills was the product of her upbringing in an unstable
home without an appropriate parenting model. Therefore, we overrule
this assignment of error.
Respondent-mother also challenges the evidentiary support for
the court's Finding of Fact 31 that “[t]he children have specific
educational needs that require consistent parenting[.]” Our review
of the transcript reveals that the children's social worker,
Crystal Simpson, testified that T.B. “is having difficulty in
school, . . . continues to have some anger management problems and
outbursts in school” and had been diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder and ADHD. Although we agree with respondent-mother that
DSS adduced no evidence of Z.C.'s specific educational needs, we do
not believe the court's error in referring to both children's
educational needs had any impact on its overall assessment of
Z.C.'s best interests. Simpson testified that Z.C. was “doingextremely well” in her foster placement, and that she and T.B. had
been with the same adoptive foster family since 14 January 2005.
Moreover, McLaughlin's testimony that both children needed a parent
who was “consistent and nurturing, [and] stable” supported the
court's finding that T.B. and Z.C. “require consistent parenting.”
Because we find no prejudice to respondent-mother from the finding
that Z.C. has specific educational needs, we overrule this
assignment of error. Cf. In re T.M., __ N.C. App. __, __, 638
S.E.2d 236, 240-41 (2006).
Respondent next claims the court improperly chose to terminate
her parental rights due to her age at the conception and birth of
the children. Citing our decision in In re Matherly, 149 N.C. App.
452, 562 S.E.2d 15 (2002), she avers the court failed to take her
youth into account in assessing her compliance with DSS's case plan
and the willfulness of her leaving of the children in foster care.
She notes the absence of any age-appropriate services provided to
her by DSS during the period of her minority, other than the
parenting classes provided through the Family Center.
Although respondent was herself a juvenile when DSS obtained
non-secure custody of her children in 2002, DSS continued its
involvement with respondent after she attained majority in January
of 2004. Moreover, DSS developed a new case plan with respondent
on 30 March 2004, after she reached adulthood; and it did not file
the petition to terminate her parental rights until January of
2005. The grounds for termination alleged in DSS's petition and
found by the district court were based upon respondent's conductduring the twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition. Because respondent was an adult throughout the relevant
period, our decision in Matherly is inapposite. Id. at 454-55, 562
S.E.2d at 17 (addressing termination petition filed when respondent
was seventeen years old); see also In re J.G.B., __ N.C. App. __,
__, 628 S.E.2d 450, 456 (2006). Accordingly, we find no merit to
this claim.
Respondent-mother also argues that the district court abused
its discretion at the dispositional stage of proceedings by
electing to terminate her parental rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1110(a). Having found grounds for termination under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a), the court was required at the dispositional
stage to terminate respondent's parental rights “unless the court
shall further determine that the best interests of the juvenile
require that the parental rights of the parent not be terminated.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). As acknowledged by respondent-mother,
the best interest of the child is the focus of the inquiry at the
dispositional stage of termination proceedings under id. In re
Johnston, 151 N.C. App. 728, 731, 567 S.E.2d 219, 221 (2002). We
review the court's decision to terminate parental rights only for
manifest abuse of discretion. In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 75,
623 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2005).
As found by the district court, respondent-mother unilaterally
ceased the therapy needed to address her persistent anger-
management and behavioral issues in June of 2005. Similarly, she
made no progress in accomplishing the goals of her in-homeparenting education and failed to meet with Neal's supervisor in
order to resume these services after the incident in July of 2005.
Respondent-mother has made no progress on obtaining her GED since
2002 and took more than two years to complete six weeks of
parenting classes. Despite consistent employment and limited living
expenses, she provided nothing but a single outfit of clothes to
the children since July of 2005, and contributed nothing toward
their cost of care. The children have been in foster care since
July of 2002. At the time of the termination hearing, they had been
living with the same adoptive foster family since 14 January 2005,
and were thriving in their placement. We find no abuse of
discretion by the court.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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