STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Forysth County
Nos. 04 CRS 46235
04 CRS 63977
OSCAR LEE WHITE
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
John F. Oates, Jr., for the State.
Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Oscar Lee White (defendant) pled guilty to felony possession
of cocaine and habitual felon status. Pursuant to the plea,
defendant reserved his right to appeal an order denying his motion
to suppress.
Judge Andy Cromer sentenced defendant to a minimum
term of 101 months to a maximum term of 131 months
in the North
Carolina Department of Correction.
The findings in the order denying defendant's motion to
suppress tended to show: At approximately 4:44 p.m. on 19 November
2004, Officer J.P. Timberlake (Officer Timberlake),an eleven-year
veteran of the Winston-Salem Police Department, drove through an
area known for drug activity. Officer Timberlake observed a
stopped vehicle near a vacant building. He ascertained by the tagnumber of the stopped vehicle that it was registered to a female by
the name of Jennifer Goral(Ms. Goral). He also received
information that Ms. Goral was a missing or endangered person.
Based upon this information, Officer Timberlake turned his vehicle
around to stop behind the stopped vehicle.
Officer Timberlake subsequently observed a male, with his left
hand clenched, walk across the street and sit in the passenger seat
of the stopped vehicle, also occupied by a female. Officer
Timberlake observed that the male and female appeared to exchange
an item. Officer Timberlake approached the vehicle and asked the
female to show her hands, to exit the vehicle, and to identify
herself. She complied with his requests and identified herself as
Jennifer Goral.
Officer Timberlake also observed that the male passenger kept
his left hand hidden and down near the edge of the seat. Officer
Timberlake asked the male, identified as defendant, to show his
hands. Defendant refused. The officer noted that defendant was
visibly nervous and fidgety, and was breathing heavily. Defendant
jumped out of the vehicle and ran. Officer Timberlake pursued
defendant and grabbed him. The two men struggled and Officer
Timberlake asked defendant multiple times to stop and put his hands
behind his back. Defendant did not comply. Officer Timberlake
ultimately placed defendant in handcuffs with the assistance of a
passing motorist. Officer Timberlake arrested defendant for
resisting or delaying an officer. The officer searched defendant
incident to arrest and found cocaine on defendant's person. Based upon the foregoing facts, the court concluded that
Officer Timberlake lawfully approached defendant and that no
seizure occurred until Officer Timberlake ultimately subdued
defendant. The court concluded that the officer had legitimate
concerns for his safety and that he had the authority to ask
defendant to open his hands.
Defendant does not contest the court's findings of fact in the
order denying the motion to suppress; therefore, they are binding
and not reviewable. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 438, 446
S.E.2d 67, 68 (1994).
When findings of fact are not contested, our
review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact
support the court's conclusions of law. State v. Cheek, 351 N.C.
48, 63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245,
147 S.E.2d 965 (2000). Defendant contends the court erred by
denying the motion to suppress. He argues Officer Timberlake
lacked reasonable suspicion to forcibly detain defendant, and
thereby violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.
IV. The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment applies to
seizures of the person, including brief investigatory detentions
such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle. Watkins, 337
N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 69-70. To justify a brief investigatory
detention, the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rationalinferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). The
stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, based on
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362
(1979). The totality of the circumstances must be considered in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory
stop exists. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed.
2d 621, 629 (1981).
The court's findings of fact in the case at bar show that
Officer Timberlake, an officer having eleven years of experience,
observed a vehicle stopped in an area known for drug activity.
Upon further investigation, he discovered that the vehicle was
registered to a person reported as missing or endangered. He then
observed defendant get into the vehicle and engage in what appeared
to be a hand-to-hand exchange. At this point under the totality of
these circumstances, we conclude Officer Timberlake possessed
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the
vehicle.
We next determine whether Officer Timberlake had reasonable
suspicion to seize defendant. Some factors our courts have deemed
supportive of an officer's formulation of reasonable suspicion to
seize a defendant for investigative purposes include the
defendant's nervousness, State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 638-9,
517 S.E.2d 128, 134 (1999); evasive or furtive conduct, State v.
Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233-34, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992); orpresence in an area known for drug activity, when combined with
other suspicious actions, State v. Willis, 125 N.C. App. 537, 541-
42, 481 S.E.2d 407, 410-11 (1997).
In State v. Shearin, 170 N.C.
App. 222, 612 S.E.2d 371, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,
360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369 (2005), a case factually similar to the
case at bar, an officer stopped a vehicle in which the defendant
was a passenger. A second officer observed that the defendant
appeared agitated and intoxicated and that the defendant attempted
to hide an open container of an alcoholic beverage. The officer
asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. The officer also asked
the defendant whether he had any weapons. The defendant refused to
answer questions and ran away when the officer attempted to frisk
him for weapons. The officer apprehended the defendant and, during
a search incident to arrest, found marijuana and drug paraphernalia
on the defendant. We stated:
In looking at the totality of the
circumstances, it is reasonable for a police
officer to suspect that someone is armed and
dangerous when that person appears agitated,
is reluctant to answer when asked whether he
is armed, and not only refuses to be searched
for weapons, but also flees when he is about
to be searched. Officer Norton's search of
defendant was thus reasonable as a means of
protecting himself from being assaulted by
defendant.
Id. at 228, 612 S.E.2d at 377.
In the case at hand, Officer Timberlake observed defendant was
concealing something in his hand and when Officer Timberlake, not
knowing whether the item might be a weapon, asked defendant to open
his hand, defendant refused and attempted to flee. Prior to thatpoint Officer Timberlake observed nervous and furtive behavior on
defendant's part. Based upon these circumstances, we conclude
Officer Timberlake had reasonable suspicion to seize defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the motion to
suppress is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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