STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
Nos. 05 CRS 10034, 58534
TERRY EDWARD RHODES
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Amanda P. Little, attorney for the State.
Nancy R. Gaines, attorney for defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction
by a jury of felonious possession of stolen property and possession
of drug paraphernalia. These felonies were elevated to Class C due
to defendant's habitual felon status to which defendant stipulated.
At trial, the State introduced evidence tending to show the
following:
On 23 June 2005, a pickup truck owned by the Flowers Company,
a NAPA parts warehouse distributor in Hickory, North Carolina, was
stolen from the company parking lot. The general manager for the
Flowers Company immediately contacted the Hickory Police Department
and provided a description of the pickup truck. A few days later,an anonymous call prompted the Hickory store manager to contact the
Asheville area NAPA store and give them a description of the stolen
pickup truck. Approximately one day later, employees of the
Asheville store spotted the stolen pickup truck in Asheville, North
Carolina, and the Hickory store manager contacted the Buncombe
County Sheriff's Department.
On 29 June 2005, two deputies with the Buncombe County
Sheriff's Department were dispatched to the Nakon Motel in Candler,
North Carolina but were unable to locate the stolen pickup.
Shortly thereafter, the deputies were again dispatched to the motel
after the pickup was seen back at the motel. After locating the
pickup at the motel, a deputy confirmed that it was the one that
had been reported stolen. The deputies then spoke with the motel's
owners and learned that they had seen the stolen pickup truck used
by the occupants staying in Room 11 of the motel, which was
registered to George Carrington.
Based on this information, the deputies proceeded to Room 11,
and Mr. Carrington answered the door. When the door was opened,
the deputies observed a female lying on one of the beds, defendant
sitting in a chair to the left of the door and a crack pipe in
plain view. One of the deputies spoke with Mr. Carrington and the
female in the room while the other stood with the defendant just
outside the room.
Soon thereafter, defendant was arrested for possession of a
stolen vehicle. Before being placed in a squad car, defendant was
searched. During the search, the deputy removed a glass crack pipefrom defendant's shirt pocket and found a silver key with a black
plastic head with “GM” engraved on it in defendant's pants pocket.
The deputy testified that when he removed the key from defendant's
pocket, defendant voluntarily stated without questioning “he didn't
know what it was used for.” A deputy used the key to open and
start the stolen pickup truck.
Prior to transporting defendant to the detention center to be
processed, a deputy wrote defendant a citation for possession of
drug paraphernalia. Without advising defendant of his Miranda
rights, the deputy preparing the citation asked defendant for
certain information needed to complete the citation form, such as
defendant's address, date of birth, and employment. Defendant told
the deputy that he was employed by Hickory Chair.
Prior to trial, defendant filed two motions to suppress. In
the first motion, defendant argued for suppression of the glass
pipe and the key found on defendant at the time of his arrest
because his “subsequent arrest and search were without probable
cause and thus in violation of his Constitutional rights.” In his
second motion, defendant sought to suppress statements he made
subsequent to his arrest because he was never advised of his
Miranda rights. At a hearing on both motions, the State presented
evidence from the two deputies who arrested defendant. The
defendant did not present any evidence.
The trial court denied both of defendant's motions, ruling
that the glass pipe and key found on defendant during the search
incident to arrest, as well as defendant's statements after arrest,were admissible evidence at trial. Defendant assigns error to the
trial court's denial of his motions to suppress.
In his first assignment of error, defendant asserts that the
trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence
of the key found in his pocket. Specifically, he contends that the
deputies did not have probable cause for his arrest and,
consequently, the search incident to his arrest which produced the
key was also unlawful.
An officer may arrest without a warrant any person who the
officer has probable cause to believe has committed a felony. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(b)(2) (2005). The requisite probable cause
exists where the facts and circumstances known to the arresting
officer would warrant the belief of a prudent man that a felony has
been committed by the person to be arrested. State v. Medlin, 333
N.C. 280, 289, 426 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1993); State v. Grady, 73 N.C.
App. 452, 454, 326 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1985). When reviewing a trial
court's determination of probable cause for a warrantless arrest,
this Court is bound by the findings of the trial court if such
findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, but the
conclusions of law are for our de novo review. State v. Ray, 137
N.C. App. 326, 328, 527 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2000).
Here, the trial court made the following relevant findings:
[O]n June 29 of 2005, that the two
deputies who testified at this hearing
received a call through dispatch that a stolen
vehicle had been seen at the Nakon Motel in
Candler. That they went to the motel and did
not find any such vehicle there and left.
That dispatch then received a call, which
was relayed to them, that the vehicle was back
at the motel. They went back to the motel.
That upon locating the vehicle, they sent - -
They investigated whether or not the vehicle
had been reported through its registration
plate on NCIC as a stolen vehicle and found
that it had been.
Upon obtaining that information, the
deputies in question went to the clerk at the
desk of the motel, who was one of the
co-owners of the motel, and asked who - -
whether she knew who had that truck, and was
told that the persons that were riding in that
truck were in Room 11.
They then proceeded to Room 11 where they
were admitted by George Carrington, to whom
that room was registered. Upon entering into
the room, Officer Whitson discovered a crack
pipe in plain view. George Carrington
admitted that the crack pipe was his. He then
told Officer Whitson, upon questioning about
the truck, that he had no idea that the truck
was stolen; that the Defendant, who was in the
room but whose name was unknown to Mr.
Carrington, took Mr. Carrington to the bank
and to the store in that truck.
Subsequent to that statement, the
Defendant was placed under arrest for
possession of a stolen vehicle.
Defendant asserts that the facts as found by the trial court
do not support a finding of probable cause because it was
unreasonable for the deputies to rely upon the statement of Mr.
Carrington that defendant had been the one driving the truck. We
disagree.
As argued by the State, the defendant has incorrectly
characterized Mr. Carrington as an informant subject to more
stringent standards of reliability. Instead, Mr. Carrington was a
witness cooperating with the deputies' investigation. Our SupremeCourt has “declined to demand of private citizens who are
voluntarily assisting the police the same standards of reliability
applicable to paid police informants.” State v. Sanders, 327 N.C.
319, 339, 395 S.E.2d 412, 425 (1990).
Nevertheless, the evidence presented at the hearing supports
the reliance by the deputies on Mr. Carrington's statement that the
truck, to his knowledge, belonged to defendant. In particular, Mr.
Carrington corroborated the hotel clerk's statement that Mr.
Carrington had been living at the hotel for several weeks. See
State v. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 134, 516 S.E.2d 883, 886
(1999) (independent police corroboration of facts are important in
evaluating the reliability of the information). In addition, Mr.
Carrington admitted to the deputies that a crack pipe lying in
plain view in the hotel room belonged to him. Such statements
against penal interest further support Mr. Carrington's
credibility. In State v. Hauser, we held that “[a] statement
against penal interest carries its own indicia of credibility
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search.” 115
N.C. App. 431, 438, 445 S.E.2d 73, 79 (1994), aff'd, 342 N.C. 382,
464 S.E.2d 443 (1995); see also State v. Freeman, 31 N.C. App. 335,
229 S.E.2d 238 (1976) (holding that identification of defendant as
a perpetrator by a codefendant in the codefendant's confession is
sufficient to establish probable cause).
We conclude that Mr. Carrington's statement along with the
other facts found by the trial court are sufficient to support the
conclusion that the deputies had probable cause to believe that thedefendant was in possession of the stolen truck. Furthermore, “[a]
search without a search warrant may be made incident to a lawful
arrest; the scope of the search being limited to the arrestee's
person and the area within his immediate control.” State v. Grady,
73 N.C. App. 452, 454, 326 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1985). Consequently,
the search of defendant revealing the key to the stolen truck was
lawful and the evidence produced therefrom was admissible.
In his second assignment of error, defendant asserts that the
trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to
suppress defendant's statement regarding his place of employment
because at the time defendant was questioned he had not been
advised of his Miranda rights.
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694,
726 (1966), evidence solicited from a defendant during a custodial
interrogation may not be used against that defendant at trial
unless, prior to such interrogation: (1) the appropriate warnings
of the rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present have
been given and (2) there is a voluntary and intelligent waiver of
those rights. However, our Supreme Court has held that “routine
informational questions necessary to complete the booking process
that are not 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response' from the accused” were free from Miranda proscriptions.
State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 287, 302 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1983)
(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302, 64 L. Ed. 2d
297, 308 (1980)) (emphasis in original). In addition, “the prior
knowledge of the police and the intent of the officer inquestioning the defendant is highly relevant to whether the police
should have known a response would be incriminating.” Id.
In the case sub judice, the deputy asked defendant the name of
his employer for the purpose of completing the citation form issued
to defendant for the unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.
The deputy testified that he did not ask defendant this question
for the purpose of eliciting incriminating information and that the
question is one of the several routine questions that he must ask
every person that he arrests. Therefore, there is no evidence in
the record indicating that the question was asked with any intent
to elicit an incriminating response.
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that because the deputy knew
that the truck had been stolen in Hickory, he should have
reasonably known that asking defendant for his place of employment,
could possibly incriminate him by connecting him to the city of
Hickory. In support of his argument, defendant cites this Court's
opinion in State v. Locklear, 138 N.C. App. 549, 531 S.E.2d 853
(2000). In Locklear, we concluded that the admission of
defendant's date of birth which defendant disclosed during the
booking process was reversible error because defendant's age was an
essential element of the statutory rape offense with which
defendant was charged and because there was no other evidence of
defendant's age. Defendant's reliance on this case is misguided.
Here, not only is the evidence of defendant's connection to
the town of Hickory not an “essential element” of the offense of
knowingly possessing stolen property, neither is it supportive ofany inference that defendant knew that the truck was stolen.
Because the response given by defendant regarding his place of
employment was not incriminating, the inquiry did not violate
defendant's Miranda rights. This assignment of error is overruled.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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