IN THE MATTERS OF:
Yancey County
E.L.W. and S.B.W. Nos. 03 J 55 and 03 J 56
Hockaday & Hockaday, P.A., by Daniel M. Hockaday, for
petitioner-appellee Yancey County Department of Social
Services.
Don Willey for respondent-appellant-mother.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Sarah L. Buthe, for
the Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
MARITN, Chief Judge.
Rachel W. (respondent) appeals from two orders which
terminated her parental rights as to her minor children E.L.W. and
S.B.W. For the reasons stated below, we affirm .
On 8 October 2003, the Yancey County Department of Social
Services (DSS) filed juvenile petitions alleging that E.L.W. was an
abused and neglected juvenile and that S.B.W. was a neglected
juvenile. The trial court entered nonsecure custody orders on 8
October 2003 and placed the children in the custody of DSS. In an
order entered 2 December 2003, the trial court adjudicated both
children to be neglected and ordered that their legal custody
remain with DSS. Reunification with respondent remained the permanent plan for
the children until 2 August 2005, at which time the trial court
changed the permanent plan to adoption with a concurrent plan for
guardianship with a nonrelative. On 19 October 2005, DSS filed
motions to terminate the parental rights of respondent and the
children's father. The trial court terminated the father's
parental rights by orders entered on 10 January 2006. The hearing
to terminate respondent's parental rights was continued, and the
matter was ultimately heard on 14 February and 8 March 2006.
At the close of the evidence at the termination hearing, DSS
requested that its motion to terminate parental rights be amended
to include failure to make reasonable progress as a second ground
for termination in order to conform to the evidence presented. The
Guardian ad Litem joined in the motion, and the trial court allowed
the motion without objection from respondent. After finding that
both children were neglected, the trial court made the following
finding of fact in its two termination orders entered on 20 April
2006:
15. That the Court further finds by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence that the
respondent mother willfully left the juvenile
in foster care or placement outside her home
for a period of more than 12 months without
showing to the satisfaction of the Court that
reasonable progress has been made to correct
those conditions which led to the removal of
the juveniles; to wit: Ms. W[] was ordered to
complete substance abuse treatment; individual
counseling; participate in therapy with the
children; maintain employment; maintain a
stable home; comply with the recommendations
of her psychological evaluation; and attend
team meetings. Although Ms. W[] has made some
progress in a few of these requirements, shehas not completed all the requirements and
therefore cannot insure the children would not
be neglected if returned to her home. Her
substance abuse treatment should have taken 10
weeks to complete (initial 20 hours of out-
patient recommended). Because Ms. W[] did not
comply timely and began using drugs, had
positive drug screens, and became dependent on
prescription drugs, it took her 10 months to
complete this treatment and Ms. W[] in fact
had to be admitted for inpatient treatment
because her drug problem became so severe.
Ms. W[] still has not completed her individual
counseling. By the time of this hearing, Ms.
W[] still has not progressed enough in
counseling to begin integrating her own
therapy with the issues of the girls. Ms. W[]
missed a number of appointments for individual
therapy and dropped out of therapy for a
substantial period of time in late 2004. Ms.
W[] has not consistently participated in the
girls' therapy with Debbie White. Although
Ms. W[] has lived in the same place since 2003
when the children were removed, Ms. W[] is
still struggling to maintain her home
financially and has not maintained steady
employment as she failed to work at all for a
period of one year. Although Ms. W[]' medical
problems began in late 2004, it took her until
January, 2006 to get to a doctor to
determinate [sic] the nature of her medical
condition. Ms. W[] testified she was
dependent on medications for pain which
prevented her from making progress in the case
but was able to quit these drugs completely in
the Fall of 2005. . . . Because Ms. W[] had
not made sufficient progress in completing her
court ordered requirements, Petitioner was
eventually relieved of providing further
reasonable efforts to reunify the juveniles
with the mother in July, 2005, some 21 months
after the children were removed from the
mother's home. Ms. W[] was given every
opportunity to comply with her court ordered
requirements but did not do so timely. When
Ms. W[] was told by her daughter E[] in
September, 2004 that [her maternal
grandfather] had molested her, the mother's
response was to drop out of all treatment,
abuse drugs and quit her job. When the Court
told Ms. W[] in May, 2005 that she had one
last chance to make progress, she ended up inin-patient treatment and missed more than half
of her group and individual therapy
appointments once she got out prior to the
July, 2005 hearing. The juvenile has now
remained in DSS custody for a period of 29
months (well beyond the 12 months required)
and Ms. W[] still is not in a position to
provide for the juvenile's care.
After finding that it was in the best interests of the children
that respondent's parental rights be terminated, the trial court
terminated respondent's parental rights. Respondent then gave
notice of appeal from both termination orders.
Respondent contends the trial court improperly and materially
relied upon incompetent hearsay statements made by the non-
testifying children in determining that clear and convincing
evidence existed to terminate her parental rights. She argues
petitioner introduced no competent, non-hearsay evidence that she
ever violated the safety plan established to protect her children.
Respondent's argument is not persuasive.
As an initial matter, respondent failed to raise her objection
to the introduction of the hearsay evidence at the hearing and must
therefore be considered to have waived it. In re Isenhour, 101
N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991). Respondent also has
made no effort to rebut the presumption that a trial court
disregards any incompetent evidence during a nonjury trial. In re
Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 438, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1996).
Multiple grounds for termination of parental rights are
enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2005), and a finding of
any one of those grounds is sufficient to support termination. In
re Baker, 158 N.C. App. 491, 493, 581 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2003); seeN.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110(a) (2005). The trial court here found and
concluded that respondent had “willfully left the [children] in
foster care or placement outside her home for a period of more than
twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that
reasonable progress has been made to correct those conditions which
led to the removal of the juveniles.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) (2005). This finding as to each child is supported by
competent evidence in the form of testimony by a foster care social
worker, a child case manager, two therapists, a psychotherapist,
and respondent herself. During the twenty-nine months that the
children had been in DSS custody at the time of the hearing,
respondent failed to complete any of the six requirements listed by
the trial court. While acknowledging that respondent had made some
progress in a few of the requirements, the trial court's finding
provides numerous examples of her failure to make sufficient
progress in completing the court-ordered requirements. Ample
evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding that
grounds for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2)
existed.
Having determined that grounds for termination exist under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and that this ground is supported
by the trial court's findings of fact, this Court need not address
whether termination was proper under the remaining subdivision
found by the trial court. In re Baker, 158 N.C. App. at 497, 581
S.E.2d at 148; N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110(a). The trial court's
termination orders are affirmed. Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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