STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Guilford County
v
.
Nos. 03CRS024610
03CRS091697-99
WILLIAM TODD GADDY 03CRS091702
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy
Attorney General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for the State.
Jones, Free & Knight, PLLC, by Walter L. Jones, for defendant-
appellant. (Defendant-appellant's brief was filed by Walter
L. Jones who was allowed to withdraw as counsel of record on
26 July 2007. Kenneth A. Free, Jr. was allowed to be
substituted as counsel of record on 26 July 2007.)
HUNTER, Judge.
William Todd Gaddy (“defendant”) appeals from the trial
court's entry of judgment based on a jury verdict of guilty on a
charge of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver
methamphetamine. After careful review, we find no error.
On 22 July 2003, Guilford County Deputy Sheriff Kevin Wallace
(“Deputy Wallace”) was on routine patrol in southern Guilford
County. He noticed a blue Thunderbird matching the description of
a car he had been told to look out for, and upon running a check on
the car's plates found they were invalid. At that point, DeputyWallace pulled the car, driven by defendant, over to the side.
Defendant produced a driver's license that Deputy Wallace's check
revealed to be revoked. At that point, Deputy Wallace put
defendant under arrest. Incident to the arrest, he searched
defendant, who produced a wallet containing two small plastic bags
that were later found to contain residue of methamphetamine.
Deputy Wallace handcuffed defendant, placed him in the back of
the police car, and began searching the vehicle. When Deputy
Wallace stuck his head inside the vehicle, he encountered a
“pungent smell which brought [him] right back out of the vehicle.”
When he backed out of the car, he noticed that defendant was
beating his head against the right rear window of his police car,
apparently to get the deputy's attention. Deputy Wallace testified
that, as he approached the police car, defendant asked him not to
search the trunk of his car because in it was a five-gallon bucket
of ammonia.
The same day, a search warrant was executed at defendant's
home, where the following evidence was found: A spoon bearing
methamphetamine residue; a jar containing both methamphetamine and
a precursor chemical for its production; a weight scale; pieces of
foil; glass jars; muriatic acid; coffee filters; pieces of tubing;
gas masks; solvent containers; camping fuel; funnels; and other
items. Ann Hamlin, a forensic chemist with the State Bureau of
Investigation, testified to the discovery of these items; she also
testified that the items were indicia of methamphetamine
production. She further testified that the ammonia found indefendant's trunk was anhydrous ammonia, used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
At the close of evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss
the charge of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or
distribute, which was denied. A jury returned a verdict of guilty
on this charge along with several other charges related to this
incident. Defendant appeals only this conviction.
Defendant's sole argument is that the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to
manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine enabled the jury to
render a verdict unsupported by the evidence. This argument is
without merit.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the
evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to the State, and the State is
entitled to every reasonable inference to be
drawn therefrom. The test of whether the
evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss is whether a reasonable inference
of defendant's guilt may be drawn therefrom,
and the test is the same whether the evidence
is direct or circumstantial.
State v. Gainey, 343 N.C. 79, 85, 468 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1996)
(internal citation omitted). When a trial court
consider[s] a motion to dismiss, “[i]f the
trial court determines that a reasonable
inference of the defendant's guilt may be
drawn from the evidence, it must deny the
defendant's motion and send the case to the
jury even though the evidence may also support
reasonable inferences of the defendant's
innocence.”
State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 187, 446 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1994)
(alteration in original; emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Smith,
40 N.C. App. 72, 79, 252 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1979)).
Defendant was convicted of violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-
95(a)(1) (2005), which makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o
manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to
manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance[.]”
“Manufacture” is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-87(15) (2005) as
the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, conversion, or processing of a
controlled substance by any means, whether
directly or indirectly, artificially or
naturally, or by extraction from substances of
a natural origin, or independently by means of
chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis; and
“manufacture” further includes any packaging
or repackaging of the substance or labeling or
relabeling of its container[.]
In its instructions to the jury on the charge of manufacturing
methamphetamine, the trial court stated: “Operating a lab used to
produce methamphetamine would be manufacture of a controlled
substance.” Defendant argues that because the trial court failed
to read the entire statutory definition written above, the jury's
verdict of guilty was based on an incorrect understanding of the
law. This argument is without merit.
The offense described in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) has
three elements: “(A) possession of a substance; (B) the substance
must be a controlled substance; and (C) there must be intent to
sell [or manufacture] the controlled substance.” State v.
Fletcher, 92 N.C. App. 50, 55, 373 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1988). Defendant does not dispute possession of the substance or that
it was a controlled substance. As to the third element, this Court
has previously held that, where copious evidence is presented that
defendant was involved in the production of a controlled substance,
the State need not prove intent to distribute the substance to
obtain a conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1). See State
v. Muncy, 79 N.C. App. 356, 363, 339 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1986). Given
the evidence presented at trial, such is the case here: In
considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, all three elements of this offense were proven at trial.
No error.
Judges WYNN and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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