IN THE MATTER OF:
B.O. Buncombe County
No. 05 J 145
Matthew J. Middleton for petitioner-appellee, Buncombe County
Department of Social Services.
Attorney Advocate Jerry W. Miller for appellee, Guardian ad
Litem Program.
Michael E. Casterline for respondent-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
When sufficient findings of fact, supported by competent
evidence, support the conclusion that placement and guardianship of
a child is in the best interest of the child, such placement must
be sustained.
The Buncombe County Department of Social Services (DSS)
received a report in March of 2005
that B.O. and her older half-
sister lived
in unsanitary conditions in the home of their mother
(respondent). Upon visiting respondent's home on three occasions,
a social worker observed the substandard condition of the home,
which did not meet minimum standards for safety.
B.O. and her
half-sister were put in a kinship placement.
On 1 April 2005, DSSfiled a petition alleging B.O. was neglected.
The juvenile petition
alleged
that DSS had substantiated previous reports of neglect on
respondent in 2000 and 2003, that respondent had not made much
progress in cleaning her home, and that
respondent had “exhibited
paranoid and strange behavior” during the March 2005 home
assessment
.
Both respondent and the minor child were appointed their own
guardian ad litem.
By order entered 30 June 2005, the trial court
adjudicated the minor child neglected
.
The trial court found that
the biological father of the minor child was unknown and continued
the minor child's kinship placement. The trial court ordered
respondent to complete a psychological evaluation, comply with
recommendations, remove clutter in her home, and maintain its
cleanliness. At the August 2005 review hearing, the trial court
granted DSS non-secure custody of the minor child and her half-
sister. The minor child and her half-sister
were subsequently put
in a kinship placement with Dr. and Mrs. Hamilton
.
After holding a review hearing in January 2006, the trial
court concluded that it was not possible to return the minor child
to respondent's home within the next six months due to “the chronic
mental health problems of the respondent mother” and “inconsistent
compliance of the respondent mother with court ordered services.”
The trial court sanctioned the Hamilton's home for temporary
placement of the minor child and ordered the permanent plan changed
from reunification with respondent to guardianship with a court
approved caretaker.
By review order entered 28 June 2006, the trial court found
that T.C. Wilsdon, father of the minor child's half-sister, had
relocated to Buncombe County, “would like to pursue custody of the
minor child and her sibling[,] and has been involved in the life of
the minor child[.]” The trial court ordered that Mr. Wilsdon be
allowed extended visitation once his completed psychological
evaluation was approved by the Department and, upon an approved
home study, that Mr. Wilsdon be allowed overnight visits with the
minor child and her half-sibling. The trial court entered another
review order on 11 August 2006 and found that Mr. Wilsdon's home
study was favorable and that he had completed his psychological
evaluation. The trial court concluded that “it is in the best
interest of the minor child that the court will sanction a
transition of the minor child from the home of the Hamiltons to the
home of Mr. Wilsdon.” On 30 August 2006, the trial court entered
a permanency planning order granting guardianship of the minor
child to Mr. Wilsdon. From this order, respondent appeals.
In her sole argument on appeal, respondent contends the trial
court did not make sufficient findings of fact as required by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 to support its conclusion that placement and
guardianship with Mr. Wilsdon is in the best interest of the child.
We disagree.
North Carolina General Statute section 7B-907 provides in
pertinent part:
(b) . . . At the conclusion of the [permanency
planning] hearing, if the juvenile is not
returned home, the court shall consider thefollowing criteria and make written findings
regarding those that are relevant:
(1) Whether it is possible for the juvenile to
be returned home immediately or within the
next six months, and if not, why it is not in
the juvenile's best interests to return home;
(2) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether legal
guardianship or custody with a relative or
some other suitable person should be
established, and if so, the rights and
responsibilities which should remain with the
parents;
(3) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether adoption
should be pursued and if so, any barriers to
the juvenile's adoption;
(4) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether the
juvenile should remain in the current
placement or be placed in another permanent
living arrangement and why;
(5) Whether the county department of social
services has since the initial permanency plan
hearing made reasonable efforts to implement
the permanent plan for the juvenile;
(6) Any other criteria the court deems
necessary.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b)(2005). A permanency planning order
need not “contain a formal listing of the § 7B-907(b)(1)-(6)
factors, expressly denominated as such . . . [as long as the trial
court makes] written findings regarding the relevant § 7B-907(b)
factors.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161
(2004). “Appellate review of a permanency planning order is
limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to
support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of
law.” Id. In this case we must determine whether the trial judgemade sufficient findings of fact to support the entry of the
permanent plan of guardianship.
Findings of fact eleven through twenty-four meet the
requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 because they state: (1)
“[i]t is not possible to return the minor child to the home of the
respondent mother within the next six months due to the chronic
mental health problems of respondent mother” and her “inconsistent
compliance” with court orders; (2) that the Hamiltons “remain
committed to the minor child and her sibling and to Mr. Wilsdon and
are willing to provide ongoing support for him and the girls[,]”
and Mrs. Hamilton is “very comfortable with going ahead and giving
Mr. Wilsdon custody of [the sibling] and guardianship of [the minor
child]”; (3) DSS recommended that the “best plan to achieve
permanency for the minor child is guardianship with Mr. Wilsdon[,]”
and the guardian ad litem recommended that it was in the best
interest of the minor child that permanent guardianship of the
minor child be granted to Mr. Wilsdon; (4) DSS made “reasonable
efforts to prevent removal of the minor child from the home[,] but
removal was necessary to protect the safety and health of the
child[;]” (5) “[e]fforts to place the minor child in the home of
the respondent mother clearly would be futile or be inconsistent
with the minor child's health, safety and need for a safe,
permanent home within a reasonable period of time[;]” and (6)
“[t]he minor child has gone to the beach with Mr. Wilsdon and has
spent several nights with him[,]” and Mr. Wilsdon has had a
relationship with the minor child “since she was born.” These findings clearly meet the requirements of the statute,
and support the court's conclusion of law that “Mr. Wilsdon is
capable of providing proper care and supervision of the minor child
in a safe home” and that granting Mr. Wilsdon guardianship of the
minor child “is in the best interest of the minor child.” This
argument is without merit.
Respondent has not argued her remaining assignments of error
in her brief, and they are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P.
28(b)(6).
AFFIRMED.
Judges GEER and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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