STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Forsyth County
No. 04 CRS 60295
DENA INEZ MINTON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General W. Dale Talbert, for the State.
Kevin P. Bradley for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the trial court's judgments sentencing
her to a minimum of 269 months in prison after a jury convicted her
of one count of attempted first-degree murder and one count of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury . We find no error.
A lengthy recitation of the evidence presented at trial is not
necessary for an understanding of the sole question raised on
appeal. Defendant is one of four children of Fred Linny Minton,
who died on 18 August 2004 . A dispute arose among the siblings
about the handling of Mr. Minton's funeral arrangements. During a
gathering of Mr. Minton's friends and relatives on 20 August 2004,
Defendant shot her brother four times . At trial, Defendantadmitted intentionally shooting her brother, but testified that she
did so in self-defense after her brother assaulted her .
The sole question presented for our review is whether the
trial court's instruction to the jury on the offense of attempted
first-degree murder relieved the State of its burden to prove an
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State has the burden of proving each element of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341,
626 S.E.2d 258 (2006). The elements of attempted first-degree
murder are: (1) a specific intent to kill another; (2) an overt
act calculated to carry out that intent, which goes beyond mere
preparation; (3) malice, premeditation, and deliberation
accompanying the act; and (4) failure to complete the intended
killing. State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 579, 599 S.E.2d 515, 534
(2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909, 161 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005). When
error in the trial court's charge to the jury is alleged,
this Court reviews jury instructions
contextually and in their entirety. If the
instructions present[] the law of the case in
such a manner as to leave no reasonable cause
to believe the jury was misled or
misinformed, then they will be held to be
sufficient. The appealing party must
demonstrate that the error in the instructions
was likely to mislead the jury.
State v. Crow, 175 N.C. App. 119, 127, 623 S.E.2d 68, 73 (2005)
(internal citations omitted), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 485,
632 S.E.2d 495 (2006).
The trial court instructed the jury on the element of malice
as follows: If the State proves beyond a reasonable
doubt or it is admitted that the Defendant
intentionally inflicted a wound upon the
victim with a deadly weapon, you may infer,
first, that the Defendant acted unlawfully
and, second, that it was done with malice, but
you're not compelled to do so. You may
consider this, along with all other facts and
circumstances, in determining whether the
Defendant acted unlawfully and with
malice. . . .
(Emphasis added). Defendant contends that the inclusion of the
words or it is admitted relieved the State of its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with malice.
Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court's jury
instructions allow[ed] the jury to infer malice from [her]
admissions made only in the context of her claim of self-
defense . . . [and] permitted the jury to conclude that malice was
established upon their rejection of the claim of self-defense. We
are unpersuaded.
Initially, we note that our Supreme Court has held that [t]he
instruction, 'or it is admitted,' should not be given in a case
where the defendant does not in open court admit to an intentional
shooting. State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 29, 277 S.E.2d 515, 535
(1981); see also State v. Shuford, 337 N.C. 641, 447 S.E.2d 742
(1994) (finding no error in trial court's instruction which
included or it is admitted where defendant, charged with murder,
admitted shooting the victim, but claimed he shot in self-defense).
In the case at bar, Defendant admitted in open court that she
intentionally shot her brother. Moreover, viewing the instructions contextually and in their
entirety, the instructions presented the law of the case in such a
manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury was
misled or misinformed. The court began its charge by instructing
the jury that [i]n order to obtain a conviction, the State must
prove to you that the Defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court then defined reasonable doubt. In charging the
jury on attempted first-degree murder and on self-defense as a
defense to that crime, the trial court followed the language of the
pattern jury instruction. N.C.P.I. --Crim. 206.17A (2003).
Specifically, the trial court charged, inter alia,
in order for you to find the Defendant
guilty of attempted first-degree murder, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt --
among other things, the State must prove that
the Defendant did not act in self-defense. If
the State fails to prove that the Defendant
did not act in self-defense, then you must
find the Defendant not guilty [of attempted
first-degree murder].
The trial court concluded its attempted first-degree murder
instruction as follows:
If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged
date the Defendant intentionally, and not in
self-defense, attempted to kill the
victim . . . with a deadly weapon and perform
an act or acts designed to bring this about
but which fell short of the completed crime
and which, in the ordinary and likely course
of things, would have proximately resulted in
the death of [the victim] had she not been
stopped or prevented from completing her
apparent course of action, and that in
performing this act the Defendant acted with
malice, with premeditation and deliberation,
then it would be your duty to return a verdictof guilty of attempted first-degree murder
. . . .
If you do not so find or if you have a
reasonable doubt as to one or more of these
things, then it would be your duty to return a
verdict of not guilty as to [the charge].
We presume the jury followed the trial court's instructions. State
v. Miller, 357 N.C. 583, 588 S.E.2d 857 (2003), cert. denied, 542
U.S. 941, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004). We conclude the instructions
as given were not likely to mislead the jury.
We need not address Defendant's contention that the trial
court somehow linked its instruction on self-defense to the crime
of attempted first-degree murder with its instruction on self-
defense to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury . Defendant neither objected at
trial nor assigned error on appeal to either self-defense
instruction, and Defendant does not contend that either instruction
amounted to plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10.
NO ERROR.
Judges McGEE and SMITH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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