IN RE: S.R.W. Yancey County
No. 04 J 40
Hockaday & Hockaday, P.A., by Daniel M. Hockaday, for Yancey
County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellee.
Hunton & Williams LLP, by Bryan A. Powell, for Guardian ad
Litem.
Michael E. Casterline, for respondent-appellant.
JACKSON, Judge.
Respondent-mother M.L.R appeals from the district court's
order terminating her parental rights to the minor child S.R.W.
Although the order also terminated the parental rights of
respondent-father R.B.W., he is not a party to the instant appeal.
The Yancey County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
obtained non-secure custody of newborn S.R.W. on 30 July 2004,
after filing a petition alleging that he was a dependent and
neglected juvenile as defined by North Carolina General Statutes,
section 7B-101(9), (15) (2005). DSS placed the child with his
maternal grandparents. On 29 September 2004, the district court
entered an adjudication of dependency and neglect, upon finding by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence: [T]hat the juvenile lived in an environment
injurious to the juvenile's welfare and that
the juvenile's parents were unable to provide
for the juvenile's care or supervision and
lacked an appropriate childcare arrangement in
that there had been issues of domestic
violence prior to the birth of the child which
had not yet been resolved, the same of which
resulted in pending criminal charges against
the respondent father, the most recent
incident occurring in July, 2004; that the
respondent parents have not adequately
addressed prior issues of domestic violence
and substance abuse . . .; that [DSS] recently
had custody of an older half sibling and
guardianship was awarded to the maternal
grandparents of that juvenile.
The district court ordered that custody and placement authority
remain with DSS, with placement of S.R.W. continuing with the
maternal grandparents. The district court awarded respondent-
mother visitation in the grandparents' home, and ordered her to
complete parenting classes, maintain suitable housing and
employment, refrain from domestic violence or other illegal
behavior, and attend and pay for “individual counseling . . . and
follow any recommendations from that counseling[.]”
Based upon respondents' lack of compliance with the 29
September 2004 order, the district court relieved DSS of further
efforts toward reunification on 27 January 2005. The district
court found that respondent_mother had failed to attend individual
counseling, lacked suitable housing, and was unemployed. Her
visitation with S.R.W. was suspended, and the permanent plan was
changed from reunification with his parents to guardianship with
his maternal grandparents, with a concurrent plan of adoption by
the grandparents. The district court again ordered respondent-mother to participate in parenting classes and individual
counseling, maintain suitable housing and employment, and refrain
from acts of domestic violence or illegal activity.
On 13 March 2005, the district court changed S.R.W.'s
permanent plan to adoption by the maternal grandparents with a
concurrent plan of guardianship. Although respondent-mother
advised the court that she had begun parenting classes, was
employed, and was scheduled to begin individual counseling, the
district court found these facts insufficient to warrant the
resumption of reunification efforts.
DSS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of
S.R.W.'s parents on 12 July 2005. Following a hearing held 16
November 2005, the district court concluded that respondent-mother
had neglected S.R.W. and had willfully left him in a placement
outside the home for more than twelve months without making
reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions which led to
his placement. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) (2005).
In addition, the district found by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence that:
. . . [T]he juvenile was removed from the care
of these respondent parents on or about 30
July, 2004 for issues of substance abuse from
the respondent father . . . and because of a
history of domestic violence which had
occurred between the [father] and the
respondent mother M[.L.R]. . . . That as to
the respondent mother . . ., the Court finds
she has . . . failed to address those issues
which led to the removal of the juvenile from
her care in July, 2004 by failing to . . .
maintain a stable residence and employment . .
. ; fail[ing] to timely complete parenting
classes . . . ; fail[ing] to completeadditional parenting classes as recommended by
Sue Wold, the instructor for the first of
parenting classes; . . . fail[ing] to
consistently attend and make adequate progress
in her individual counseling . . .; [and]
fail[ing] to consistently attend visitations
with the minor child, attending approximately
one-half of the same until these visitations
were suspended 10 January, 2005[.]
The district court also found the existence of three grounds for
termination of respondent-father's parental rights pursuant to
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and
(5).
In support of its disposition terminating respondents'
parental rights, the district court found the following additional
facts:
. . . [S.R.W.] has lived in one placement
since his birth, a period of 16 months; that
the juvenile is doing well in this placement;
that the respondent parents have had no
contact with or visitation with the minor
child for a period of more than 10 months;
that the respondent mother's contact with her
older two children is now limited to
visitations in the home of the maternal
grandparents as the custody of these children
have been awarded to their natural father . .
.; that the maternal grandparents, who have
provided for the exclusive care of the
juvenile since his birth, desire to adopt the
juvenile; . . . that terminating the parental
rights of the respondent parents would assist
Yancey DSS in . . . providing for a safe,
permanent home for the juvenile within a
reasonable period of time.
The district court then concluded “that it is in the best interests
of the juvenile that the parental rights of the respondents . . .
be terminated.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005).
Respondent-mother appeals from the 27 December 2005 orderterminating her parental rights. On 3 October 2006, this Court
granted respondent-mother's petition for writ of certiorari to
review the district court's 27 December 2005 order.
On appeal, respondent-mother assigns error to the district
court's decision to terminate her parental rights, claiming that
“termination of her parental rights was not necessary to achieve a
permanent plan of care for [S.R.W.]” Citing the policy against
“unnecessary severance” of the parent-child relationship expressed
in North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1100(2) (2005), she
argues the court could have provided a safe, permanent home to
S.R.W. without terminating her parental rights, but instead by
simply awarding guardianship to the maternal grandparents. Beyond
her references to the general purposes of the Juvenile Code,
however, respondent-mother cites no authority to support her
argument. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006).
Initially, we note that respondent-mother misstates the
applicable standard of review claiming that the decision to
terminate her rights is reviewed de novo. It is well-established
that, once grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) are
shown, the district court's decision to terminate an individual's
parental rights is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. In re
J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 24, 616 S.E.2d 264, 278 (2005) (citing In re
Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995)).
Respondent-mother has not assigned error to any of the district
court's findings of fact or conclusions of law, including its
conclusions that grounds for termination exist under section 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (deeming unchallenged findings to be binding
on appeal); In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 581, 571 S.E.2d 65,
75 (2002) (upholding termination based upon the respondent's
failure to argue against certain grounds found by the district
court). Nor has she assigned error to the conclusion that
termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of
S.R.W. See generally In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491
S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (“[B]est interest determinations are
conclusions of law because they require the exercise of
judgment.”). Accordingly, we must uphold the district court's
disposition unless it is “manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re
J.A.A. & S.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 75, 623 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2005).
It is true that one purpose of the Juvenile Code is “to
protect all juveniles from the unnecessary severance of a
relationship with biological or legal parents.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1100(2) (2005). However, another avowed purpose of the Code is
“to recognize the necessity for any juvenile to have a permanent
plan of care at the earliest possible age.” Id. Moreover, “the
fundamental principle underlying North Carolina's approach to
controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] that the
best interest of the child is the polar star.” In re Montgomery,
311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984); see also N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-100 (2005). When the interests of the child and parent
are in conflict, the child's interest must prevail. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1100(3) (2005). With these principles in mind, we find no abuse of discretion
by the district court. The evidence at the termination hearing
showed that respondent-mother failed to consistently attend her
court-ordered visitation with S.R.W., she failed to demonstrate
meaningful efforts or progress towards reunification, she was non-
cooperative with DSS, and she continued her relationship with
respondent-father despite his ongoing criminal activity and his
failure to address any of the issues which led to S.R.W.'s removal
from the parents' care. Beth Harmon, Supervisor for Foster Care
and Adoptions for DSS, opined that the child's best interest would
be served by his adoption by the maternal grandparents, rather than
guardianship. She noted that S.R.W. has resided with the
grandparents since the day he left the hospital and has thrived in
their care. The child's maternal grandmother confirmed to the
court that she and her husband wished to adopt S.R.W. Although she
and her husband were guardians of respondent-mother's seven year
old son, C.J., she explained that she wanted S.R.W. to avoid the
feelings of insecurity, “instability and wanting to be fit in
somewhere” that his older brother had experienced.
The district court's emphasis on S.R.W.'s need for a permanent
home was consistent with the legislative intent expressed in
section 7B-1100(2). Although legal guardians enjoy certain
protections under North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-
600(b) (2005), an award of guardianship does not provide the same
degree of finality as adoption and would be subject to a possible
later challenge by respondent-mother. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(b) (2005); compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-106 (2005) (setting
forth legal rights of adoptees). While we have found termination
to be contrary to the best interests of a child who had no other
family ties and no reasonable prospects for adoption, In re J.A.O.,
166 N.C. App. 222, 227-28, 601 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2004), the facts of
this case fully support the judgment of the district court.
Respondent-mother's assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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