IN RE:
Davie County
D.J.D., No. 04 J 92
A Minor Child
Martin & Van Hoy, LLP, by Sally W. Smith, for petitioner-
appellee mother.
Lynne Hicks for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant father.
HUNTER, Judge.
Respondent father (“respondent”) appeals the order terminating
his parental rights as to the minor child D.J.D. After careful
review, we affirm.
At the age of fifteen, D.J.D.'s mother became pregnant by
respondent while the two were dating in 1998. The couple broke up
when she was four or five months into the pregnancy. D.J.D. was
born on 23 March 1999. At no time were respondent and D.J.D.'s
mother married. D.J.D. has been in his mother's custody since
birth and has never met respondent. D.J.D.'s mother petitioned the
court to terminate respondent's parental rights on 4 November 2004.
On 10 April 2006, an order was filed terminating respondent'sparental rights as to D.J.D., finding two grounds: (1) the child
was born out of wedlock and had not been legitimated by respondent
per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5), and (2) respondent willfully
abandoned D.J.D. for at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
Respondent appeals.
This Court's review of a trial court's order terminating
parental rights involves two inquiries: Whether the trial court's
findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence, and whether those findings support its conclusions of
law. In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86
(1996). A finding by the trial court of any one of the grounds
enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1111 is sufficient to support an
order of termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990).
The complete grounds given by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5)
(2005) for terminating parental rights are as follows:
(5) The father of a juvenile born out of
wedlock has not, prior to the filing of a
petition or motion to terminate parental
rights:
a. Established paternity judicially or
by affidavit which has been filed in
a central registry maintained by the
Department of Health and Human
Services; provided, the court shall
inquire of the Department of Health
and Human Services as to whether
such an affidavit has been so filed
and shall incorporate into the case
record the Department's certified
reply; or
b. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to
provisions of G.S. 49-10 or filed a
petition for this specific purpose;
or
c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage
to the mother of the juvenile; or
d. Provided substantial financial
support or consistent care with
respect to the juvenile and mother.
Id.
Respondent assigns error to findings of fact 6-8 and 13-15.
Of those, numbers 6-8 and 13 are relevant to the question of
legitimizing D.J.D. and thus the grounds enumerated in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5):
6. The Respondent father did not legitimate
the child, D.J.D.[,] pursuant to G.S. 49-10
nor did he file a petition for that purpose.
The child was not legitimated by marriage of
his father to the mother. The Respondent has
failed to provide any support or financial
assistance for the child, D.J.D.
7. Since the child was born on [redacted], the
Respondent father has had no contact with the
child. He sent no cards and no letters,
except for one letter sent in September of
2005 after [this] petition was filed. The
Respondent did not communicate with the
mother, or the child, in any manner whatsoever
after the child was born.
8. The Respondent father has failed to provide
any support and has not attempted to contact
the child in any way. The father was
incarcerated when the child was about 5 months
old. The father is in prison for conspiracy
to commit murder. Since he has been in
prison, the father has been on work release
for a least part of the term of his
imprisonment. The father has never supported
the child financially.
. . .
13. Except for one letter from the Respondent
in September of 2005, there has been no
contact between the Respondent and the child
since the child was born.
Respondent does not actually dispute the facts that he did not
marry D.J.D.'s mother, that he did not file a petition pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-10 to legitimize the child, or that he did not
attempt to establish paternity through judicial or other channels.
What respondent does is to give excuses for not doing so. The
excuses are that respondent was young, though he was eighteen and
nineteen during the pregnancy and birth; that he was excluded from
discussions about the baby by both of the baby's grandmothers; that
no one attempted to establish the baby's paternity; and that
D.J.D.'s mother married someone else before the baby's birth. Each
of these excuses is simply an attempt to place the blame for
respondent's failure to take any action to legitimize the child on
other parties. Respondent can cite to no case law supporting these
excuses as creating an exception to this ground for termination,
and respondent's own inertia cannot logically be considered
justification for his failure to participate or even acknowledge
his child.
The one portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) that
respondent actually produces evidence to dispute is the last: He
argues that he did in fact “[p]rovide[] substantial financial
support or consistent care with respect to the juvenile and
mother.” Id. However, the testimony to which he points shows only
that his parents might have made offers of financial assistance,
such as purchasing clothing for the mother during her pregnancy;that respondent's mother might have purchased items for a nursery
in her home; and that respondent himself “gave [the mother's] dad
some money to help with gas. He gave some money to eat on . . .
for [her] doctor visits.” This testimony refers to the time before
D.J.D. was born. Even if all of these statements are true, surely
a handful of offers in the almost eight years since D.J.D. was
conceived cannot constitute “substantial financial support[,]” and
the fact that he has never laid eyes on D.J.D. is certainly
competent evidence that he has not provided “consistent care[.]”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5)d.
It is true that respondent has been in prison for all but the
first five months of D.J.D.'s life. However, he was employed and
not in prison for those five months and the nine months previous,
when the mother was pregnant with D.J.D. Further, respondent has
been on work release since April 2005, but there is no evidence
that he has contributed financially or provided care for D.J.D. or
the child's mother.
In the face of this evidence, we affirm the termination of
respondent's parental rights as to the minor child D.J.D. pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5).
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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