STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Wayne County
No. 05 CRS 54781
YIETAQUENA T. JOHNSON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
William B. Crumpler, for the State.
Adrian M. Lapas, for defendant.
SMITH, Judge.
Yietaquena Johnson (defendant) appeals an order denying a
motion to suppress evidence of marijuana discovered in his vehicle
during a traffic stop. We affirm.
At a suppression hearing conducted on 17 and 18 July 2006, the
State offered the testimony of Sergeant Chris Worth, a deputy with
the Wayne County Sheriff's Office and supervisor of a special unit
called the Aggressive Criminal Enforcement Team. This team is
involved with traffic and criminal interdiction. Sergeant Worth
testified that he had been to various interdiction schools dealing
with vehicle violations and the characteristics of persons who are
stopped for violations who may be engaged in criminal activity. Sergeant Worth testified that on 4 June 2005 around 11:00
a.m., he was on duty in an unmarked red Chevrolet Camaro on Highway
70 west of Goldsboro. This highway has four lanes, two going west
and two going east separated by a median. As Sergeant Worth was
turning around in a median crossover to change his direction to
eastbound, he observed a gray Honda SUV proceeding in his
direction. As the vehicle approached, it became apparent that it
did not display a North Carolina inspection sticker in the lower
left hand corner of the windshield. Instead, the vehicle displayed
a sticker in the upper center of the windshield. Sergeant Worth
testified that he was aware that some states north of North
Carolina, including Virginia, require inspection stickers to be
located on the windshield where the sticker was affixed on the
Honda. Accordingly, as Sergeant Worth knew the vehicle might be
from a state other than North Carolina, he looked for a front
license plate, which is required under some other states' laws.
The Honda did not have a front license plate.
When the Honda went past the police vehicle, Sergeant Worth
observed a Virginia license plate on the rear. In one of the
interdiction schools he had attended, Sergeant Worth learned that
Virginia had a requirement for both front and back license plates
for vehicles registered in Virginia. Sergeant Worth's training and
experience also taught him that a vehicle not properly licensed
with vehicle tags could also indicate a stolen vehicle.
Sergeant Worth then pulled up behind the Honda, which was
driven by defendant in the left hand lane. He testified thatdefendant pulled into the right lane between two cars. There were
about four car lengths between the other two vehicles, so defendant
had to squeeze in between them and there was not ample room for him
to get in between the cars. When defendant finally executed the
lane change, there was only one car length between his car and the
car in front. Sergeant Worth testified that defendant's action
resulted in an unsafe following distance. Consequently, Sergeant
Worth pulled defendant over, exited his unmarked vehicle and
approached the Honda on the passenger side. The passenger side
window was partially down. Through the window the sergeant
observed green vegetable matter which he believed to be marijuana,
around the center console area. Sergeant Worth could not hear what
defendant was saying, so he reached in and started rolling the
window down. While he was doing so, the door opened. As defendant
was getting out of the Honda, Sergeant Worth examined the vegetable
material and was certain the material was marijuana. A subsequent
search of defendant's vehicle revealed ten ounces of marijuana in
defendant's car and a small hand-held metal scale, which is
commonly used to weigh illegal narcotics, in defendant's pocket.
On cross-examination when asked by defense counsel what his
purpose was in stopping defendant, Sergeant Worth testified that it
was to let him know he was following too close to the car in front
of him, and to determine whether the vehicle was stolen. Defendant
did not offer any evidence at the suppression hearing. The trial
court ruled on defendant's motion to suppress from the bench as
follows: Well, I think it's close, but I think, based
on what the officer observed, he observed an
automobile that he had a reasonable idea may
have been improperly registered. He stopped it
for the purpose of determining that. When he
did stop it he saw, in open view, the
contraband material, so, yeah, I think he had
a reasonable basis for making the stop. I do
think that the reasonable basis was most
anything, but I think that falls within the
rules. So I'm going to deny your motion to
[suppress] the evidence.
Defendant plead no contest to the charge of Maintaining a Motor
Vehicle for Use of a Controlled Substance in violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-108(a)(7) (2005) in exchange for the State dismissing
Count I of the indictment charging defendant with Possession With
Intent to Sell and Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat § 90-95(a)(1) (2005). The trial court suspended the
active sentence of 4-5 months imprisonment and sentenced defendant
to 24 months supervised probation and ordered him to pay a $250.00
fine. Defendant filed timely notice of appeal.
In defendant's sole argument on appeal, he contends the trial
court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of the
marijuana because Sergeant Worth lacked the probable cause required
to stop defendant's vehicle, in contravention of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
I § 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.
When the competency of evidence is challenged and the trial
judge conducts a voir dire to determine admissibility, the general
rule is that the judge should make findings of fact to show the
basis of the ruling. If there is a material conflict in the
evidence on voir dire, he must do so in order to resolve anyconflict. If there is no material conflict in the evidence on voir
dire, it is not error to admit the challenged evidence without
making specific findings of fact, although it is always the better
practice to find all facts upon which the admissibility of the
evidence depends. In that event, the necessary findings are
implied from the admission of the challenged evidence. State v.
Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 580, 461 S.E.2d 655, 661 (1995) (citations
omitted). In the instant case, there was no material conflict in
the evidence and hence it was not prejudicial error for the court
to fail to enter an order making findings of fact and conclusions
of law. We must therefore determine only whether the trial court's
legal conclusion was correct.
This Court has held that '[w]here an officer makes a traffic
stop based on a readily observed traffic violation, such as
speeding or running a red light, such a stop will be valid if it
was supported by probable cause.' State v. Baublitz, Jr., 172
N.C. App. 801, 806 616 S.E.2d 615, 619 (2005) (quoting State v.
Barnhill, 166 N.C. App. 228, 231, 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004)). In
the case sub judice, Sergeant Worth observed defendant's vehicle
following too closely to the vehicle in front of it in violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-152(a) (2005). Hence, as defendant's traffic
violation was readily observable, the probable cause standard
applies.
In examining the legality of a traffic stop,
the proper inquiry is not the subjective
reasoning of the officer, but whether the
objective facts support a finding that
probable cause existed to stop the defendant.
Probable cause exists when there is a fairprobability or substantial chance a crime has
been committed and that the defendant
committed it. Thus, the United States and
North Carolina Constitutions require an
officer who makes a seizure on the basis of a
perceived traffic violation to have probable
cause to believe the driver's actions violated
a motor vehicle law.
State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 564, 633 S.E.2d 459, 460-461 (2006)
(internal citations omitted).
In the case at bar, notwithstanding Sergeant Worth's testimony
regarding his knowledge of Virginia traffic law and his assertion
that defendant violated the same, there was probable cause with
which to justify the stop of defendant's vehicle. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-152(a) provides that [t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall
not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and
prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
Sergeant Worth's testimony described his objective observation
that when defendant changed lanes he only left one car length
between his car and the car in front of him. We therefore
conclude that Sergeant Worth's personal observation of defendant
following too closely on Highway 70 constituted the probable cause
necessary with which to effectuate a traffic stop. See State v.
Wilson, 155 N.C. App. 89, 95, 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002)(state
trooper's observation of the vehicles speed and its following
distance to another vehicle of one car length established probable
cause to believe that defendants were in violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-152(a)). As Sergeant Worth had the necessary probable cause to stop the
defendant's vehicle, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and STEPHEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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