MARTIN ANDREW OAKES
v
.
Lincoln County
No. 06 CVS 00838
LINCOLN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
LINCOLN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
LINCOLN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Martin Andrew Oakes, pro se plaintiff-appellant.
Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by K. Dean Shatley, II, for
defendant-appellee Board of Education.
Pendleton & Pendleton, P.A., by Jeffrey A. Taylor, for
defendants-appellees Board of Commissioners and Board of
Elections.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Insofar as the method and system of election for the Lincoln
Board of Education does not run afoul of our State's constitution,
and defendant Lincoln County Board of Education did not violate
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 115C-37(i)
in holding its 2006 elections without
redistricting for alleged “population imbalances” following the
2000 federal census, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment as to all defendants. In 1973, the General Assembly established a seven-member Board
of Education for Lincoln County. 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 876, § 3.
Election to a four-year term occurs on a staggered basis, with four
seats in alternating general elections (1976-2008) and three in the
intervening elections (1978-2010). Id. § 5. “All candidates shall
be elected by the voters of Lincoln County at large.” Id. The law
further specifies that one of the seven seats (the “at large” seat)
has no residency requirement, but that candidates for the other six
seats (“residency district seats”) are required to reside in a
certain district of the County, including the City of Lincolnton
and five Townships. Id. § 3. In 2006, the seats on the ballot
were Catawba Springs Township, Howard's Creek Township (outside
Lincolnton city limits), and Lincolnton Township (outside
Lincolnton city limits).
District boundaries of the seats for Howard's Creek and
Ironton Townships were adjusted by the legislature in the 2001
session. The 2001 General Assembly amended 1973 N.C. Sess. Law
876, § 3 to reflect annexations by the City of Lincolnton that
incorporated portions of Howard's Creek and Irontown Townships into
its municipal limits. 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 22, § 1. By admission
of the parties, the effect of the amendment was to provide that
residents of Ironton and Howard's Creek Townships now living inside
the municipal limits of Lincolnton were eligible for the City of
Lincolnton seat, rather than the Ironton Township or Howard's Creek
Township seats. In June 2006, plaintiff-appellant, a resident of Catawba
Springs Township, attempted to file as a candidate for the Howard's
Creek Township seat on the Lincoln County Board of Education in a
general election to be held in November of that year. In his
filing, appellant acknowledged that he “did not reside in Howard's
Creek Township but was an eligible voter for the . . . seat in
question.” The Lincoln County Board of Elections rejected the
filing, citing the municipal statutes governing the administration
of Lincoln County Board of Education elections. 2002 N.C. Sess.
Laws 22 (2001 session) (establishing eligibility of annexed
citizens from Ironton and Howards Creek Townships for the city of
Lincolnton seat); 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 304 (changing the filing
period for candidates); 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 155 (providing for
non-partisan elections; eliminating the nomination of candidates by
voting district); 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 876 (reorganizing and
consolidating the Lincolnton City and County Boards of Education;
creating a single administrative board for all public schools of
Lincoln County). The Board notified appellant that he “could file
for the seat in his own residential district[.]” Although eligible
to run for the Catawba Springs Township seat in 2006, plaintiff did
not attempt to file for that seat.
Plaintiff filed two complaints in the Superior Court of
Lincoln County seeking injunctive relief. In case 06 CVS 0838,
plaintiff asserted that the residency requirements of the six
residency district seats on the Lincoln County Board of Education
imposed an additional requirement upon his candidacy in violationof Article VI, § 8 of the North Carolina Constitution, and that the
Lincoln County Board of Commissioners refused to change the
election districts in accordance with the principles of “one-man,
one-vote.” In case 06 CVS 0839, plaintiff asserted in his amended
complaint that, even though all voters in Lincoln County vote for
all seats on the Board of Education, because of population
disparities between them, the residency districts violate the
United States Constitution as enumerated in the principle of “one-
man, one-vote.” He further alleged that the allocation of seats on
the Board of Education violated the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 115C-
37, which required redistricting following a federal census.
Finally he asserted that the Board of Commissioners “aided and
abetted” in circumventing “equitable representation” by rejecting
the Board of Education's request to change the voting method before
the 2002 elections.
This matter was heard by the trial court upon the parties'
cross motions for summary judgment upon stipulated facts. The
parties also stipulated that there were no genuine issues of
material fact. At the hearing, plaintiff dismissed his claims
asserting a violation of the United States Constitution and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The two cases were consolidated for
hearing and disposition.
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed plaintiff's complaints, with prejudice. Plaintiff
appeals. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) “requires that a question be presented
and argued in the brief in order to obtain appellate review.” Love
v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 514, 239 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1977)
(citing State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976);
State v. Brothers, 33 N.C. App. 233, 234 S.E.2d 652 (1977)). At
oral argument, plaintiff acknowledged naming the Board of
Commissioners as a party “in the belief that the Commissioners
acted illegally” in taking no action on the Board of Education's
2002 recommendations for redistricting. As there is nothing in the
record to support this claim, and appellant's brief discusses only
the Board of Education in its arguments, plaintiff has not
preserved any issues pertaining to the Board of Commissioners or
the Board of Elections. Thus, we limit our analysis to defendant
Lincoln County Board of Education.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed by this Court “in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” Bradley v. Hidden Valley Transp., Inc., 148
N.C. App. 163, 165, 557 S.E.2d 610, 612 (2001) (citation omitted),
aff'd, 355 N.C. 485, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002).
Appellate review of an order awarding summary judgment is
limited to a de novo review of the trial court's conclusions of
law. Coastal Plains Utils., Inc. v. New Hanover County, 166 N.C.
App. 333, 340-41, 601 S.E.2d 915, 920 (2004). However, although a
de novo standard of review applies to summary judgment orders,
constitutional challenges to acts of the General Assembly are
reviewed on a deferential standard, and “[w]here a statute issusceptible of two interpretations, one of which is constitutional
and the other not, the courts will adopt the former and reject the
latter.” Guilford Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford Co. Bd. of
Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1993)
(citing Wayne County Citizens Ass'n v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs,
328 N.C. 24, 29, 399 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In his first argument, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in its conclusion that the residency-based method of election
for seats on the Lincoln County Board of Education does not violate
Article VI, Section 8 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Interpreting the term “office” to refer to a particular seat on the
Lincoln County Board of Education, he argues that the residency
requirement unconstitutionally disqualifies him from running for
the Howard's Creek Township seat. We disagree.
Relying upon Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1,
413 S.E.2d 541 (1992), appellant first argues that the “clear
meaning” of Article VI, Section 8 prohibits the General Assembly
from imposing residency requirements on seats on the Lincoln County
Board of Education as such a requirement amounts to an additional
disqualification for office. Second, appellant argues that the
term “office” refers to each seat on the Lincoln County ballot
because: (1) the word “offices” is used elsewhere in the
Constitution; (2) “seat” is not clearly defined but only referenced
as an elected member of the General Assembly 'taking his seat'; (3)
a case governing the election of judges by residency district isinapposite as the Constitution expressly permits such a
requirement; and (4) the statute governing Elections requires the
Board of Elections to include “the title of each office to be voted
on and the number of seats to be filled in each ballot item” and
the Lincoln County Board of Elections listed “Board of Education -
Howard's Creek” as a separate entry from the other seats on the
ballot. Finally, he argues that, as the framers of our State
constitution included a residency requirement for judges, such
express permission could have been included for other offices, had
that been the framers' intent.
A party who challenges the constitutionality of a legislative
act bears the burden of proof that the statute violates the
Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. Guilford Co., 110 N.C.
App. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684 (citations omitted). It is firmly
established that the North Carolina Constitution is a limit on the
power of the people, not a granting of power. Wayne County
Citizens Ass'n v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. at 29, 399
S.E.2d at 315. Any power not clearly limited by the State
Constitution is reserved to the people of North Carolina, and an
act of the people through their legislature is presumptively valid
unless it contravenes a specific provision of the State
Constitution. Id. Accordingly, great deference is accorded to
acts of the legislature as the agent of the people. State ex rel.
Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989).
In relevant part, the North Carolina Constitution states that
“[t]he following persons shall be disqualified for office: First,any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God. Second, with
respect to any office that is filled by election by the people, any
person who is not qualified to vote in an election for that
office.” N.C. Const., art. VI, § 8.
Appellant argues that Article VI, § 8 should be read as “if
you can vote for the office, you can run for the office.” However,
we must first interpret the language of the statute:
Sec. 3. The newly constituted and
established Lincoln County Board of Education
shall consist of seven members, and each of
said members shall be residents and qualified
voters of the townships according to the
membership allocations hereinafter made to
said townships . . . .
. . . .
One member shall be elected from the county at
large, without regard to township.
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 876, § 3 (emphasis added). Since the word
“member” is susceptible to two interpretations, one which is
Constitutional (“seat”) and one which is not (“office”), we “adopt
the former and reject the latter.” Guilford Co., 110 N.C. App. at
511, 430 S.E.2d at 685 (citations omitted). This argument is
overruled.
In his second argument, appellant contends that the trial
court erred in its conclusion that the Board of Education was not
required by N.C.G.S. § 115C-37 to redistrict following each federal
census. He argues that the statute should be read within the
context of other statutes governing the elections of county
commissioners and council members. We disagree. In matters of statutory construction, our principal task is to
ensure that the purpose of the legislative body, or legislative
intent, is achieved. Elec. Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C.
651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). Where the statute is clear
and unambiguous, the plain words of the statute suffice, and no
judicial construction is necessary. See Wiggs v. Edgecombe County,
361 N.C. 318, 322, 643 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2007).
The relevant portion of N.C.G.S. § 115C-37 reads:
(i) The local board of education shall revise
electoral district boundaries from time to
time as provided by this subsection. If
district boundaries are set by local act or
court order and the act or order does not
provide a method for revising them, the local
board of education shall revise them only for
the purpose of (i) accounting for territory
annexed to or excluded from the school
administrative unit, and (ii) correcting
population imbalances among the districts
shown by a new federal census or caused by
exclusions or annexations. After the General
Assembly has ratified an act establishing
district boundaries, the local board of
education shall not revise them again until a
new federal census of population is taken or
territory is annexed to or excluded from the
school administrative unit, whichever event
first occurs.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-37(i) (2005).
In their focus on the second sentence of this subsection of
the statute, the litigants have altogether ignored the third
sentence. The statute proscribes redistricting by a local Board of
Education following ratification by the General Assembly of
legislation establishing district boundaries until a new federal
census is taken or further annexations occur. Since 2002 Sess. Law
22 established that residents of Ironton and Howard's CreekTownships inside the city limits of Lincolnton are eligible for the
city of Lincolnton seat, rather than Ironton or Howard's Creek
Township seats, the Board of Elections is proscribed from further
redistricting until 2010 or further annexations by the city of
Lincolnton, whichever comes first.
Finally, we note that appellant's brief addresses only two of
three original assignments of error
. Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P.
28(b)(6) (2007), we deem the last assignment of error to be
abandoned.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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