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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-129
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 October 2007
ALFRED L. PACK,
Employee,
Plaintiff,
v
.
N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 938993
HAPPY RENTZ, INC.,
Employer,
KEY RISK INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Carrier,
Defendants.
Appeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 8
September 2006 by Commissioner Laura Kranifeld Mavretic for the
North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 12 September 2007.
Barron & Berry, L.L.P., by Vance Barron, Jr., for plaintiff-
appellee.
Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, LLP, by Paul A.
Daniels, for defendants-appellants.
TYSON, Judge.
Happy Rentz, Inc. (Happy Rentz) and Key Risk Insurance
Company, Inc. (collectively, defendants) appeal from the Full
Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission's (the
Commission) opinion and award granting Alfred L. Pack
(plaintiff) permanent total disability benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
Plaintiff was employed by Happy Rentz as a delivery truck
driver. On 17 May 1999, plaintiff suffered an accidental injurywhen a 400-pound pallet fell onto his back at work and injured his
left shoulder and neck. Plaintiff was sixty-two-years-old at the
time of the injury and has not returned to work as a truck driver
for Happy Rentz or any other employer in any capacity.
Plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.
On 7 June 1999, defendants accepted the compensability of
plaintiff's claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18(d).
Defendants began paying $339.32 per week to plaintiff.
On 2 October 2004, plaintiff filed a Form 33 requesting his
claim to be assigned for hearing. Plaintiff asserted he was
entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Defendants
responded that plaintiff was not entitled to permanent total
disability benefits because: (1) authorized physicians had
released him to work with restrictions; (2) Happy Rentz offered
plaintiff a position within his restrictions as an assistant
sanitizer, but he unjustifiably refused the position; and (3)
plaintiff's disability, if any, is due to conditions unrelated to
his work injuries.
After his injury, plaintiff initially presented to Dr.
Phillips Carter (Dr. Carter), an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Carter
performed two surgical operations on plaintiff's left rotator cuff.
Dr. Carter also performed two surgical manipulations on plaintiff's
left shoulder under anesthesia. On 3 August 2000, Dr. Carter found
plaintiff's left rotator cuff had reached maximum medical
improvement and assigned him a twenty percent permanent partial
disability rating. Dr. Carter noted, I do not think [plaintiff]can go back-to [sic] . . . doing heavy work. On 20 November 2000,
Dr. Carter increased plaintiff's permanent partial disability
rating to thirty percent. On 16 March 2001, Dr. Carter referred
plaintiff to another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. James E. Nitka (Dr.
Nitka).
On 4 May 2001, plaintiff presented to Dr. Nitka. Dr. Nitka
performed two cervical fusion operations on plaintiff's neck for a
left-sided disc herniation at the C4-C5 and C5-C6 vertebrae. Dr.
Nitka released plaintiff from any further treatment for his neck on
26 September 2002. Plaintiff continued to experience difficulties
with his neck and left shoulder and obtained approval from the
Commission on 29 April 2004, for a change of treating physician to
yet another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Peter G. Dalldorf (Dr.
Dalldorf).
On 27 October 2003, Dr. Dalldorf concluded plaintiff had
reached maximum medical improvement and would never be able to
drive a truck again. Dr. Dalldorf also noted plaintiff's work
restrictions are some light duty restrictions which involve a 10-
pound lift and no use of the affected left arm above the level of
his waist.
On 6 February 2004, plaintiff's vocational rehabilitation
counselor, Amanda Ratliffe (Ratliffe), arranged for William
McClure (McClure), a therapist, to perform a work task analysis
on a new position called assistant sanitizer created by Happy
Rentz. McClure concluded that plaintiff could perform the jobrequirements of an assistant sanitizer within the work restrictions
imposed by Dr. Dalldorf.
Another vocational rehabilitation counselor, Dr. Ann T.
Neulicht, (Dr. Neulicht), conducted an investigation of
plaintiff's capacity to obtain employment in the marketplace. Dr.
Neulicht testified:
Based on my review of the medical records, my
interviews with [plaintiff], and the results
of the Functional Capacity Evaluation and
information from his physicians regarding
functional capacity and residual capacity as
well as his age, education, and training,
there's no evidence that he's capable of
sustained competitive work in even routine
repetitive occupations.
His functional capacity has been listed as
sedentary in nature and his prior job as a
truck driver would be medium, so he cannot
return to a job at [sic] truck driver and was
precluded from that by Dr. Dalldorf and at the
recommendation of his physical therapist. So
the question would be could he return to other
sedentary occupations, and based on the
Functional Capacity Evaluation as well as the
results of the Raleigh Vocational Center
assessment, he cannot.
(Emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff also suffered from other medical problems unrelated
to his compensable injury that affected his ability to work at
various times. On 17 March 2004, Dr. Dalldorf performed a left
carpal tunnel release and removed plaintiff from work for a period
of four to eight weeks. On 14 September 2004, plaintiff underwent
a prostate operation and was removed from work for an additional
eight weeks. On 7 July 2005, Dr. Dalldorf performed a right carpaltunnel release and removed plaintiff from work for a period of
thirty days.
On 13 June 2005, the matter was heard before Deputy
Commissioner George T. Glenn, II (Deputy Commissioner Glenn). On
12 December 2005, Deputy Commissioner Glenn entered an opinion and
award that concluded plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled
in light of his medical restrictions, age, education, and
experience and it would be futile for Plaintiff to engage in a job
search henceforth. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission.
On 21 June 2006, the Full Commission reviewed the matter.
Plaintiff was sixty-eight years old at the time of the hearing. On
8 September 2006, the Commission, without receiving further
evidence, entered an opinion and award that concluded: (1)
plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident; (2)
plaintiff's refusal to accept the position offered by Happy Rentz
was justified because the job duties were within his work
restrictions; (3) plaintiff has been and remains incapable of
earning wages with Happy Rentz or any other employer in light of
his medical restrictions, age, limited education, and lack of
employment experience in clerical or office work; and (4) plaintiff
is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Defendants
appeal.
II. Issues
Defendants argue the Commission erred by concluding plaintiff
is entitled to permanent total disability benefits because: (1) he
could perform the position as an assistant sanitizer offered byHappy Rentz; (2) the position was consistent with his work
restrictions; (3) he refused to return to work in a position that
was within his restrictions; and (4) plaintiff is not permanently
and totally disabled due to his compensable injury.
III. Standard of Review
Our Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen reviewing Industrial Commission
decisions, appellate courts must examine
whether any competent evidence supports the
Commission's findings of fact and whether
[those] findings . . . support the
Commission's conclusions of law. The
Commission's findings of fact are conclusive
on appeal when supported by such competent
evidence, even though there [is] evidence
that would support findings to the contrary.
McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700
(2004) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116,
530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000); Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401,
402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965)). [T]he full Commission is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence[.]
Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. The Commission's mixed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and its conclusions of law
applying the facts are fully reviewable de novo by this Court.
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682,
684 (1982); Cauble v. Soft-Play, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 526, 528, 477
S.E.2d 678, 679 (1996), disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 751, 485 S.E.2d
49 (1997).
IV. The Position Offered Plaintiff
Defendants argue the Commission erred by concluding plaintiff
is entitled to permanent total disability benefits and assertsplaintiff was offered and could perform the position as an
assistant sanitizer, and the position was consistent with his work
restrictions imposed by Dr. Dalldorf. Within this broad argument,
defendants specifically argue the Commission's findings of fact
numbered 12, 17, 18, 19, and 21 are not supported by any competent
evidence.
A. Finding of Fact Numbered 12
Defendants specifically assert the Commission's conclusion
within the finding of fact numbered 12 that Mr. McClure's Work
Task Analysis erroneously concluded that plaintiff could perform
the job of Assistant Sanitizer within Dr. Dalldorf's restrictions
is erroneous. We disagree.
Finding of fact numbered 12 states:
12. Mr. McClure was asked to perform an
analysis to determine whether plaintiff could
perform the Assistant Sanitizer job within the
work restrictions assigned by Dr. Dalldorf.
Mr. McClure testified that Ms. Ratliffe gave
him a form dated October 27, 2003, signed by
Dr. Dalldorf, which proved to be an incomplete
statement of plaintiff's restrictions. The
form stated that the work restrictions for
plaintiff were light duty--10 lb. lift, waist
level left arm. Mr. McClure was not given
Dr. Dalldorf's more complete clinical note of
October 27, 2003, which stated specifically
that the work restrictions included no use of
the affected left arm above the level of the
waist. Thus, Mr. McClure's Work Task
Analysis erroneously concluded that plaintiff
could perform the job of Assistant Sanitizer
within Dr. Dalldorf's restrictions. Several
of the job tasks were clearly described in Mr.
McClure's report as being between waist level
and shoulder level, such as the use of a linen
rack which was 56 inches off the floor,
vertical storage drawers which were 4 to 51
inches from the floor, and a hand-wiping
station which was 34 to 56 inches from thefloor. Mr. McClure stated in his report,
Based on the work tasks identified, all
vertical heights reflect to be at or below
shoulder level, Reaching above shoulder
level: Infrequent, and Reaching below
shoulder level: Occasional frequent.
Moreover, certain routine tasks normally
associated with work done at the facility had
been excluded by defendant employer from the
job description of Assistant Sanitizer given
to Mr. McClure.
(Emphasis supplied).
Ratliffe arranged for McClure to perform a work task analysis
on the assistant sanitizer position created by Happy Rentz.
Ratliffe testified she sent the work restrictions imposed by Dr.
Dalldorf to McClure, but she could not definitively state whether
she furnished the restrictions to McClure before he did his
evaluation of the assistant sanitizer position.
McClure also testified about the information Ratliffe had
furnished him about Dr. Dalldorf's work restrictions:
Q. Well, sir, let me show you Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4 [Dr. Dalldorf's clinical note dated
27 October 2003 containing plaintiff's work
restrictions]. I don't find either of these
documents in your file. Can you confirm that,
please?
A. I have not seen this document.
McClure further testified about the information he was given
about plaintiff's work restrictions:
Q. I would like you to find out what actual
information was given to you about the work
restrictions placed on [plaintiff] by Mr. -
Dr. Dalldorf in February 2004.
A. Well, I referred in my recommendations in
my report regarding Dr. Dalldorf's work
restrictions of light duty, ten pounds lift,
waist level left arm, so I was informed priorto the analysis that that was a restriction
imposed by Dr. Dalldorf on [plaintiff].
Q. All right, sir. You're referring to your
report which I have marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 5, is that correct?
A. That is correct. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Now I ask you, sir, isn't it
correct that your report assumes that he could
do work up to shoulder level?
A. With his hands. That's correct.
This testimony is competent evidence to support the Commission's
finding of fact numbered 12 that:
Mr. McClure was not given Dr. Dalldorf's more
complete clinical note of October 27, 2003,
which stated specifically that the work
restrictions included no use of the affected
left arm above the level of the waist. Thus,
Mr. McClure's Work Task Analysis erroneously
concluded that plaintiff could perform the job
of Assistant Sanitizer within Dr. Dalldorf's
restrictions.
McClure's work task analysis is further competent evidence to
support the Commission's finding of fact numbered 12. The report
omits Dr. Dalldorf's work restrictions which included no use of
the affected left arm above the level of the waist. The report
states Dr. Dalldorf's work restrictions on plaintiff were only,
light duty, 10 lbs lift, waist level, left arm.
In describing the physical demands of the assistant sanitizer
position, the report stated reaching above shoulder level is
[i]nfrequent and reaching below shoulder level is
[o]ccasional/frequent. The report also listed the work surface
heights contained in finding of fact numbered 12. McClure further
testified about the work surface heights: Q. So the work heights were at or below
shoulder level. That means that there were
some work heights which were between waist
level and shoulder level, isn't that correct?
A. That's correct.
The Commission's finding of fact numbered 12 is supported by
competent evidence. The Commission's conclusion that McClure's
Work Task Analysis erroneously concluded that plaintiff could
perform the job of Assistant Sanitizer within Dr. Dalldorf's
restrictions is supported by findings of fact based upon competent
evidence that McClure did not take into account plaintiff's work
restrictions, which included no use of the affected left arm above
the level of the waist. The Commission's findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence.
McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700.
Also, [t]he full Commission is the sole judge of the weight
and credibility of the evidence[.] Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530
S.E.2d at 553. Here, the Commission found McClure's conclusion
that plaintiff could perform the requirements of the assistant
sanitizer position within Dr. Dalldorf's work restrictions not
credible. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.
B. Findings of Fact Numbered 17 through 19
Defendants argue findings of fact numbered 17 through 19 are
not supported by competent evidence. Defendants assert the
Commission erred by adopting Dr. Neulight's opinions set out in
these findings of fact because her opinions were based on the
mistaken belief that Dr. Dalldorf's restrictions applied to both
arms. We disagree. Findings of fact numbered 17 through 19 state:
17. Plaintiff's prior work experience as a
truck driver and as a substation electrician
was at the medium level, a degree of exertion
that he can no longer perform. The Raleigh
Vocational Center tested plaintiff's ability
to perform routine repetitive tasks at the
sedentary exertion level, within Dr.
Dalldorf's restrictions, and specifically with
no use of the left arm above waist level.
Testing revealed that plaintiff could only
work at the low 26th percentile of competitive
norms, which is deemed non-competitive
according to Dr. Neulicht. In order to
achieve that level of performance, it was
noted that plaintiff had to take pain
medication and the tester observed that due to
his pain symptoms, plaintiff was moderately
limited in his ability to remember and carry
out detailed instructions and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number
of rest periods. Plaintiff could not sustain a
production or piece-rate pace of work.
18. Due to the combination of all these
factors, Dr. Neulicht was of the opinion, and
the Commission finds, that plaintiff is not
capable of sustained competitive work in even
routine, repetitive, and unskilled
occupations.
19. Dr. Neulicht was of the opinion, and the
Commission so finds, that the job of Assistant
Sanitizer at defendant-employer was a job
compiled of sedentary tasks extracted from the
normal work routines of jobs that are at the
medium exertion level, such as laundry duties
and dishwashing, which usually require lifting
more than ten pounds, and silver-polishing,
which is light in exertion but requires
constant use of the hands. There was no
credible evidence that such a job, as defined
by defendant-employer, exists elsewhere in the
competitive job market, since dishwashing jobs
require loading, unloading, and lifting
dishes; laundry jobs require lifting laundry
to and from a washer to a dryer; and
silver-polishing jobs require a competitive
pace of work performance with dexterity and a
firm grasp.
Here, defendants do not argue the above findings of fact are
not supported by competent evidence. These findings are supported
by Dr. Neulicht's testimony as noted above. Instead, defendants
assert Dr. Neulicht's findings are not credible. Again, [t]he
full Commission is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of
the evidence[.] Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
[T]he Commission does not have to explain its findings of fact by
attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds
credible. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.
C. Finding of Fact Numbered 21
Defendants argue finding of fact numbered 21 is not supported
by competent evidence. Defendants assert plaintiff's refusal to
accept the assistant sanitizer position with Happy Rentz was not
justified. We disagree.
Finding of fact numbered 21 states:
21. Although the job of Assistant Sanitizer
was specially designed by defendant-employer
for plaintiff, another employee filled the
position for defendant-employer after
plaintiff turned down the job in March 2004.
Thus, the job is not makework. However, the
Commission finds that the Assistant Sanitizer
position was not within his restrictions and
not suitable for plaintiff, and, therefore,
his refusal to perform the job was justified.
Dr. Dalldorf noted plaintiff's work restrictions are, some
light duty restrictions which involve a 10-pound lift and no use of
the affected left arm above the level of his waist. (Emphasis
supplied). As shown above, McClure's Work Task Analysis clearly
shows the assistant sanitizer position offered by Happy Rentz
involves plaintiff using his left arm above his waist and shoulder. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-32 (2005) provides, [i]f an injured
employee refuses employment procured for him suitable to his
capacity he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time
during the continuance of such refusal, unless in the opinion of
the Industrial Commission such refusal was justified. Here, the
Commission found and concluded plaintiff was justified in refusing
to accept the assistant sanitizer position offered by Happy Rentz
because the duties of the position did not comport with his work
restrictions set forth by Dr. Dalldorf. See Oliver v. Lane Co.,
143 N.C. App. 167, 171, 544 S.E.2d 606, 608 (2001) (The plaintiff
was justified in refusing the employer's offered job, which
consisted of highly repetitive motion involving the hand and wrist
and was in direct conflict with her doctor's recommendation.).
The Commission's finding of fact numbered 21 is supported by
competent evidence. The Commission's findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence.
McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700. The Commission's
conclusion that plaintiff justifiably refused to accept the
position offered by Happy Rentz is supported by its finding of
fact. This assignment of error is overruled.
V. Permanent Total Disability
Defendants argue plaintiff is not permanently and totally
disabled due to his compensable injury. Defendants assert the
Commission's findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law
that plaintiff is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
We disagree. Under the North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act, [t]he
term 'disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the
same or any other employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2005)
(emphasis supplied). In order to obtain compensation under the
Workers' Compensation Act, the claimant has the burden of proving
the existence of his disability and its extent. Hendrix v.
Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 185, 345 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1986).
Our Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n order to support a conclusion of
disability, the Commission must find: (1)
that plaintiff was incapable after his injury
of earning the same wages he had earned before
his injury in the same employment, (2) that
plaintiff was incapable after his injury of
earning the same wages he had earned before
his injury in any other employment, and (3)
that this individual's incapacity to earn was
caused by plaintiff's injury.
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682,
683 (1982) (internal citation omitted).
In Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, this Court set out
four separate and distinct ways a plaintiff can carry his burden to
prove disability:
The burden is on the employee to show that he
is unable to earn the same wages he had earned
before the injury, either in the same
employment or in other employment. The
employee may meet this burden in one of four
ways: (1) the production of medical evidence
that he is physically or mentally, as a
consequence of the work related injury,
incapable of work in any employment; (2) the
production of evidence that he is capable of
some work, but that he has, after a reasonable
effort on his part, been unsuccessful in his
effort to obtain employment; (3) theproduction of evidence that he is capable of
some work but that it would be futile because
of preexisting conditions, i.e., age,
inexperience, lack of education, to seek other
employment; or (4) the production of evidence
that he has obtained other employment at a
wage less than that earned prior to the
injury.
108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993) (emphasis
supplied) (internal citations omitted).
The Commission found as fact:
16. Dr. Neulicht's opinion was based on
plaintiff's age, education, training and other
factors. Dr. Neulicht found that plaintiff
has a very limited education, having left
school at age 16 when he was in the seventh
grade. Further, in April 2004, Ms. Ratliffe
requested that plaintiff attend Guilford
Technical Community College (GTCC) to obtain
his G.E.D. Plaintiff was given placement
tests at GTCC in May 2004, which placed him at
grade two in reading, at less than grade one
in mathematics, and less than grade one in
language arts. Dr. Neulicht found that
plaintiff is functionally illiterate and has
no clerical skills.
17. Plaintiff's prior work experience as a
truck driver and as a substation electrician
was at the medium level, a degree of exertion
that he can no longer perform. The Raleigh
Vocational Center tested plaintiffs ability to
perform routine repetitive tasks at the
sedentary exertion level, within Dr.
Dalldorf's restrictions, and specifically with
no use of the left arm above waist level.
Testing revealed that plaintiff could only
work at the low 26th percentile of competitive
norms, which is deemed non-competitive
according to Dr. Neulicht. In order to
achieve that level of performance, it was
noted that plaintiff had to take pain
medication and the tester observed that due to
his pain symptoms, plaintiff was moderately
limited in his ability to remember and carry
out detailed instructions and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable numberof rest periods. Plaintiff could not sustain a
production or piece-rate pace of work.
18. Due to the combination of all these
factors, Dr. Neulicht was of the opinion, and
the Commission finds, that plaintiff is not
capable of sustained competitive work in even
routine, repetitive, and unskilled
occupations.
(Emphasis supplied).
The Commission concluded plaintiff was entitled to permanent
total disability under the third Russell factor:
3. The greater weight of the medical evidence
indicates that plaintiff is currently unable
to work and will continue to be unable to work
in the competitive labor market in the future.
Vocational rehabilitation professionals have
been unsuccessful in any attempt to find
suitable work for plaintiff, other than the
position offered by defendant-employer which
was not within plaintiff's restrictions and
therefore not suitable employment. Therefore,
in light of [plaintiff's] medical
restrictions, advanced age, very limited
education, and lack of employment experience
in clerical or office work, plaintiff has been
and remains incapable of earning wages with
defendant-employer or in any other employment
since May 17, 1999.
(Emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff carried his burden to prove he is entitled to
permanent total disability through the production of evidence that
he is capable of some work but that it would be futile because of
preexisting conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of education,
to seek other employment. Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 765, 425
S.E.2d at 457. The Commission's findings of fact support the
conclusion of law that plaintiff is entitled to permanent totaldisability compensation benefits. This assignment of error is
overruled.
VI. Conclusion
The duties of the assistant sanitizer position offered by
Happy Rentz were not within Dr. Dalldorf's work restrictions for
plaintiff. Plaintiff justifiably refused to accept the position.
Oliver, 143 N.C. App. at 171, 544 S.E.2d at 608. The Commission's
findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and the
findings of fact support the conclusion of law plaintiff is
entitled to permanent total disability compensation benefits.
McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700. The Commission's
opinion and award is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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