IN THE MATTERS OF: New Hanover County
Nos. 06 JT 38-39
K.S.E. and B.N.E.
WYNN, Judge.
This appeal arises from the trial court's order to terminate
Respondent-mother's parental rights. Because the record shows that
the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence; the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law; and the trial court properly determined that
the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
child, we affirm the order of termination.
On 21 June 2001, New Hanover County Department of Social
Services (DSS) filed a petition alleging that K.S.E. and B.N.E.
were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. DSS claimed that
the children were at risk of sexual abuse and had been exposed to
“grossly inappropriate sexual conduct on the part of their motherand other relatives, including their siblings.” DSS recounted that
Respondent-mother and the two juveniles had recently relocated from
Cumberland County to live with Respondent-mother's mother and
stepfather. DSS stated that the home in which Respondent-mother
and the children lived was inappropriate in that the stepfather had
pled guilty to a sexual offense against a mentally disabled adult,
and the maternal grandmother suffered from bipolar disorder and did
not understand the nature or extent of Respondent-mother's and the
juveniles' problems.
DSS further alleged that the children displayed significant
behavioral and emotional problems, noting that K.S.E. had engaged
in sexual activity with his cousin. Additionally, DSS stated that
both children and a neighbor child had observed Respondent-mother
“kissing, licking, and caressing pornographic materials.” DSS
therefore asserted that Respondent-mother could not provide, and
the children did not receive, proper care, supervision, or
discipline. An order for non-secure custody was entered, and DSS
assumed immediate custody of the children. On 18 October 2001,
nunc pro tunc 24 August 2001, the children were adjudicated abused,
neglected, and dependent juveniles.
Since 21 June 2001, when DSS filed its initial petition and
took custody of the children, K.S.E. and B.N.E. have been placed in
foster homes, group homes, and hospitals, and given therapy to try
and address their special needs, including diagnoses of post-
traumatic stress disorder and mild retardation for both children.
During that time, Respondent-mother was initially cooperative withDSS, completing a parenting skills course and attending a course
for parenting hyperactive children, but she also had difficulty
addressing her own mental health needs and was terminated from
Dialectical Behavioral therapy due to non-attendance and
inappropriate behavior in group sessions. Respondent-mother also
entered one-on-one therapy with a psychologist, who diagnosed her
with borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder.
By May 2002, Respondent-mother had remarried and secured
adequate housing for the children; nonetheless, her therapist
requested more time prior to returning the children to Respondent-
mother, to allow her to gain understanding of their needs and deal
with her own mental health issues. Visitation continued, and
included in-home therapeutic services for Respondent-mother such as
modeling parenting skills while the children visited. However,
B.N.E. had only four in-home visits with Respondent-mother before
in-home therapy was terminated, and a fire then rendered the home
uninhabitable for several months. According to the trial court's
findings, Respondent-mother then became “secretive and inconsistent
in representations about her employment, the stability of her
marriage, [and] her compliance with therapy and medication.”
The children's visitation with Respondent-mother was suspended
in 2005, due to the children's need for a high level of care and
their therapist's opinion that visitation would harm their
progress. Respondent-mother had also ended her one-on-one therapy
with the psychologist provided by DSS but claimed to be seeking
treatment at a county mental health center. The trial court alsofound that Respondent-mother's marriage had disintegrated and that
she and her husband were separated but had moved to South Carolina,
where they were charged with arson and a false insurance claim in
April 2006. According to the trial court, Respondent-mother
conceded that she could not meet the needs of K.S.E. but sought
reunification with B.N.E.
On 31 January 2006, after over four years of failed efforts at
reunification of Respondent-mother and the minor children, DSS
filed a petition to terminate Respondent-mother's parental rights
as to K.S.E. and B.N.E. DSS alleged three grounds for termination,
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6), respectively:
(1) Respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles; (2) Respondent-
mother had willfully left the juveniles in foster care for more
than twelve months without showing reasonable progress; and (3)
Respondent-mother is incapable of providing for the proper care and
supervision of the children, such that they were dependent
juveniles, with a reasonable probability that such incapability
will continue for the foreseeable future. Following a hearing held
on 24 and 25 July 2006, the trial court terminated Respondent-
mother's parental rights.
Respondent-mother now appeals, contending that the trial court
erred by concluding that (I) the juveniles were neglected,
willfully left in foster care for more than twelve months, and
dependent because Respondent-mother is incapable of providing
proper care and supervision; and (II) terminating Respondent-
mother's rights was in the best interest of the children.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005). The court should take action
“which is in the best interests of the juvenile” when “the
interests of the juvenile and those of the juvenile's parents or
other persons are in conflict.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(3)
(2005). As a discretionary decision, the trial court's disposition
order will not be disturbed unless it could not have been the
product of reasoning. In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 747, 751, 616
S.E.2d 385, 387, aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 165, 622 S.E.2d 495
(2005).
Here, the trial court made a number of findings of fact that
relate to the children's best interest, and which are binding on
this Court because they were unchallenged by Respondent-mother.
Specifically, the trial court referred to the recommendations of
John Schenk, the guardian ad litem appointed for the juveniles, as
well as those of Mary Mack, the children's therapist.
(See footnote 1)
The trial
court noted that Mr. Schenk had initially, and for two years intothe underlying case, advocated for the reunification of the
children with Respondent-mother, as well as for in-home therapy to
teach her the necessary skills to handle two disturbed children.
Nevertheless, Mr. Schenk later concluded that reunification was no
longer appropriate for the children because Respondent-mother could
not meet their needs due to her lack of progress and lack of
attention to her own mental health needs and her own well-being,
employment, and marriage. The trial court likewise noted that Ms.
Mack's evaluation of the children mentioned their progress in
therapy and their protectiveness toward their mother, but that they
do not mention her often. Ms. Mack also determined that it is not
in the children's best interest to have visitation with Respondent-
mother, as she believed such visitation would set the children back
in their progress.
Based on these findings, as well as the trial court's findings
regarding the juveniles' special needs, Respondent-mother's lack of
stability, and her failure to meet her own needs, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
termination was in the juveniles' best interest.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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