IN THE MATTER OF: Wake County
M.B.M. No. 03 JB 56
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Gail E. Dawson, for the State.
Duncan B. McCormick, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
M.B.M. (juvenile) appeals from adjudication and disposition
orders entered finding him to be guilty of misdemeanor carrying a
concealed weapon
and adjudicating him to be delinquent. We affirm.
The State's evidence tended to show that Cary Police
Officer
Tiffany Selby (Officer Selby) came upon a group of juveniles at
approximately 8:50 p.m. on 9 September 2006. As Officer Selby
approached, the group dispersed except for one female, who remained
and told Officer Selby that the rest of the juveniles were walking
back to their residences. Officer Selby advised her to go home
because the area would soon be saturated by other Cary Police
Officers trying to catch a perpetrator who had been breaking into
motor vehicles in the area.
Approximately two hours later, Officer Selby spotted the samegroup of juveniles sitting inside a silver GMC Envoy parked in
front of the same house as earlier. As Officer Selby approached,
the vehicle drove away. Officer Selby followed the vehicle and
observed the vehicle run a stop sign, exceed the speed limit, and
make a turn without signaling. Officer Selby stopped the vehicle,
approached it, and asked the driver to produce his operator's
license. The driver handed her an identification card and told her
that his license had been suspended. Officer Selby arrested the
driver for operating a vehicle without a valid driver's license and
obtained the driver's permission to search the vehicle.
Cary Police Detective Matthew Pearson (Detective Pearson)
and two other officers arrived to assist in the search. Detective
Pearson asked the occupants to exit
the vehicle. Detective Pearson
recognized one of the occupants as juvenile, with whom he had prior
dealings. Detective Pearson asked juvenile for permission to pat
him down for weapons. Juvenile consented and Detective Pearson
found a box cutter inside juvenile's pocket.
On 15 September 2006, juvenile petitions were filed alleging
juvenile was carrying a concealed weapon and that he had provided
a false home address to Detective Pearson. On 28 November 2006,
juvenile moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search of
the vehicle at the traffic stop. On 30 November 2006, juvenile's
motion was denied and the trial court adjudicated juvenile
delinquent and found him to be guilty of misdemeanor carrying a
concealed weapon. The trial court imposed a sentence of fourteen
days
confinement to a detention center and supervised probation forsix months. Juvenile appeals.
Juvenile argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop.
Juvenile contends the law enforcement officers did not have a
sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain and search him following
a routine traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger.
We disagree.
Juvenile argues: (1) the officers did not have any reason to
believe that he had been engaged in criminal activity; (2) his
detention and search was not related to the traffic violation; and
(3) the officers did not have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.
Juvenile does not
contest the legality of the stop of the vehicle, but argues that
the officers did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain
and search him, as a passenger in the vehicle, following the
routine traffic stop.
Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. McClendon,
350 N.C. 630, 636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). A law enforcement
officer may make a brief investigative stop of a vehicle if he is
led to do so by specific, articulable facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Watkins, 337
N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). The temporary detentionof a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated
a traffic law is not inconsistent with the prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have
stopped the motorist for the violation. State v. McRae, 154 N.C.
App. 624, 628, 573 S.E.2d 214, 218 (2002).
An officer who has lawfully detained a vehicle based upon
probable cause to believe that a traffic law has been violated may
constitutionally order the driver to exit the vehicle. State v.
McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237, 239, 468 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (1996),
aff'd per curiam, 345 N.C. 624, 481 S.E.2d 288 (1997). The officer
may also order passengers to exit the vehicle in order to conduct
a search of the driver's car, even when probable cause or
reasonable suspicion concerning the passengers is lacking. State
v. Pulliam, 139 N.C. App. 437, 440-41, 533 S.E.2d 280, 283 (2000).
A pat-down safety search of the passengers for weapons may be
conducted if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon
articulable facts under the circumstances that the passengers are
armed and dangerous. Id. at 441, 533 S.E.2d at 283. An officer
may search an individual at anytime with the person's consent.
State v. Graham, 149 N.C. App. 215, 218, 562 S.E.2d 286, 288
(2002), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 685, 578
S.E.2d 315 (2003).
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court concluded
that the officers properly stopped the vehicle and properly
conducted a consent search for weapons. Juvenile neither contends
in his brief that he did not consent to the search nor that he didnot give valid consent. Even if a claim could be made that he did
not validly consent, the evidence shows that Detective Pearson had
a reasonable and articulable suspicion for conducting a pat-down
search for weapons. Based upon his prior dealings with juvenile,
Detective Pearson knew that juvenile belonged to a gang, normally
carried a weapon, and juvenile had a prior record of assaultive
behavior. This assignment of error is overruled.
We hold the trial court properly denied juvenile's motion to
suppress. The trial court's orders are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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