BILVIA SANDOVAL,
Employee,
Plaintiff,
v
.
N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 351615
PILLOWTEX CORP.,
Employer,
CRAWFORD & COMPANY,
Carrier,
Defendants.
Kathleen G. Sumner, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Joel K.
Turner, for defendants-appellees.
TYSON, Judge.
Bilvia Sandoval (“plaintiff”) appeals from the Full Commission
of the North Carolina Industrial Commission's (“the Commission”)
opinion and award enforcing the terms of the parties' mediated
settlement agreement. We affirm.
In September 2002, plaintiff was employed by Pillowtex
Corporation (“defendant”) as a spinning machine operator making an
average weekly wage of $438.46. On 31 July 2003, plaintiff fileda Form 18 alleging she had injured her back while “leaning over a
steel bar and reaching to pull out a spool of thread[]” on 6
September 2002. Defendant responded that plaintiff had provided
late notice of her claim, asserted she did not sustain a
compensable injury by accident, and denied her claim for benefits.
On 30 September 2003, plaintiff requested her claim be assigned for
hearing. The Commission ordered the parties to attend mediation
prior to proceeding to hearing.
On 27 April 2004, the parties attended a mediated settlement
conference. Plaintiff was accompanied by a translator at the
mediation conference. At mediation, the parties executed a
settlement agreement which provided, inter alia: (1) “plaintiff
will execute a clincher agreement/general release/other agreement,
in consideration of the sum of $7,500.00 . . . .;” (2) plaintiff
will pay all related unpaid medical bills; (3) defendant's attorney
“will prepare and submit for approval to the [p]laintiff the
settlement document(s) . . . .;” and (4) defendant will advance
plaintiff $1,500.00 upon execution of the settlement document. On
30 April 2004, defendant forwarded to plaintiff a Compromise
Settlement Agreement drafted in accordance with the parties'
mediation agreement. Plaintiff refused to sign the agreement.
Defendant moved to enforce the 27 April 2004 mediated
settlement agreement. On 30 January 2006, the deputy commissioner
filed his opinion and award concluding that “[a]t the mediation .
. . there was no meeting of the minds due to [plaintiff] not
understanding the terms or essence of the alleged settlementagreement reached . . . .” Defendants appealed. On 2 February
2007, a divided panel of the Commission enforced the terms of the
parties' mediated settlement agreement. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff argues the Commission erred by: (1) entering
findings of fact numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, and 22; (2)
failing to make appropriate findings of fact; and (3) enforcing the
terms of the mediated settlement agreement.
Our Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen reviewing Industrial Commission
decisions, appellate courts must examine
“whether any competent evidence supports the
Commission's findings of fact and whether
[those] findings . . . support the
Commission's conclusions of law.” The
Commission's findings of fact are conclusive
on appeal when supported by such competent
evidence, “even though there [is] evidence
that would support findings to the contrary.”
McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700
(2004) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116,
530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000); Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401,
402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965)). “[T]he full Commission is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence[.]”
Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. The Commission's mixed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and its conclusions of law
applying the facts are fully reviewable de novo by this Court.
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682,
684 (1982); Cauble v. Soft-Play, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 526, 528, 477
S.E.2d 678, 679 (1996), disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 751, 485 S.E.2d49 (1997).
Plaintiff argues the Commission's findings of fact numbered 3,
4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, and 22 are not supported by any competent
evidence. We disagree.
The challenged findings of fact state:
3. Plaintiff testified that on September 5,
2002, she leaned over a metal bar to pick
up a bobbin that had fallen off a spool,
and she felt pain in her back on her left
side.
4. Plaintiff testified that she did not
immediately report the incident to her
supervisor. Plaintiff indicated that she
originally thought the back pain was
related to constipation.
5. Plaintiff testified that the next day she
told her supervisor, Helen, about the
incident. Plaintiff's production was
poor on her shift which began on
Saturday, September 7, 2002, and ended
Sunday, September 8, 2002. Plaintiff did
not work on Monday, September 9, 2002, or
Tuesday, September 10, 2002. On
Wednesday, September 11, 2002,
plaintiff's supervisor reprimanded her
for her low production at work and told
her to go to the doctor.
6. Plaintiff was seen by Kim Purcell, P.A.,
on Friday, September 13, 2002 with
complaints of pain in her lower back for
approximately two weeks, hip pain,
urinary frequency and urinary hesitancy.
PA Purcell's assessment was low back pain
and urinary tract infection.
. . . .
13. On November 18, 2002, plaintiff indicated
to Dr. Roy for the first time that her
problems “may” be work related. Dr. Roy
noted that plaintiff described the type
of work the [sic] she was doing, and thatthe work may have led to the problem, but
there is no description of the particular
incident.
14. Plaintiff was out of work as a result of
her back pain and subsequent surgery from
September 16, 2002 until November 26,
2002. Plaintiff returned to work in her
normal position on November 27, 2002.
15. On December 2, 2002, plaintiff told Dr.
Roy that she initially felt that her back
pain was related to her constipation and
urinary tract infection. Plaintiff also
indicated to Dr. Roy that her heavy work
load appeared to worsen the back pain.
. . . .
22. Dr. Roy testified that during his
treatment of plaintiff, he felt that
plaintiff was able to communicate
effectively in English, and he did not
have any difficulty understanding
plaintiff when she explained her history
to him. Dr. Roy felt comfortable enough
with plaintiff's English skills to allow
her to sign a consent form for surgery
without a translator. In addition,
plaintiff had been taking English classes
as part of her GED since the fall of
2003.
After a thorough review of the record on appeal, transcript,
depositions, and plaintiff's medical records, we find competent
evidence in the record to support the challenged findings of fact.
McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700. These findings of fact
support the Commission's conclusions of law. Id. This assignment
of error is overruled.
Plaintiff argues the Commission failed to make appropriate
findings of fact based upon competent evidence presented. We
disagree. “The Commission is not required . . . to find facts as to all
credible evidence. That requirement would place an unreasonable
burden on the Commission. Instead, the Commission must find those
facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.”
London v. Snak Time Catering, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 473, 476, 525
S.E.2d 203, 205 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 352 N.C. 589,
544 S.E.2d 781 (2000).
Presuming the Commission could have made further findings of
fact, such omissions are not reversible error. The Commission's
findings of fact are sufficient and adequately support its
conclusions of law. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.
Plaintiff argues the Commission erred by enforcing the terms
of the settlement agreement when “[plaintiff] speaks Guatemalan
Spanish and requires a Guatemalan Spanish speaking interpreter and
understood that she was to be paid $7,500.00 per month for each of
three months but the settlement agreement was in fact for only for
a single payment of $7,500.00[.]” We disagree.
The Commission found as fact, inter alia:
19. On April 27, 2004, a mediation was held
in this case. . . . An agreement was
reached at the mediation to settle the
matter for $7,500.00, with plaintiff
paying the unpaid medical bills and
defendants paying the mediation cost.
Plaintiff was to be advanced $1,500.00
upon execution of the settlement
agreement.
. . . .
22. Dr. Roy testified that during his
treatment of plaintiff, he felt thatplaintiff was able to communicate
effectively in English, and he did not
have any difficulty understanding
plaintiff when she explained her history
to him. Dr. Roy felt comfortable enough
with plaintiff's English skills to allow
her to sign a consent form for surgery
without a translator. In addition,
plaintiff had been taking English classes
as part of her GED since the fall of
2003.
. . . .
25. The parties entered into a valid,
enforceable contract following a meeting
of the minds regarding the essential
terms of the Agreement which were
sufficiently definite and certain.
The Commission then concluded, inter alia:
4. The Memorandum of Agreement fully
complies with the requirements of the Act
and constitutes a valid compromise
settlement agreement subject to approval
by the Industrial Commission. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-17. Having reviewed the Final
Agreement, the undersigned find it to be
fair and just to all parties and hearby
APPROVES the agreement.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-80(c) (2005), “the Commission
may order parties to participate in mediation . . . .” “If an
agreement is reached in the mediation conference, the parties shall
reduce the agreement to writing, specifying all the terms of their
agreement bearing on the resolution of the dispute before the
Industrial Commission, and sign it along with their counsel.”
Indus. Comm'n R. For Mediated Settlement and Neutral Evaluation
Conferences 4(d), 2007 Ann. R. (N.C.) 679.
“All compromise settlement agreements must be submitted to the
Industrial Commission for approval. Only those agreements deemedfair and just and in the best interest of all parties will be
approved.” Workers' Comp. R. of N.C. Indus. Comm'n 502(1), 2007
Ann. R. (N.C.) 651.
Compromise settlement agreements, including
mediated settlement agreements, are governed
by general principles of contract law. It is
a well-settled principle of contract law that
a valid contract exists only where there has
been a meeting of the minds as to all
essential terms of the agreement. To be
enforceable, the terms of a contract must be
sufficiently definite and certain.
Lemly v. Colvard Oil Co., 157 N.C. App. 99, 103, 577 S.E.2d 712,
715 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
It is the general rule that one who signs a
contract is presumed to know its contents, and
an illiterate person signing an instrument
without request that it be read to him is
chargeable with negligence for which the law
affords no redress, unless he has been lulled
into security or thrown off his guard and
deceived.
Ellis v. Mullen, 34 N.C. App. 367, 370, 238 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1977)
(citing W. R. Grace & Co. v. Strickland, 188 N.C. 369, 124 S.E. 856
(1924)).
Here, the Commission's findings of fact support its
conclusions of law. Defendant's attorney prepared a clincher
agreement and sent it to plaintiff in accordance with the signed
mediation agreement. This clincher agreement contained the
standard terms required by Rule 502(2) of the Workers' Compensation
Rules of the North Carolina Industrial Commission.
While the better practice would be for the
parties to execute a clincher agreement which
contains all the required terms and language
at the conclusion of the mediated settlement
conference if an agreement is reached, thesigned [Mediation Agreement] here fully
complies with Rule 502(2) of the Workers'
Compensation Rules and is a valid compromise
settlement agreement subject to approval by
the Industrial Commission pursuant to Rule
502(1).
Lemly, 157 N.C. App. at 104, 577 S.E.2d at 716.
The Commission did not err in enforcing the terms of the
mediated settlement agreement. Competent evidence exists to
support the Commission's findings of fact and these findings
support the Commission's conclusion of law. Under de novo review,
the Commission's conclusions of law are not erroneous as a matter
of law. This assignment of error is overruled.
Competent evidence in the record on appeal supports the
Commission's findings of fact. These findings of fact support the
Commission's conclusions of law. These conclusions of law are not
erroneous as a matter of law. The Commission's opinion and award
is affirmed.
Affirmed
Judges JACKSON and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***