STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
No. 05 CRS 54941
ZAELVIN M. GINYARD
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Ann W. Matthews, for the State.
Russell J. Hollers, III, for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Zaelvin M. Ginyard (defendant) appeals from the trial court's
order revoking his probation and activating his suspended sentence.
On 25 July 2005, defendant pled guilty to a charge of failure to
register as a sex offender. The trial court sentenced defendant to
a suspended sentence of seventeen months' minimum to twenty-one
months' maximum and a supervised probation period of twelve months.
On 29 June 2006, the trial court extended the term of
defendant's probation by three months, or until 25 October 2006.
On 11 October 2006, the State served defendant with a probation
violation report alleging that defendant had tested positive for
cocaine and violated certain monetary conditions of his probation. The probation violation report, which specified a hearing date of
13 November 2006, was filed with the superior court on 24 October
2006. After a hearing on 29 November 2006, the trial court found
defendant in violation of his probation and activated his suspended
sentence.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation after the 25 October
2006 expiration of his probation term. Defendant contends that the
trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to
make a finding that the State made reasonable efforts to conduct a
revocation hearing before the expiration. We agree.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f), a trial court may
revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation
if:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of
probation the State has filed a written motion
with the clerk indicating its intent to
conduct a revocation hearing; and
(2) The court finds that the State has made
reasonable effort to notify the probationer
and to conduct the hearing earlier.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f) (2005).
Here, the trial court failed to make a finding that the State
made any effort to conduct the revocation hearing before 25 October
2006. In fact, the first scheduled date for the hearing included
in the probation violation report was 13 November 2006, almost
three weeks after the expiration of defendant's probation.
Although the State concedes that the record does not contain
the required finding, it nevertheless urges this Court to affirmthe revocation, reasoning that the case upon which defendant
relies, State v. Bryant, 361 N.C. 100, 103, 637 S.E.2d 532, 534
(2006), was handed down one month after the trial court revoked
defendant's probation. In Bryant, the Supreme Court held that
[i]n the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the
trial court's jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of
the probationary period is not preserved. Id. The State contends
that [i]t is [sic] would be unjust to overturn the revocation
order entered by the trial court in this case before the decision
was rendered in the Bryant case because the Supreme Court had not
yet ruled that such a factual finding had [to] be made by the trial
court.
The State's position misconstrues the law on this issue.
First, our Supreme Court did not announce a new requirement that
the trial court make the subject finding. Rather, it concluded
that [t]he plain language of this statute leaves no room for
judicial construction. Id. Thus, the language of the statute,
standing alone, rather than the Supreme Court's ruling in Bryant,
imposed the requirement. Furthermore, the Bryant case is not the
sole judicial guidance on this issue. In 2005, this Court held
that a trial court may not revoke a defendant's probation where the
trial court failed to make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1344(f)(2). State v. Burns, 171 N.C. App. 759, 763, 615
S.E.2d 347, 350 (2005).
Because the trial court in this case failed to make the
findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344, we hold that thetrial court lacked both the jurisdiction and authority to revoke
defendant's probation. The judgment from which defendant appeals
is vacated. As a result of our holding, we need not address
defendant's remaining assignments of error.
Vacated.
Judges WYNN and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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