IN THE MATTER OF: Cleveland County
A.M., Z.B., A.B., C.S. Nos. 06 JA 63-66
JACKSON, Judge.
Shelly B. (“respondent”) appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to her minor children, A.M., Z.B., A.B., and C.S.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On 15 December 2004, the Cleveland County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that A.M., Z.B., A.B.,
and C.S.
were neglected juveniles. DSS stated that on 14 December
2004, respondent had been arrested and the children's aunt was
staying with them. The aunt told DSS she would not be able to
watch the children for “more than a little while longer” and could
not take them home with her. DSS responded to the home and foundthe aunt and her husband along with the four juveniles. The aunt
told DSS that respondent had called her that morning from jail and
asked her to check on the children. She and her husband found the
children with a man they did not know. She agreed to stay with the
children long enough for DSS to go to the jail and talk with
respondent.
DSS interviewed respondent at the jail and asked what her plan
was for the children. Respondent stated that “she didn't need a
plan because she was getting out of jail . . . .” DSS learned that
respondent was facing charges of common law robbery and assault
with a staple gun, and her bond was set at $10,000.
DSS spoke with
Mike Brown (“Brown”), a friend of respondent who allegedly was a
convicted sex offender. Brown told DSS that “he was working on
getting the money to get [respondent] out of jail but could not
promise anything.” Eventually, respondent signed a voluntary
placement agreement in case Brown was unsuccessful in his attempts
to get her out of jail. When asked about who the man was that the
aunt found at her home watching the children, respondent stated
that her neighbors were watching the children and no man should
have been there. DSS assumed custody of the children.
While at the DSS office, one of the juveniles, A.M., stated
that “Jason” had been staying with them. A.M. then identified
Jason Guye (“Guye”) from a picture on the North Carolina Sex
Offenders Web Site. DSS stated that Guye is a convicted sex
offender, and that DSS was familiar with him from prior involvement
with the family. On 1 April 2004, respondent had signed a safetyplan with DSS in which she agreed that she would not allow her
children around Guye and would not allow Guye into her home. The
plan stated that respondent “understands that allowing her children
around a sex offender places her children at risk of being sexually
abused and being removed from the home.” Upon learning that Guye
was living in the home again and helping to care for the children,
DSS decided to file the petition alleging neglect. DSS assumed
custody of the children by non-secure custody order.
On 30 March 2005, an adjudicatory hearing was held in
Cleveland County District Court. The court found that on 14
December 2004, Guye was alone in the home with the juveniles, and
had been in the home prior to that date. The trial court further
noted that DSS made an unannounced visit to the home on 28 March
2005. While in the home, the DSS social worker observed men's
clothing and someone hiding under a blanket in the bedroom. The
person would not identify himself or come out from under the
blanket. Respondent claimed that the person was someone named
“Octavius Odoms,” and that he was not dressed and was embarrassed
to come out. The children were adjudicated as neglected juveniles.
The trial court held review hearings on 25 May and 20 July
2005. The court noted that respondent had been cooperative with
DSS, had been participating in the By-Standers Group, and had
completed parenting classes.
Custody remained with DSS, but the
trial court ordered that respondent be allowed unsupervised day
visitation. Another review hearing was held on 21 September 2005. The
court noted that since its prior hearing, respondent had been
arrested on a felony charge of conversion of a motor vehicle.
Respondent also
was allegedly kidnapped and held in her home
overnight by two men. The men were arrested when respondent left
her home and called the police. Both men were found asleep in the
home; a gun was found inside as well. Charges against the men were
later dropped due to lack of evidence. Due to these incidents,
unsupervised visitation was suspended.
On 30 March 2006, DSS
filed a petition
to terminate
respondent's parental rights.
DSS alleged three grounds for
termination: (1)
that respondent had neglected the juveniles
within
the meaning of North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-101(15),
and pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-
1111(a)(1)
; (2) that respondent had willfully left the juveniles in
foster care for more than twelve months without showing that
reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in
correcting those conditions that led to the removal of the
juvenile
s, pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-
1111(a)(2);
and (3) that the juveniles had been placed in the
custody of the petitioner and that respondent, for a continuous
period of six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition, had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the
cost of care for the juvenile
s, although physically and financially
able to do so, as required by North Carolina General Statutes,
section 7B-1111(a)(3)
.
Hearings were held on the petition to terminate parental
rights 4 October, 1 November, and 20 December 2006. The trial
court
concluded that sufficient grounds for termination existed
pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section
7B-1111(a)(1)
and (2).
The court further concluded that it was in the juveniles'
best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
Respondent appeals.
26. That on the Labor Day Weekend of
September, 2006, the mother was admitted in
Gaston Memorial Hospital. She admitted having
used cocaine the day before, and she was
pregnant. The mother tested positive for
cocaine upon her admission to Gaston Memorial.
In findings of fact numbers 27 to 33, the trial court described how
following her admission to Gaston Memorial Hospital,
a social
worker made “diligent efforts to find the mother bed, housing,
money and care.” The social worker finally
was able to secure a
bed at the Florence Crittenden Home so that respondent could
receive proper pre-natal care and live in a safe home, free from
illegal drugs. The trial court found that the social worker
explained to respondent that the home would assist her with her
pregnancy and drug abuse. The social worker completed a taxi
voucher to transport the respondent from the hospital to the home.
However, instead of going to the home, respondent used the taxi
voucher to go elsewhere. Respondent did not assign error to any of
these findings of fact. Thus, these findings of fact are deemed
supported by competent evidence and are conclusive on appeal. See
id.
Based upon these findings, the trial court stated:
34. That the mother's decision to return to
Shelby and to not enter the Florence
Crittenden Home while pregnant is clear and
convincing evidence of neglect on behalf of
the juveniles in that the mother intentionally
abused illegal drugs and turned down help to
assist her in becoming stable and appropriate
and safe for the juveniles of this action.
These actions on the part of the motherdemonstrate the ongoing neglect to which the
mother will expose the juveniles, as well as
the likelihood that this neglect will continue
for the foreseeable future.
In light of the trial court's findings relating to respondent's
persistent drug abuse, we hold that the trial court was free to
conclude that respondent neglected the juveniles, and that there
was a probability of repetition of neglect.
Accordingly, we hold
that sufficient grounds existed for termination of respondent's
parental rights.
Because
grounds exist
to support the trial court's order, the
remaining ground found by the trial court to support termination
need not be reviewed by this Court. See Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at
64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that it was in the best interests of the juveniles to
terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
“The trial court has discretion, if it finds that at least one
of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate parental rights upon
a finding that it would be in the child's best interests.” In re
Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001) (citing
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 543 S.E.2d 906 (2001); In re
McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 583 S.E.2d 508 (2000)). Factors to
consider in determining the juvenile's best interests include: (1)
the age of the juvenile; (2) the likelihood of adoption; (3) the
impact on the accomplishment of the permanent plan; (4) the bond
between the juvenile and the parent; (5) the relationship between
the juvenile and a proposed adoptive parent or other permanentplacement; and (6) any other relevant consideration. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005). The court is to take action “which is
in the best interests of the juvenile” when “the interests of the
juvenile and those of the juvenile's parents or other persons are
in conflict.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(3) (2005). As a
discretionary decision, the trial court's disposition order will
not be disturbed unless it could not have been “the result of a
reasoned decision.” In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 747, 751, 616 S.E.2d
385, 387, aff'd, 360 N.C. 165, 622 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
The trial court's detailed findings of fact reveal that the
trial court considered the factors required by North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1110(a). The trial court made
specific findings referencing the birth date of each of the
children, respondent's failure to maintain stable employment and
housing, respondent's persistent drug abuse, respondent's
instability, the efforts of DSS to reunify the children with
respondent, and the relationship between respondent and her
children. Based upon the findings of fact made by the trial court
after an extensive termination hearing, we can discern no abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges STEELMAN and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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