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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA07-660


Filed: 18 September 2007

IN THE MATTER OF:                    Haywood County
T.L.M., T.J.M., J.K.J.                Nos. 06 J 51-53

    Appeal by respondent-mother from an order entered 12 March 2007 by Judge Bradley B. Letts in District Court, Haywood County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 20 August 2007.

    Ira L. Dove, for petitioner-appellee.

    Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent_appellant.

    Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, by G. Wriston Marshburn, for guardian ad litem.

    STROUD, Judge.

I. Background

    On 25 April 2006, the Haywood County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. DSS alleged that: (1) respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 101(15) and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1); (2) respondent-mother had willfully left the juveniles in foster care or placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without showing that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting those conditions that led to the removal of the juveniles, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 1111(a)(2); and (3) the juveniles had been placed in the custody of the petitioner and for a continuous period of six monthsimmediately preceding the filing of the petition respondent-mother failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles although physically and financially able to do so, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3).
    On 12 March 2007, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights. In this appeal, respondent- mother does not challenge the trial court's reliance upon these statutory grounds, nor does she assert that any of the trial court's factual findings are unsupported by the evidence. Respondent-mother asserts only that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that termination is in the best interest of the juveniles. She has not assigned error as to any of the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law.
    Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a), ”the scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal in accordance with this Rule 10.” N.C.R. App. P. 10. “Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.” Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Therefore, we presume that all of the trial court's detailed findings of fact are supported by the evidence and thus they are binding on appeal.
II. Termination of Parental Rights

    “After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall determinewhether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005). The standard of review for the trial court's decision is abuse of discretion. See In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 569, 471 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996). The trial court's order may be reversed “for abuse of discretion only upon a showing by a litigant that the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.” Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 128, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980). “A ruling committed to a trial court's discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
    Here, the trial court made extensive findings of fact in its order determining the best interests of the juveniles. The trial court made multiple findings relating to respondent-mother's issues with domestic violence and anger management, the effects on the juveniles, and respondent-mother's failures to complete treatment and comply with DSS's case plan or the trial court's prior orders.
    Additionally, the trial court specifically stated that it had considered the six factors enumerated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 1110(a) including the age of the juveniles, the likelihood of adoption, whether termination would aid in a permanent plan for the juveniles, the parental-juvenile bonds, the quality of the relationship between the juveniles and the new placement, and other relevant factors. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(1)-(6). Among the trial court's finding relevant to these factors were:        112.    [T.L.M.'s] and [T.J.M.'s] placement is a pre-adoptive home where they have been placed since January 2007. This is the second foster home placement for these children in the last year. The foster parents indicate they are also willing to take [J.K.J.] into the home, upon recommendation of the child's Therapist and completion of his [Reactive Attachment Disorder] evaluation. [J.K.J.] has had his first initial intake and recommendations were made for further evaluations.

        113.    The permanent plan for the children is adoption and termination of parental rights would allow maintaining their placements in a permanent home.

        114.    [T.L.M.] and [T.J.M.] have been observed by the Department of Social Services with their current foster parents. The foster parents have a realistic view regarding the issues these children have been and will be facing in the future, and there is affection displayed in this home.

        115.    It is Social Worker Mesimer's opinion that the Respondent Mother's bond with the children is not a healthy bond. . . .

        116.    [J.K.J.] does not exhibit any bond with either of his Parents. . . . The child has refused to come to visits with his Mother, on one occasion standing in the stairwell screaming and refusing to come upstairs, and having to be carried upstairs to the visit.

        . . . .

        133.    On 25 October 2006, Ms. Barnhill observed a visit between [J.K.J.] and [respondent- mother] for two hours. No bond between the child and his Mother was observed.

        . . . .

        153.    The conduct of the Respondent Parents has been such as to demonstrate that they will not promote the healthy and orderly physical and emotional wellbeing of the juvenile[s].

        154.    The juveniles are in need of a Permanent Plan of Care at the earliest age possible,which can be obtained only by the severing of the relationship between the juveniles and the Respondent Parents by termination of the parents' parental rights.
The trial court's order demonstrates that it was “the result of a reasoned decision.” White, 312 N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judges STEELMAN and JACKSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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