IN RE: J.G., D.B Wake County
No. 05 JT 625
Janna D. Allison, for respondent-appellant.
Poyner & Spruill, LLP, by Bryn D. Wilson, for appellees-
Guardians ad Litem.
Al Singer and Corinne G. Russell, for petitioner-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Brandon P. (“respondent”) appeals from the order terminating
her parental rights to J.G. and D.B (collectively, “the minor
children”). The order also terminated the parental rights of
J.G.'s father (“Terry G.”), who is not a party to the instant
appeal. D.B.'s father, William B., relinquished his parental
rights to the child on 6 February 2007. We affirm.
On 29 September 2005, Wake County Human Services (“WCHS”)
filed a petition and obtained non-secure custody of J.G., D.B., and
their half-sister N.P. The petition alleged that J.G. was a
neglected juvenile, and that D.B. and N.P. were neglected and
dependent juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
101(9), (15) (2005). The petition reported that police had chargedrespondent with child abuse after she left multiple bruises on
seven-year-old J.G.'s back while whipping him with a belt. It
further alleged that the minor children had witnessed a knife fight
in the home between respondent, their maternal grandmother, and
Terry G. Subsequently, Terry G. acknowledged to WCHS that he
smoked marijuana and got “high” but claimed he did so outside the
presence of the children. Finally, the petition alleged that the
family's apartment contained only four beds for nine occupants, and
that respondent continued to live with the minor children's
maternal grandmother, Laurenette Perry (“L.P.”), despite knowing
that L.P. abused cocaine and recently gave birth to a cocaine-
positive baby.
On 10 November 2005, the district court entered a consent
order adjudicating the minor children neglected and dependent as
alleged in the petition filed by WCHS. The court placed the minor
children in the legal custody of WCHS and granted respondent
supervised visitation. Respondent was ordered to follow the
recommendations of her substance abuse assessment, attend
individual domestic violence counseling, submit to and follow the
recommendations of a psychological evaluation, “obtain and maintain
stable housing and employment or other income adequate to provide
for the basic needs of the [children,]” and attend a parenting
class.
Following review and permanency planning hearings in January,
May, and September of 2006, the district court entered an order on
10 October 2006, relieving WCHS of further reunification effortsand changed the permanent placement plan for N.P. to custody with
her paternal grandmother and for J.G. and D.B. to adoption with a
concurrent plan of custody with a relative. The court found that
further efforts to reunify the minor children with respondent-
mother would be futile, in light of her continual positive tests
for marijuana and cocaine use, her lack of stable employment and
housing, and her failure to receive mental health therapy or
psychiatric treatment. Since respondent wished to be reunified
with her children, the court ordered respondent to comply fully
with the recommendations for completing substance abuse and
psychological assessments, obtaining stable employment and housing,
and paying child support.
On 27 November 2006, WCHS filed a motion to terminate
respondent's parental rights to J.G. and D.B. on the grounds that
she had (1) neglected the children, and (2) willfully left the
children in a placement outside the home for more than twelve
months without showing reasonable progress to correct the
conditions which led to their removal. N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2) (2006). After a hearing on 7 February 2007, the
district court terminated respondent's parental rights. In the 22
February 2007 termination order, the court found grounds for
termination and further concluded that termination would serve the
best interests of the children.
On appeal, respondent claims that the evidence and the
district court's findings of fact were insufficient to establish
grounds for termination based on neglect or lack of reasonableprogress under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) or (2). She notes
that she visited the minor children regularly and insists that she
“substantially completed” her court-ordered case plan. Respondent
points to evidence that she had been living with her cousin for
approximately one year at the time of the hearing, had applied for
housing with the Zebulon Housing Authority, and had maintained six
months of stable employment before her employer went out of
business in January of 2007. She further avers that she completed
a parenting class and the women's group pre-treatment component of
her substance abuse treatment, attended substance abuse counseling
and AA/NA meetings, and made six unsuccessful attempts to telephone
her mental health therapist.
Upon review of an order terminating parental rights, this
Court must determine (1) whether the trial court's findings of fact
are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, and (2)
whether the court's findings of fact support its conclusion of law
that one or more statutory grounds for termination exist. In re
Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000); see also
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a). It is the province of the trial
judge to “weigh and consider all competent evidence, and pass upon
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their
testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” In
re Whisnant, 71 N.C. App. 439, 441, 322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984).
Because respondent has not brought forward her three assignments of
error challenging the court's individual findings of fact, we are
bound by the findings for purposes of our review. Koufman v.Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991); see also
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Accordingly, we only need to determine
whether the court's findings of fact support its conclusions that
grounds for termination exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2). In re Beasley, 147 N.C. App. 399, 405, 555 S.E.2d
643, 647 (2001). Moreover, we note that “[t]he finding of any one
of the grounds is sufficient” to order termination. In re C.L.C.,
171 N.C. App. 438, 447, 615 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2005) (quoting Owenby
v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2003)).
A court may terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), if it finds that the parent has “neglected
the juvenile.” The Juvenile Code defines “neglect,” inter alia, as
the denial of “proper care, supervision, or discipline” to the
juvenile, or exposure of the juvenile “to an environment injurious
to the juvenile's welfare[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). In
order to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the evidence must
show actionable neglect at the time of the termination hearing. In
re Beasley, 147 N.C. App. 399, 404, 555 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2001)
(quoting In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615
(1997)). Where a child has been placed outside of the parent's
care for a significant period prior to the hearing, “a trial court
may find that grounds for termination exist upon a showing of a
history of neglect by the parent and the probability of a
repetition of neglect.” In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 435, 621
S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). In addition to noting respondent's consent to the prior
adjudication of neglect entered on 10 November 2005, the district
court found that WCHS “has substantiated three reports of neglect
regarding [her] minor children” since 1995. The court made
additional findings regarding respondent's conduct since WCHS
gained custody of her children in September 2005, as follows:
20. That the mother . . . . was diagnosed
with Cannabis Dependence and dysthymic
disorder. She was referred for a psychiatric
evaluation, but did not follow through and
have the evaluation. [She] was referred to
begin individual therapy with Lynn Prior in
May of 2006. She met with Lynn Prior on one
occasion but did not meet with her again.
[She] stated that she made attempts to contact
Lynn Prior, but not until after . . . the
Court ordered that reunification efforts with
her cease. [She] presented a log of phone
calls to Lynn Prior, which does not appear to
be a reliable document. Even if the court
relied on the document, [she] has not
presented sufficient evidence to show that she
has made a sincere effort to engage in
recommended therapy.
21. That the mother had a substance-abuse
assessment . . . . [and] was diagnosed with
marijuana dependence and use of cocaine. She
completed the Women's Pretreatment Group, but
continued to test positive for marijuana use .
. . . Pat Van Scoy recommended the mother meet
with her for individual counseling sessions.
The mother attended only 7 of a possible 18
individual therapy appointments . . . .
22. That the mother was referred to a relapse
group with Pat Van Scoy, but her attendance
for the group sessions was sporadic . . . .
She was dropped from the rolls as required by
the program during [a] long period of absence
. . . .
23. That the mother was to attend two NA/AA
sessions per week, but she did not regularly
attend these sessions. [She] presented to the
Court a log of attendance . . . from August15, 2006 through February 1, 200[7]. The
Court questions the reliability of the
document, but even if [it] were reliable[,] .
. . . [s]he did not begin to attend until
August 15, 2006 and did not consistently
attend two weekly sessions as required.
24. That after the child[ren were] removed
from the mother's care she continued to have
positive drug screens each time the test was
actually completed, including those taken on
12/21/05, 12/27/05, 3/20/06, 4/27/06, 5/18/06,
7/28/06, 8/21/06, and 2/2/07. All the tests
were positive for marijuana use and the 4/27
test was also positive for cocaine. . . .
25. That the mother has not made progress in
her drug rehabilitation.
26. That the mother has not obtained or
maintained stable housing . . . . [She] had
several addresses until she moved in with a
cousin sometime in November 2005. [She]
testified that she has lived there
consistently since then, however the mother
gave her address as something different . . .
to the social worker in February 2007. The
mother states that this is her present
boyfriend's address where she stays overnight
on occasion. The mother stated that she has
been on a waiting list for housing since
November of 2005.
27. That the mother has had one job since the
children were removed from her custody. She
began employment . . . in July, 2006, 7 months
after the children were taken into custody.
The company closed in January, 2007 and the
mother stated she is seeking new employment,
but has not been successful as yet.
. . . .
29. That the mother has done some of [the]
things required by [WCHS] and the Court . . .
but has not made significant progress . . . .
She still tests positive for illegal drugs,
has not obtained stable housing, has not shown
any progress in substance abuse treatment . .
. and has yet to engage in mental health
therapy. . . .
30. That the children have been adjudicated
as neglected children and it appears likely
that the neglect on the part of the mother
would continue if the children were placed in
her care.
The court acknowledged that respondent completed a parenting class,
paid child support, and “had quality visits with her children whom
she loves[.]” While noting that respondent made “substantial
progress toward reunification in the first half of 2006,” the court
found that respondent's progress stalled when she “stopped going to
therapy visits on a consistent basis.” Given respondent's history
of “inconsistent parenting since 1995" and her failure to address
the causes of the 10 November 2005 adjudication, the court found
that “it does not appear she will be able to provide a safe home
for the children within a reasonable time.”
We conclude the facts found by the court are sufficient to
establish grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1). Notwithstanding her apparent love for the children,
respondent failed to participate meaningfully in her court-ordered
substance abuse and mental health treatment. The findings reflect
her unbroken series of positive drug tests from December of 2005 to
February of 2007, as well as her failure to obtain the psychiatric
evaluation required for treatment of her psychological diagnoses.
Respondent never obtained independent housing, and her claim of
living consistently in her cousin's home was belied by her own
representations to the social worker. She had been employed for
only six months since 10 November 2005, and was unemployed at the
time of the hearing. When paired with the prior adjudication ofneglect entered on 10 November 2005 and the additional reports of
neglect substantiated by WCHS since 1995, these facts support the
district court's finding of a probability of future neglect if the
children were returned to respondent's care.
Since we upheld the district court's adjudication of neglect
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we need not address the
second ground for termination found by the court under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293
S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139, 74 L. Ed.
2d 987 (1983).
The record on appeal includes additional assignments of error
which are not addressed by respondent in her appellant's brief. We
deem these assignments of error abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App.
P. 28(b)(6).
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***