IN THE MATTER OF:
Buncombe County
J.F. No. 06 J 307
Ingrid Friesen, P.A., by Ingrid Friesen, for Petitioner-
Appellee.
Susan J. Hall for Respondent-Appellant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Respondent-Father (“Respondent”) appeals from an order
terminating his parental rights to the minor child, J.F. We
affirm.
On 11 August 2006, J.F.'s mother filed a petition seeking to
terminate Respondent's parental rights on the grounds that
Respondent willfully abandoned J.F. for at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(7) (2005), and that Respondent neglected the minor
child, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2005) . After a hearing
held 22-23 January 2007, the trial court entered its order
terminating Respondent's parental rights on both grounds . The sole
issue Respondent raises on appeal is whether the trial court erredin concluding that termination of his parental rights is in the
best interests of the child.
Proceedings to terminate parental rights are conducted in two
parts
: (1) the adjudication phase, governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1109 (2005), and (2) the disposition phase, governed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2005). In re Baker, 158 N.C. App. 491, 581
S.E.2d 144 (2003).
If a trial court, in the adjudication phase,
determines that at least one ground to terminate parental rights
exists,
the court then, in the disposition phase, must decide
whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the child. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 543 S.E.2d 906
(2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005). In considering the
child's best interests, the trial court must consider certain
factors, including: (1) the child's age, (2) the likelihood of
adoption of the child, (3) whether termination will aid in the
accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile, (4) the bond
between the parent and the child, (5) the quality of the
relationship between the child and the proposed adoptive parent,
and (6) any other relevant consideration. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a).
“'The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn,
support the conclusions of law.'” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App.
215, 221-22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (citation omitted).
Findings
of fact supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal eventhough there may be evidence to the contrary. In re Williamson, 91
N.C. App. 668, 373 S.E.2d 317 (1988).
A trial court's
determination that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Blackburn, supra.
Although in the record on appeal Respondent assigns error to
many of the trial court's findings of fact, Respondent does not
bring those assignments of error forward in his brief. “Questions
raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but
not then presented and discussed in a party's brief, are deemed
abandoned.” N.C. R. App. P. 28(a). The trial court's findings of
fact are therefore “deemed to be supported by competent evidence
and are conclusive on appeal.” In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426,
428, 621 S.E.2d 236, 238 (2005) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330
N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). Pursuant to his fourth
assignment of error, Respondent argues only that the trial court
abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights because
evidence was presented that Respondent and his family attempted to
maintain contact with the minor child and that “a reasonable hope”
exists that Respondent can reunite with the child. We disagree.
The trial court made numerous findings of fact which support
its conclusion that terminating Respondent's parental rights is in
J.F.'s best interests. The trial court found: (1) Respondent last
saw J.F. in September 2001, when J.F. was eighteen months old, and
Respondent has not contacted the mother about J.F.'s welfare since
that time ; (2) Respondent is currently incarcerated, and J.F. willbe at least ten years old before Respondent becomes eligible for
release ; (3) After divorcing Respondent, J.F.'s mother re-married
in June 2005, and J.F. enjoys a strong relationship with his
mother's husband, whom he calls Dad ; (4) The mother and her
husband want the husband to adopt J.F. ; (5) J.F. is currently
healthy and happy, is doing very well at school, and is involved in
several sports and the Boy Scouts ; (6) Respondent is a registered,
untreated sex offender ; (7) Respondent committed numerous acts of
domestic violence against the mother, yet has never participated in
domestic violence treatment programs ; (8) Respondent's past
actions, including the domestic violence and a lengthy criminal
history, create a likelihood that J.F. would be at a high risk of
future abuse or neglect if he were in Respondent's care ; (9) There
is no evidence Respondent would be able to provide J.F. with a
stable or safe life . Finally, the trial court noted the child's
guardian ad litem made an independent inquiry of the situation and
recommended terminating Respondent's rights so that J.F. may be
adopted by the mother's husband.
The foregoing findings of fact address each of the factors
listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) and fully support the trial
court's conclusion that the termination of Respondent's parental
rights is in the best interests of the child, notwithstanding any
evidence to the contrary. See
Williamson, 91 N.C. App. at 674, 373
S.E.2d at 320 (“When the court's findings . . . are supported by
ample, competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even though
there may be evidence to the contrary.”).
The trial courttherefore did not abuse its discretion in terminating Respondent's
parental rights. Respondent's assignment of error is overruled and
the order of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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