IN THE MATTER OF:
J.T.E.
Harnett County
No. 05 J 108
E. Marshall Woodall and Duncan B. McCormick, for Harnett
County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellee.
Elizabeth Myrick Boone, for Guardian ad Litem.
Robin E. Strickland, for respondent-appellant, mother.
Mercedes O. Chut, for respondent-appellant, father
JACKSON, Judge.
K.W. (“respondent-mother”) and C.E. (“respondent-father”)
(collectively, “respondents”)
, parents of the minor child J.T.E.,
appeal from a permanency planning review order entered 27 April
2007 awarding guardianship of J.T.E. to Kathy L., the juvenile's
paternal grandmother. For the following reasons, we affirm.
J.T.E. was born in 2002 to respondents, who are unmarried.
Since birth, J.T.E. has lived intermittently with Kathy L. While
J.T.E. was living with respondents in early 2005, the Lee County
Department of Social Services investigated the family based uponreports of respondents' drug usage and bringing J.T.E. to drug
houses. Respondents were arrested, and J.T.E. resumed living with
Kathy L. in Harnett County.
After being released from jail, respondents failed to retrieve
J.T.E., allowing J.T.E. to remain with Kathy L. Respondents moved
to Virginia to live with J.T.E.'s maternal grandmother.
Notwithstanding pending criminal charges in Lee County, and without
either suitable housing or means of support for J.T.E., respondents
threatened to remove J.T.E. from Kathy L.'s home.
On 7 July 2005, the Harnett County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging neglect and
obtained a non-secure custody order authorizing J.T.E. to be placed
with Kathy L. Neither parent attended the 23 September 2005
adjudicatory hearing, during which J.T.E. was adjudicated a
neglected juvenile. By order entered 28 November 2005, the trial
court ordered that (1) full custody of J.T.E. should be given to
Kathy L.; (2) respondents could have visitation with J.T.E.; and
(3) reunification efforts should cease until respondents requested
reunification services.
A review hearing was held on 8 December 2005.
Respondent-
mother was present for the hearing, but respondent-father was not
present because he was being held in jail in Virginia.
Respondent-mother filed notice of appeal
from a 17 February
2006 order entered by the trial court , but on 8 March 2006, the
trial court reviewed its earlier order and determined that it was
entered in error. The court vacated its prior order and entered anew order that (1) continued custody of J.T.E. with Kathy L.; (2)
allowed visitation between J.T.E. and respondents; (3) relieved DSS
of further reunification efforts unless respondents returned to
North Carolina and sought reunification services; and (4)
restrained respondents from making harassing telephone calls to
Kathy L. On 20 March 2006, respondents both filed notices of
appeal. On 12 May 2006, the trial court entered an order
dismissing respondents' appeals, and respondent-mother appealed to
this Court. This Court dismissed her appeal on 28 September 2006.
On 27 October 2006, the trial court entered an order (1)
continuing custody of J.T.E. with Kathy L.; (2) ordering the social
worker, her supervisor, respondents, and respondents' attorneys to
meet and establish a visitation plan; (3) relieving DSS of
reunification efforts; and (4) granting respondent-mother's request
for a home study by Virginia authorities.
On 20 April 2007, the trial court entered an order (1)
continuing custody of J.T.E. with Kathy L.; (2) specifying a
visitation schedule for unsupervised visits between respondents and
J.T.E.; (3) continuing cessation of reunification efforts until
further orders from the court; and (4) requiring respondents to
cooperate with DSS workers and to release information requested by
DSS workers.
Also on 20 April 2007, the trial court held a permanency
planning review hearing, at which it heard testimony from both
respondents and adopted, without objection, a DSS court report
(“the DSS Report”) and a home study report from the City ofNorfolk, Virginia Department of Human Services (“the Norfolk Home
Study”). On 27 April 2007, the court entered an order (1)
appointing Kathy L. J.T.E.'s legal guardian pursuant to North
Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-600; (2) establishing
guardianship as J.T.E.'s permanent plan; (3) providing a visitation
plan; (4) continuing cessation of reunification efforts
; (5)
releasing the guardian ad litem and attorney advocate from further
involvement; and (6) waiving further hearings unless and until a
motion for review was filed. Thereafter, respondents filed timely
notices of appeal from the 27 April 2007 order as well as notices
to preserve their right to appeal the trial court's 20 April 2007
order ceasing reunification efforts.
On appeal, respondent-father first contends that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was not
properly served with a summons. We disagree.
“Our Court has [] held that where no summons is issued the
court acquires jurisdiction over neither the persons nor the
subject matter of the action.” Conner Bros. Mach. Co., Inc. v.
Rogers, 177 N.C. App. 560, 562, 629 S.E.2d 344, 345 (2006) (citing
In re Mitchell, 126 N.C. App. 432, 433, 485 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, in the instant case,
the undisputed evidence shows that the summons was sent to
respondent-father on 7 July 2005 by certified mail, and the record
includes a copy of the return receipt signed by respondent-father
on 9 July 2005. As noted by counsel for DSS in an affidavit filed
on 2 September 2005, “a copy of the Summons . . . was in factreceived by [] C.E. on the 9th day of July, 2005.” The record
demonstrates that respondent-father received a summons, and
therefore, respondent-father's argument that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction is without merit. Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled.
Next, both respondents assign error to the following findings
of fact:
[13(n)] It appears that [respondents] are
living with the maternal grandmother at her
expense. There appears to be no reason for
[respondent-mother] to be unemployed.
[13(o)] The record herein discloses a
history of non-cooperation between
[respondents] and the DSS social worker (early
failure to communicate and later revoking the
social worker's source of communication with
the probation officers and therapist). That
failure of cooperation by [respondents] seems
to continue.
[13(p)] There is no evidence of
[respondents]' involvement with on-going
substance abuse treatment.
. . . .
[13(v)] A return of custody or care of the
juvenile to [respondents] at this time would
be contrary to his welfare. It is not
probable that custody of the juvenile will be
returned or placed with either [respondent]
within the next six (6) months.
[13(w)] It is in the best interest of the
juvenile that [Kathy L.] be appointed his
guardian as the permanent plan for the
juvenile.
. . . .
[13(z)] [DSS] has made reasonable efforts in
carrying out the plan of the court and did in
the past make attempt[s] to encourage
[respondents] to become involved in a plan ofreunification with their child and further
[DSS] has made reasonable efforts to formulate
a permanent plan for the juvenile.
. . . .
[13(aa)(ii)] The placement has been stable and
a continuation of [the] same is in the best
interest of the juvenile . . . .
Respondents contend that the challenged findings of fact are not
supported by competent evidence. We disagree.
“Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to
whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the
findings and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re
S.J.M., __ N.C. App. __, __, 645 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even when there is evidence
to the contrary, a trial court's findings of fact are binding on
appeal if they are supported by competent evidence in the record.
See In re C.M., __ N.C. App. __, __, 644 S.E.2d 588, 593 (2007).
“The trial court's 'conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on
appeal.'” In re D.M.M., 179 N.C. App. 383, 385, 633 S.E.2d 715, 716
(2006) (quoting In re D.H., 177 N.C. App. 700, 703, 629 S.E.2d 920,
922 (2006)).
Respondents first challenge finding of fact number 13(n), in
which the trial court found that respondents were living with
J.T.E.'s maternal grandmother at her expense and that there was no
reason for respondent-mother to be unemployed. Although
respondents contend that respondent-mother helps with her mother's
antique business and internet sales, the Norfolk Home Study states
that “[respondent-mother] is unemployed. She relies on the incomeof her paramour [respondent-father] and her mother to survive.
Since [respondent-mother] resides at home with her mother[,] she
does not have any expenses other than her child support
obligations.” The Norfolk Home Study
further notes that the
maternal grandmother is the sole owner of the home and has no
mortgage on the home. Additionally, the DSS Report expresses
concern with respondents' “lack of steady employment” and “[lack
of] income sufficient to independently support [J.T.E.].”
Therefore, the trial court's finding of fact number 13(n) is
supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, respondents'
argument is overruled.
Next, respondents assign error to finding of fact number
13(o), in which the court found a history of respondents' non-
cooperation with DSS and specifically cited respondents' failure to
communicate as well as their revocation of permission for DSS to
speak with their probation officers. Contrary to respondents'
contention, this finding of fact is supported by competent evidence
in the record.
Although both respondents received the summons, neither
respondent attended the adjudicatory hearing on 23 September 2005.
The trial court noted in its 8 March 2006 order that respondents
failed to respond to phone calls from DSS and failed to initiate
contact with DSS to establish a plan for reunification. Beginning
in December 2005, respondent-mother visited J.T.E. twice per month,
but her visits tapered off to once per month, with the last visit
being on 27 July 2006. In September 2006, DSS suspected thatrespondents had relapsed into drug abuse and requested that each
respondent submit to a drug test. Respondents refused testing, and
the social worker stated, “About the time this social worker
started suspecting drug use, [respondent-mother] contacted all of
her collaterals (Probation, Mental Health) advising them not to
speak with me regarding her progress or lack thereof.” Respondent-
father also revoked his permission for DSS to speak with his
probation officer. Respondents later gave permission to DSS to
resume speaking with their respective probation officers , during
which time DSS learned that respondents both had tested positive
for cocaine in drug screens administered in September 2006.
Therefore, the trial court's finding of fact number 13(o)
concerning respondents' history of failing to cooperate with DSS is
supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, this argument is
overruled.
Respondents next assign error to finding of fact number 13(p),
in which the trial court found no evidence of respondents'
involvement with on-going substance abuse treatment. The record
demonstrates that respondent-father completed an eighteen session
substance abuse treatment program on 19 July 2006. The record also
indicates that, as of 21 March 2006, respondent-mother had
participated in a substance abuse treatment program through her
church. Notwithstanding their prior treatment, both respondents
tested positive for cocaine use in September 2006, and neither
resumed substance abuse treatment on a continuous basis.
Respondent-father admitted at the hearing that he had not attendeda Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) meeting for approximately six weeks.
When asked how often he had attended NA meetings, respondent-father
stated, “I mean I don't go. I might go once a month.” Although
respondents continue to participate in drug tests through their
probation officers, nothing in the record indicates ongoing
substance abuse treatment, and the guardian ad litem expressly
noted that “[n]either participates in a support group nor attends
individual or group therapy.” Finding of fact number 13(p) is
supported by competent evidence, and therefore, this argument is
overruled.
Next, respondents challenge findings of fact numbers 13(v) and
13(w), in which the trial court found that (1) it would be contrary
to J.T.E.'s welfare to return care or custody of J.T.E. to either
respondent; (2) such a return would be unlikely to occur within the
next six months; and (3) it is in J.T.E.'s best interest that his
permanent plan be guardianship with Kathy L. Respondents also
assign error to finding of fact number 13(aa)(ii), in which the
court found that J.T.E.'s placement with Kathy L. has been stable
and that continuing placement with her is in J.T.E.'s best
interest. Contrary to respondents' contentions, these findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence.
The DSS Report indicates that respondents (1) failed to make
any attempt to retrieve J.T.E. from Kathy L. upon their release
from jail; (2) failed to respond to early communications from DSS;
(3) tested positive for cocaine use as recently as September 2006;
(4) have not maintained steady employment; (5) failed to establishsufficient income to support J.T.E. independently; (6) failed to
pay any child support; and (7) either failed to show or arrived
late for visitations with J.T.E. The DSS Report also shows that
(1) respondent-mother's brother lives with respondents in the
maternal grandmother's home and has a substance abuse problem; (2)
respondent-mother has an “explosive temper”; and (3) respondent-
mother recently “verbally attacked” both Kathy L. and the guardian
ad litem. In contrast, the DSS Report notes that (1) Kathy L. has
provided all medical care, daycare, and transportation for the
juvenile at her own expense; (2) J.T.E.'s shots are current and
Kathy L. keeps all appointments; (3) it is improbable that J.T.E.
will return home in the next six months; (4) it is in J.T.E.'s best
interest to remain with Kathy L.; and (5) guardianship of J.T.E.
with Kathy L. should be the permanent plan. Furthermore, the trial
court's findings of fact numbers 13(a) and 13(c) both are
uncontested and support findings of fact numbers 13(v) and 13(w):
[13(a)] The juvenile continues in the custody
of [Kathy L.] and resides in her home. [The
juvenile] has lived with her since the spring
of 2005 and was legally placed there by the
court on July 7, 2005. [The juvenile] has
adjusted well and [the juvenile's] medical and
dental needs have been adequately met by
[Kathy L.] (at her expense).
. . . .
[13(c)] [Respondents] have not made any
payments to the child support office for the
support of the juvenile. [Kathy L.] has
informed [DSS] that [respondents] have made no
payments of child support to her since the
last court hearing (October 27, 2006).
Accordingly, the trial court's findings of fact numbers 13(v),
13(w), and 13(aa)(ii) are supported by competent evidence, and
respondents' arguments are without merit.
Respondents next challenge finding of fact number 13(z), in
which the trial court found that DSS (1) had made reasonable
efforts in carrying out the plan of the court; (2) had attempted to
encourage respondents to become involved in reunification with the
juvenile; and (3) had made reasonable efforts to formulate a
permanent plan for the juvenile. The record demonstrates that
throughout the proceedings
, DSS complied with the trial court's
orders, such as establishing schedules for respondents to visit
with J.T.E. and coordinating the Norfolk Home Study. As discussed
supra, respondents failed to respond to early communications by DSS
and failed to attend the adjudicatory hearing. Respondents failed
to take advantage of the services and assistance offered by DSS,
and only after the trial court relieved DSS of making further
reunification efforts did respondents seek case management services
from DSS. Although reunification efforts had been ceased, the
trial court ordered DSS to coordinate the Norfolk Home Study, and
DSS, on its own accord, continued to contact respondents'
respective probation officers until respondents closed that line of
communication. DSS also requested drug tests from respondents in
September 2006, but respondents refused. Finally, DSS has
satisfied its burden of making reasonable efforts to formulate a
permanent plan for J.T.E., since
DSS formulated and consistently
advocated a permanent plan of guardianship for J.T.E. with KathyL., which the trial court ultimately granted. The trial court's
finding of fact number 13(z) is based on competent evidence, and
accordingly, respondents' arguments are overruled.
Respondent-mother further assigns error to the trial court's
finding of fact number 13(t) on the grounds that the finding of
fact is not supported by competent evidence. We disagree.
Finding of fact number 13(t) states:
The court released DSS from efforts to reunite
the juvenile with [respondents] at the
dispositional hearing on September 23, 2005.
Since that time, the court has continued that
directive at each review of custody. The
social worker has extended case management
services to assist the court in review
hearings, with visitation between
[respondents] and the juvenile and with
coordination for a home study and information
about the progress being made by [respondents]
in seeking services in Virginia.
In orders entered 28 November 2005, 8 March 2006, and 27 October
2006, the trial court ordered cessation of reunification efforts.
Without a duty to make reunification efforts, and notwithstanding
respondents' lack of cooperation with DSS, DSS formulated a
visitation plan that the trial court adopted without objection in
finding of fact number 13(y), which states, in pertinent part, that
“[t]he visitation plan as set forth in the [DSS Report] . . .
should be approved.” Additionally, the Norfolk Home Study states
that “[t]he Norfolk Department of Human Services received a
referral from the North Carolina Department of Social Services to
complete a home study on the home of [the maternal grandmother].”
In addition, the DSS Report indicates that DSS contacted
respondents' treatment resources in Virginia, but respondentsprevented those resources from communicating with DSS. In sum, DSS
assisted the trial court in review hearings by extending case
management services to establish a visitation plan, to coordinate
a home study with Virginia authorities, and to gather information
about respondents' progress in Virginia. Finding of fact number
13(t) is supported by competent evidence, and accordingly,
respondent-mother's assignment of error is overruled.
Respondent-mother also assigns error to finding of fact number
12 and contends that the trial court violated North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-907. We disagree.
Pursuant to section 7B-907,
[a]t any permanency planning review, the court
shall consider information from the parent,
the juvenile, the guardian, any foster parent,
relative or preadoptive parent providing care
for the child, the custodian or agency with
custody, the guardian ad litem, and any other
person or agency which will aid it in the
court's review.
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-907(b) (2005). In the case sub judice,
respondent-mother contends that the trial court improperly
incorporated findings from prior court orders in finding of fact
number 12.
(See footnote 1)
Although a trial court may not delegate its fact-finding duty
by relying wholly on prior court orders, trial courts nevertheless
may consider all written reports and materials submitted in
connection with juvenile proceedings. See In re Z.J.T.B., __ N.C.
App. __, __, 645 S.E.2d 206, 211 (2007); see also In re Isenhour,
101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991) (“A trial court
may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same
cause.”). This Court has held only that “the trial court's factual
findings must be more than a recitation of allegations.” In re
Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). In
the instant case, the trial court specifically noted that it only
“partially relied upon previous findings of the court.”
In addition to finding of fact number 12, the court made
twelve other findings of fact, and finding of fact number 13
includes twenty-seven individual findings. When, as in the instant
case, the trial court makes sufficient findings of fact relating to
the situation at the time of the proceeding, the trial court is
permitted to incorporate facts found by the court in previous
orders. See In re As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. 551, 553 n.2, 619 S.E.2d
561, 563 (2005) (noting that “the district court may rely on and
incorporate previous orders or reports submitted to it, but it
cannot delegate its role as an independent finder of ultimate
facts.”), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 476, 628
S.E.2d 760 (2006). Accordingly, respondent-mother's assignment of
error is overruled. Respondents next assign error to the following conclusions of
law:
2. A return of custody to [respondents]
would be contrary to the juvenile's welfare.
3. It is in the best interest of the
juvenile for [Kathy L.] to be appointed his
guardian pursuant to [section] 7B-600 as his
permanent plan.
. . . .
6. [DSS] exercised reasonable efforts in
attempting to previously encourage and extend
services to [respondents] and establish a plan
of reunification and has exercised reasonable
efforts to perform the duties assigned by the
court.
Respondents
contend that the challenged conclusions of law are not
supported by the findings of fact. We disagree.
First, conclusion of law number 2 is supported by portions of
findings of fact numbers 12 and 13
. These findings demonstrate,
inter alia, evidence of respondents' past and present (1) substance
abuse, (2) noncooperation with DSS, (3) failure to provide child
support, (4) failure to obtain stable employment, and (5) failure
to obtain independent housing. The findings also show (1)
respondents' current probationary status for convictions for grand
larceny; and (2) respondent-mother's displacement of blame on Kathy
L. for respondents' failure to obtain custody of J.T.E. These
findings adequately support the conclusion that “[a] return of
custody to the parents would be contrary to the juvenile's
welfare.
” Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
Next, conclusion of law number 3 is supported by findings of
fact numbers 12(c), 12(g), 12(j)(iii), 12(j)(iv), 13(a), 13(w),13(aa)(i), and 13(aa)(ii). These findings demonstrate that (1)
J.T.E. has resided with Kathy L. continuously since February 2005
and by order of the court since 7 July 2005; (2) Kathy L. “has
sustained the costs of [J.T.E.'s] daycare, medical, [dental,] food,
clothing, shelter and transportation needs”; (3) J.T.E. “has
adjusted well in [Kathy L.]'s home and has been thriving in that
placement”; (4) Kathy L.'s home is adequate to meet J.T.E.'s needs;
and (5) Kathy L. understands the legal significance of maintaining
custody of J.T.E. The court's conclusion that
it is in J.T.E.'s
best interest for Kathy L. to be his guardian is supported by the
findings of fact, and accordingly, this argument is overruled.
Finally, conclusion of law number 6 is supported by findings
of fact numbers 12(e), 12(f), 12(j)(i), 12(j)(ii), 12(j)(vii),
12(k), 13(b), 13(f), 13(j), 13(o), 13(t), and 13(z). These
findings show that (1) DSS served respondents with a summons, but
neither respondent attended the 23 September 2005 adjudicatory
hearing; (2) at the dispositional hearing, DSS was relieved by the
trial court of reunification efforts “until such time as the
parents requested services”; (3) DSS attempted to contact
respondents, but respondents were non-responsive; (4) respondents
failed to contact DSS on their own accord to establish a
reunification plan; (5) DSS offered respondents services, which the
trial court deemed appropriate, including case management services
and contact with respondents to solicit help for J.T.E.; (6)
respondent-mother did not request any services from DSS until her
counsel's argument on her behalf on 8 December 2005; (7)respondent-father failed to contact DSS after his release from jail
in Virginia on 17 July 2006; (8) DSS referred respondents to the
IV-D child support agency in July 2006, but neither respondent has
paid any support; (9) DSS has arranged for visitation, but
respondents occasionally arrived late or failed to attend; (10) DSS
requested a drug test on 8 September 2006, but both respondents
refused; (11) respondents are not engaged in current substance
abuse treatment; (12) DSS assisted with coordinating the Norfolk
Home Study as ordered by the trial court; and (13) respondents have
demonstrated and continue to demonstrate noncooperation with DSS.
Based upon these findings, the trial court properly concluded that
DSS had exercised reasonable efforts in (1) extending services to
the parents, (2) attempting to establish a plan of reunification,
and (3) performing duties assigned by the court.
Accordingly,
respondents' arguments are overruled.
Respondent-mother next assigns error to the trial court's
decision to cease reunification efforts. Respondent-mother,
however, has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Both respondent-mother's notice of appeal and her assignment
of error refer to the permanency planning order entered 27 April
2007. In the argument section of her brief, however, respondent-
mother quotes from and cites to the dispositional order entered 28
November 2005. This order “released [DSS] from further efforts to
re-unite [J.T.E.] with [respondents] until such time as
[respondents] request services.” Neither respondent appealed this
order, and therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court.See In re Laney, 156 N.C. App. 639, 644, 577 S.E.2d 377, 380, disc.
rev. denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 762 (2003). Accordingly,
this assignment of error is dismissed.
Next, with respect to the award of guardianship, respondent-
father argues that the trial court failed to make the findings
required pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-
907(b) and (c). Respondent-father concedes that the trial court
entered the required findings, but argues that those findings were
not supported by competent evidence. Respondent-father states in
his brief, “[I]f this Court agrees with [respondent-father]'s
arguments with respect to findings of fact 13v and 13w, the [t]rial
[c]ourt's order granting guardianship to [Kathy L.] must be
reversed.” Because, as discussed supra, we have held that findings
of fact numbers 13(v) and 13(w) are supported by competent
evidence, respondent-father's argument is without merit.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Finally, both respondents argue that the trial court failed to
make the necessary inquiries of Kathy L. to determine whether Kathy
L. both understands the legal significance of guardianship and has
adequate resources to care for J.T.E. as required by North Carolina
General Statutes, sections 7B-600 and 7B-907(f). We disagree.
Pursuant to section 7B-907(f),
[i]f the court determines that the juvenile
shall be placed in the custody of an
individual other than the parents or appoints
an individual guardian of the person pursuant
to [section] 7B-600, the court shall verify
that the person receiving custody or being
appointed as guardian of the juvenile
understands the legal significance of theplacement or appointment and will have
adequate resources to care appropriately for
the juvenile.
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-907(f) (2005).
Respondent-father first argues that the trial court's order
contains no findings of fact directed toward the requirements of
section 7B-907(f). However, as this Court has explained, “neither
[section] 7B-600(c) nor [section] 7B-907(f) require that the court
make any specific findings in order to make the verification.” In
re J.E., __ N.C. App. __, __, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73, disc. rev. denied,
361 N.C. 427, 648 S.E.2d 504 (2007).
Both respondents argue that Kathy L. did not testify at the 20
April 2007 hearing and that no inquiry was made of her at that
time. A trial court is not required, however, to conduct an
inquiry of the proposed guardian at the hearing during which
guardianship is awarded. In In re J.E., this Court upheld a
guardianship award when (1) the trial court's order showed that it
considered a home study, and (2) the home study demonstrated that
the proposed guardians were in good health, financially capable of
providing for the juvenile, had experience caring for children,
understood “the enormity of the responsibility of caring for [the
juvenile],” and were ready and willing to assume the responsibility
of caring for the juvenile. Id. at __, 643 S.E.2d at 73.
In the case sub judice, the trial court considered and
incorporated the DSS Report, which indicated that “[Kathy] L. has
sustained all costs for medical and dental expenses for J[.T.E.]
His shots are current and she keeps all appointments.” The courtalso considered, without objection, the guardian ad litem's report,
which noted that (1) Kathy L.'s home is comfortable and contains a
number of toys for J.T.E.; (2) J.T.E. has “received a considerable
amount of stimulation” and has been “meeting developmental
milestones” while in Kathy L.'s home; and (3) Kathy L. “is willing
and feels that she is quite able to provide a permanent home for
J[.T.E.]” The trial court also made a finding of fact that J.T.E.
“has adjusted well and his medical and dental needs have been
adequately met by [Kathy L.]” Finally, the court incorporated
findings from prior court orders and noted in finding of fact
number 12(j)(iv) that it previously had found that Kathy L.'s home
was adequate for J.T.E. and that Kathy L. understood the
significance of the custodial requirements placed upon her. This
finding was based upon a finding from the 8 March 2006 order,
(See footnote 2)
which provided that
[Kathy L.] lives . . . in a two (2) bedroom
single wide manufactured housing unit. The
social worker reports that the home is
adequate, that there are a lot of educational
toys present and the child appears happy at
the times she has visited in the home. It is
apparent to the court that [Kathy L.]
understands the legal significance of the
custodial requirement placed on her by thecourt and further she has demonstrated
adequate resources to appropriately care for
[J.T.E.].
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court satisfied its
responsibility pursuant to sections 7B-600 and 7B-907(f) to verify
that Kathy L. could adequately care for J.T.E. and that she
understood the legal significance of being his guardian.
Accordingly, respondents' arguments are overruled.
Respondents' remaining assignments of error not argues in
their briefs are deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)
(2006).
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and STROuD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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