All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Car olina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be consid ered authoritative.

1.    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--constitutional arguments-- not raised at trial

    Constitutional components to assignments of error were not preserved for appellate review where they were not preserved at trial, not argued on appeal, and no supporting cases were cited.

2.    Discovery--evidence admissible under Rules 803, 804 and 404

    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant's motion to compel disclosure of evidence the State intended to offer pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 803(24), 804(b)(5), and 404(b). Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) contain notice requirements and an order compelling disclosure would be redundant; moreover, the State here provided the particulars of the hearsay statements to defendant and defendant did not move to continue or assert surprise. Rule (404)(b) is not a discovery statute and there is no support for the assertion that disclosure of Rule (404)(b) evidence is required.

3.    District Attorneys --recusal--former defense attorneys joining prosecutor's office

    The trial court in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder properly denied defendant's motion to recuse the district attorney's office because two of defendant's attorneys at the public defender's office had joined the district attorney's office. The two attorneys were reassigned by the public defender's office before they obtained confidential information, neither discussed the case with other prosecutors at their new employment, and the attorneys acted properly in avoiding all contact with the case after changing jobs. Defendant failed to show the actual conflict of interest required by State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589.

4.    Jury--selection--instructions--capital sentencing

    The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant's motion for instructions explaining the capital sentencing process to prospective jurors. The instruction given was in accord with pattern jury instructions previously approved and correctly instructed prospective jurors as to the law governing the capital sentencing process.

5.    Criminal Law--sequestration of witnesses--lack of specificity in motion--better practice

    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant's motion for sequestration of witnesses where defendant gave no specific reason to suspect that the State's witnesses would tailor their testimony to fit a consensus, defendant did not point to any instance in the record where a witness conformed his or her testimony to that of another witness, and defendant argued on appeal only that the trial court was biased because facilities were available to sequester the witnesses. However, it was noted that the better practice is to sequester witnesses on the request of either party unless there is a reason not to do so. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1225.
6.    Jury--selection--capital trial--rehabilitation

    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by denying defendant's request to rehabilitate prospective jurors where the jurors sooner or later unequivocally stated that they could not recommend the death penalty under any circumstances.

7.    Criminal Law--improper comments by court--not established

    The defendant in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder did not establish that the trial court improperly expressed an opinion or made inappropriate comments. N.C.B.S. §§ 15A-1222, 15A-1230.

8.    Evidence--hearsay--excited utterance--homicide victim's last statements

    Statements by a first-degree murder victim begging for her life and expressing concern for her children were spontaneous and fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

9.    Evidence--hearsay--statement admitted for another purpose

    A statement in a first-degree murder prosecution from the victim's mother that the victim had not wanted her estranged husband (defendant) to see their children before they left for school because it was upsetting to them was not hearsay where it was admitted because it was offered to explain the grandfather's action in keeping defendant from the children on the morning of the killing rather than to establish that the children became agitated. Moreover, the grandfather's actions contributed to defendant's motive for the shooting later that day.

10.    Evidence--statement by murder victim to officer--restraining order against her husband--admissible

    Statements by a first-degree murder victim to an officer concerning a restraining order against her estranged husband (defendant) and her intent to go to court the next day to get it extended related directly to a feared confrontation with defendant and were properly admitted as evidence of the victim's state of mind, her then-existing plan to engage in a future act, and to show a relationship with defendant contrary to defendant's version. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice.

11.    Evidence--habit--speculation into thoughts

    There was no prejudicial error in a prosecution for first-degree murder in the admission of testimony that the victim expected her estranged husband (defendant) to return their children to their grandparent's house. Although there was sufficient evidence of habitual behavior in picking up and dropping off the children to satisfy N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 406, this question invited speculation into the victim's thoughts rather a description of her actions. However, there was no prejudice in light of the evidence against defendant.

12.    Evidence--testimony by officer concerning domestic violence protective order--not a legal opinion

    The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting the testimony of an officer concerning a domestic violence protective order taken out against defendant where the officer described the evidence available to him at the time, paraphrased the statute inneutral terms, and gave an opinion that the facts provided to him by the victim's father provided probable cause for arrest. He was offering an explanation of his actions rather then an interpretation of the law.

13.    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--evidence elsewhere admitted without objection--cross-examination

    The admission of evidence concerning a bumper sticker on defendant's truck was properly preserved for appeal where the State contended that defendant waived review by not objecting to the same evidence during the State's cross-examination of defendant. Defendant did not waive his objection by seeking to explain, impeach, or destroy the value of the evidence by explaining the bumper sticker's meaning on cross-examination.

14.    Evidence--bumper sticker on defendant's truck--not relevant--not prejudicial

    Testimony about a bumper sticker on a truck driven by the defendant in a first-degree murder prosecution was not prejudicial where there was no indication that defendant placed the bumper sticker on the truck and the testimony about the bumper sticker did not go to prove the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of defendant's guilt, but the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming.

15.    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--evidence elsewhere admitted without objection

    A defendant in a first-degree murder prosecution waived appellate review of whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to ask a witness about a 911 call where the 911 recordings were played in their entirety without objection.

16.    Witnesses--redirect examination--scope--abbreviated exchange

    There was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution where the court overruled defendant's objection to testimony from a pathologist on redirect examination that the victim's wounds were not instantly fatal. Although defendant had asked on cross-examination whether the wounds were of equal severity and did not seek information about the length of time the victim remained conscious, the State on redirect asked only three questions on this topic, one of the answers was only partially responsive, and there was evidence from other witnesses that the victim remained conscious for several minutes after being shot. There was no prejudice from this abbreviated exchange.

17.    Evidence--testimony of deputy of clerk of court--personal knowledge

    There was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution from the admission of testimony from a deputy clerk about a complaint and motion for a domestic violence protective order filled out by the victim before her murder. The testimony was competent and helpful to the jury and, although defendant argues that the clerk lacked personal knowledge, he cites no testimony to support his contention and it is apparent from the testimony that she did possess personal knowledge.

18.    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--no offer of proof after objection

    The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by sustaining the State's objections to the testimony of defendant'spsychiatric expert about alcoholism, Xanax, and addiction where defendant made no offer of proof.

19.    Trials--objection--not sustained before jury

    There was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended that the court erroneously sustained the State's objection to a question to an expert psychiatrist on voir dire, but the record indicates that the court did not sustain the State's objection when it was asked in the presence of the jury.

20.    Evidence--evidentiary errors--cumulative effect

    The cumulative effect of alleged evidentiary errors in a capital first-degree murder prosecution did not deprive defendant of a fair trial where the Supreme Court did not, in fact, find such errors.

21.    Evidence--relevancy--first-degree murder--threats by victim--self- defense not alleged

    The trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by excluding testimony from defendant's mother about statements made by the victim where defendant did not assert self-defense. Alleged threats by the victim were not relevant.

22.    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--opened door--no objection to same evidence

    A first-degree murder defendant lost the benefit of his objection to testimony that defendant had been known to torment and kill cats when growing up where defendant had opened the door by asking the witness whether she had ever known defendant to be violent; furthermore, defendant did not object to admission of the same testimony from a psychiatrist.

23.    Evidence--rebuttal questions--within the scope of rebuttal

    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution for first-degree murder by overruling defendant's objections to rebuttal testimony where defendant argued that the prosecutor exceeded the scope of rebuttal. The challenged questions were properly formulated to rebut matters presented during defendant's case-in-chief. N.C.G.S. §15A-1226.

24.    Witnesses--hypothetical--witness who had examined defendant

    There was no error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the State was allowed to ask one of its rebuttal witnesses, Dr. Robbins, hypothetical questions which defendant alleged were not proper for an expert who had examined defendant. There is no authority for the contention that these questions should not have been asked, and the questions were based upon facts supported by the evidence, the answers were not so equivocal as to render them without probative value, and the responses did not improperly embrace legal terms.

25.    Evidence--cumulative effect--not prejudicial

    The cumulative effect of any erroneous evidentiary rulings during a capital first-degree murder prosecution did not entitle defendant to a new trial given the greater weight of evidence against defendant.

26.    Criminal Law--prosecutor's argument--based on evidence--voice ofcommunity

    The trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during two portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in the guilt phase of a capital first-degree murder prosecution where the first portion of the argument quoted testimony verbatim and was therefore based on the evidence, and the second portion of the argument merely reminded the jury that it was the voice of the community.

27.    Criminal Law--flight--evidence sufficient--instruction proper

    The evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on flight in a capital first-degree murder prosecution where defendant entered his car immediately after shooting the victims, drove quickly from the crime scene without rendering assistance or seeking to obtain medical aid for the victims, and passed one officer without flagging him down. This evidence was sufficient to show that defendant did more than merely leave the scene of the crime; furthermore, the court's instruction accurately informed the jury that proof of flight alone was insufficient to establish guilt and would not be considered as evidence of premeditation and deliberation.

28.    Criminal Law--prosecutor's argument--victim's experience

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not intervening ex mero moto when the prosecutor asked jurors to think of what the victim went through as she lay dying. The prosecutor focused on what the victim may have been thinking and the argument was based upon the evidence at trial, did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, and did not urge the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place.

29.    Criminal Law--defendant's argument--reading from appellate opinion

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by sustaining the State's objection to portions of defendant's closing argument in which his counsel sought to read the facts and the holding from a North Carolina Supreme Court case regarding the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance.

30.    Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--hindering government function

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting to the jury the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function where a domestic violence protective order had been issued after the victim had filed a complaint against defendant, the victim was scheduled to return to court the next day to obtain an extension, defendant was aware of the hearing and had asked that the date be changed, statements by defendant both before and after the shooting reflected his belief that the victim was keeping his children from him, and a restraining order so upset defendant that he ripped the papers and threw the pieces at the door of the victim's apartment. The jury could reasonably find that one reason defendant killed his wife was to stop this proceeding. N.C.G.S. § 15A- 2000(e)(7).

31.    Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--victim's exercise of official duty as witness

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committedbecause of the victim's exercise of her official duty as a witness whe re she had previously obtained an ex parte domestic violence protection order, she was scheduled to testify against defendant the day after her murder, defendant had been upset for some time over his separation from the victim and the custody of their children, defendant's own testimony reflected his frustration and anger over these issues, and defendant was aware of the ex parte order and that the victim was going to testify. A reasonable jury could conclude that one reason defendant killed his wife was that she obtained the protective order as an aspect of her official duty as a witness against him. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(8).

32.    Sentencing--capital--two aggravating circumstances--same evidence

    There was no prejudicial error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the trial court submitted two aggravating circumstances, that the murder was committed to hinder a governmental function and because of the witness's performance of her official duty as a witness, where both of these circumstances referred to the same domestic violence protective order. While there was sufficient evidence to support submission of either circumstance, it was error to submit both; however, there was no prejudice because the jury rejected the circumstance that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(7); N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(8).

33.    Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting the especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance where the evidence showed that the victim's death was physically agonizing, involved psychological torture, and was conscienceless. There was evidence which included the victim being helpless to prevent her impending death between the time defendant first shot her and when he flipped her over to shoot her a second time, defendant killing the victim in the presence of her parents, and statements by defendant to several witnesses indicating that she feared defendant, as well as the fact that she had taken out a domestic violence order against him.

34.    Sentencing--capital--definition of mitigating circumstances

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by giving instructions on the definition of mitigating circumstances which were in accord with the pattern jury instructions and which are virtually identical to instructions approved elsewhere. Moreover, the court's additional instructions on mitigating circumstances were also in accord with the pattern jury instructions and were given in cases in which similar arguments were rejected.

35.    Sentencing--capital--mitigating circumstances--nonstatutory circumstances combined

    There was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the trial court combined various nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that defendant had requested be submitted separately. The jury was not prevented from considering any potential mitigating evidence; the circumstances proffered by defendant were subsumed in the circumstances submitted by the court; the court's language was identical to defendant's in many instances and, where it was not, the jury was required to address all of the points proposed by defendant; defendant was able to present evidence on each profferedcircumstance and to argue the weight of that circumstance to the jury; a nd the court carefully instructed the jury not to apply a mathematical approach.

36.    Sentencing--capital--nonstatutory mitigating circumstances--father's drinking

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not submitting nonstatutory mitigating circumstances dealing with the effects on defendant of his father's drinking problem where those circumstances either were not supported by the evidence or were subsumed in other mitigating circumstances submitted to the jury.

37.    Sentencing--capital--nonstatutory mitigating circumstance--defendant's potential for rehabilitation--subsumed in other circumstances

    The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not submitting the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that defendant's prospect for rehabilitation is excellent where that circumstance was subsumed in two of the circumstances submitted.

38.    Sentencing--capital--mitigating circumstances--instructions

    The trial court did not commit reversible error in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, when it instructed the jury that it must be unanimous in its answers to Issues Three and Four on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form.

39.    Sentencing--capital--mitigating circumstance--impaired capacity-- consideration by jury

    The jury in a capital sentencing proceeding did not fail to consider the impaired capacity mitigating circumstance where no juror found it to exist. Although defendant contended that the jury must have failed to consider it because the testimony of his psychiatrist was uncontested, the evidence was in fact contested by lay testimony and defendant did not request a peremptory instruction. Moreover, the jury could have considered that the defense expert interviewed defendant for little more than an hour on one occasion. Finally, the statutory circumstances found by the jury indicate that they considered the evidence with discrimination and not arbitrarily. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6).

40.    Sentencing--capital--nonstatutory mitigating circumstances--submitted with peremptory instruction--not found

    There was no error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the jury did not find three of the nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted with peremptory instructions. A reasonable juror could have concluded that these mitigating circumstances had no mitigating value; the fact that the jury found six out of the nine submitted indicates that it considered the evidence and the circumstances submitted.

41.    Sentencing--death sentence--not disproportionate

    A sentence of death was not disproportionate where defendant shot his wife while her family watched; inflicted a second wound while the victim begged for her life; reloaded and shot the victim's father and attempted to shoot her mother; there was abundant evidence that he had been considering the shootings for a long time; defendant is an adult and there is no indication that he suffers from diminished capacity; and the especiallyheinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance has been suffi cient to support the death penalty even standing alone.

    Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Seay, J., on 3 June 1999 in Superior Court, Gaston County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. On 3 August 2000, the Supreme Court allowed defendant's motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of an additional judgment. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 March 2001.
    Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

    Sue A. Berry for defendant-appellant.

    EDMUNDS, Justice.

    On 7 July 1997, defendant William Todd Anthony was indicted for first- degree murder of Semantha Belk Anthony   (See footnote 1)  and for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury on John Edward Belk. Defendant was tried capitally before a jury at the 3 May 1999 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Gaston County. On 27 May 1999, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation, but not on the basis of felony murder. The jury also returned a verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder. On 3 June 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the first-degree murder conviction and seventy-three to ninety-seven months' imprisonment for the assault conviction. Defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death to this Court as a matter of right. On 3 August 2000, we allowed defendant's motion tobypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of the assault c onviction. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant's trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error and that defendant's sentence of death is not disproportionate.
    At defendant's trial, the State presented evidence that defendant and Semantha Belk Anthony were married on 26 October 1985 and that two children were born of the marriage. Defendant and Semantha separated for several months in 1992. During this separation, defendant wrecked Semantha's vehicle with his truck and grabbed her after allegedly seeing her with another man. Defendant was charged with communicating a threat and with assault on a female as a result of this incident, but the charges were subsequently dropped. Defendant and Semantha temporarily reconciled but separated again in March 1997, as detailed below. Semantha told her mother, Martha Belk, that she was leaving defendant because her sons “were being abused” and “she was scared of [defendant].” Similarly, she told her father, John Edward Belk, that she was separating from defendant because “she was afraid he was going to kill her and the boys.”
    On 15 March 1997, Semantha met with attorney Jay Stroud, who prepared a separation agreement. This agreement, which defendant and Semantha signed on 19 March 1997, gave Semantha primary custody of the children and entitled defendant, in part, to visitation with the children twice a week and on alternate weekends. Thereafter, Semantha and the children left the marital residence. Semantha stayed with her parents briefly, then moved into an apartment. The children slept at the Belks' home.
    A week after signing the separation agreement, defendant contacted Susan Russell, a legal assistant for attorney Stroud, to complain about Semantha's failure to remove the remainder of her property from the marital residence. Ms. Russell contacted Semantha, who responded that defendant had been harassing her since they signed the separation agreement. She further explained that she had not yet acted because she was afraid ofdefendant and was trying to find someone to accompany her when she retrieved her property. In fact, on 16 March 1997, the day after Semantha visited attorney Stroud, the Gaston County Police Department had been dispatched to the marital residence in response to a domestic dispute. Defendant told the responding officer that he had a gun but had thrown it in the woods behind the house at Semantha's request.
    On 9 April 1997, Semantha filed a “Complaint and Motion for a Domestic Violence Protective Order” against defendant in which she stated, “4-8-97. Has threatened to kill me, constantly follows me at different times, carries a gun. I fear for my life.” That same day, a judge signed an “Ex Parte Domestic Violence Protective Order” and set a hearing in the matter for 16 April 1997.
    On the morning of Tuesday, 15 April 1997, defendant arrived at the Belks' home to visit his children. Although in the past defendant had been welcome do to so whenever he wanted, Semantha instructed her parents no longer to allow defendant to see the children before school because his visits upset them. However, when Mr. Belk told defendant that he could not see his children, defendant pushed him aside and entered the house. Defendant was crying at the time, and his children became agitated while talking to him. After defendant left, Mr. Belk reported the incident to the police, and J.T. Welch, an officer with the Mount Holly Police Department, responded. He testified that Mr. Belk described the incident to him and stated that defendant had at some point made threats that he would kill the whole family. Mr. Belk appeared troubled and said that he did not know what defendant was capable of doing. He added that he thought his daughter had obtained a restraining order against defendant.
    Officer Welch advised Scott Wright, an officer with the Mount Holly Police Department, of the incident and of a possible restraining order against defendant. Officer Wright went to the Belks' home to speak with Semantha, who told him about the incident that morning and added thatdefendant had been following her and threatening to “blow her f-- -ing head off.” After speaking with Semantha, Officer Wright confirmed that an “Ex Parte Domestic Violence Protection Order” had been issued.
    Officer Wright saw Semantha later that day at a hair salon. While speaking with her, she exclaimed, “There he is, there he is,” and she and the officer watched as defendant drove slowly past the salon. Afterwards, Officer Wright visited Semantha at her residence, where she told him that defendant was supposed to bring the children to her parents' home later that day. She requested that a police officer come by during that time because she thought there would be trouble and added, “He'll kill me if he gets a chance.”
    That same day, Semantha also called legal assistant Russell to report that defendant had hired an attorney who was going to attempt to have the 16 April 1997 domestic violence hearing postponed because defendant was scheduled to undergo surgery. During their conversation, Semantha told Ms. Russell that she recently had purchased a gun because she was afraid to stay in her residence without protection and that her children were sleeping at her parents' home because she was fearful something would happen.
    Defendant went back to the Belks' home on the afternoon of 15 April 1997, bringing flowers for Semantha and steaks for the Belks as an apology for the encounter that morning. Although defendant left after several minutes, events rapidly took an ominous turn. Defendant's stepfather, Johnny Kendall, testified that he later told Mount Holly Police Officer Barry Colvard that he thought he had talked defendant out of doing something he would regret but that when defendant grabbed several shotgun shells and ran out of the house, Mr. Kendall called 911. He told the operator that defendant had left his home with a gun to shoot Semantha. Randy Carter, a neighbor of the Kendalls, testified that Mrs. Kendall came to his house on 15 April 1997 just prior to the shootings and asked him tocalm defendant. Defendant told Mr. Carter that he could not take it anymore and was going to kill Semantha. While Mr. Carter was speaking with defendant, defendant was searching for something in three rooms and the attic of the Kendalls' house. When defendant left, Mr. Carter observed a shotgun in the back of defendant's truck.
    Approximately one hour after leaving the Belks' home, defendant returned. Semantha, who was there waiting for defendant to drop off the children, ran outside when she heard defendant blow his horn. Mr. Belk, who had seen defendant drive down the street, was outside talking with his neighbor James Fitcher. Several minutes later, Mr. Belk heard someone yell, “Todd's got Sandy, dragging Sandy out front, he's got a gun.” Mr. Belk ran inside his home to find something with which to defend himself. When he emerged, he saw that defendant was wielding a shotgun while holding the crouching or kneeling Semantha by her hair. Defendant told Semantha, “Hold still, b----. I'm going to kill you,” while she pleaded with defendant to let her go. When Mr. Belk told defendant not to hurt his daughter, defendant became distracted and Semantha was able to break free and run. Defendant chased her and shot her in the back. He then reloaded his shotgun and, as the wounded Semantha lay on the ground begging for her life, flipped her over with his foot; said, “Hold still, b----”; and shot her again. Defendant reloaded; aimed his shotgun at Mr. Belk; said, “You're next, old man”; and shot Mr. Belk in the shoulder. Defendant next aimed at Mrs. Belk, who was standing on her front porch. Although defendant apparently pulled the trigger, his weapon failed to fire. Defendant threw the shotgun in the back of his truck; said, “Now I can go to jail”; then sped away, scattering gravel. Several neighbors, including James Fitcher, Kimberly Fitcher, Brenda Cagle, Bobbie Auten, and Gloria Jenkins, witnessed the shootings and corroborated the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Belk.
    After shooting Semantha and Mr. Belk, defendant drove to his parents'house. Defendant told Mr. Carter that he had shot Semantha and asked Mr. Carter to drive him to the jail. As Mr. Carter was driving, defendant repeatedly stated, “Why did she do this to me? Why? Why? Why?” Mr. Carter saw several patrol vehicles and flagged down Mount Holly Police Officer B.G. Summey. As Officer Summey approached, defendant spontaneously stated, “I did it. I shot them. I couldn't take it anymore.” Defendant identified himself and while being handcuffed said, “I shot her twice. Is she all right?” After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, Officer Summey searched defendant and found several Xanax tablets in defendant's pocket. Defendant then told Officer Summey that the murder weapon was in the back of his truck at his parents' home.
    Defendant was taken to the Mount Holly Police Department, where he consented to a search of his truck and his parents' home. When asked to sign a waiver of rights form, defendant responded, “Yes, I'm guilty. I'll sign whatever.” Defendant said that he had not slept in three to four weeks and that he had taken several Xanax pills before the shootings. When Officer Summey informed defendant that his wife had died and that he was under arrest for her murder, defendant responded, “I know I'm guilty.” Thereafter, defendant was transported to the Gaston County Police Department to be fingerprinted and photographed. While entering the patrol vehicle, defendant responded to an officer's caution to watch his head by saying, “I just killed my wife. My head's the last of my worries.” While en route, defendant asked, “Is she still alive?” and “Can I get the death penalty for this?”
    Once at the Gaston County Police Department, defendant explained that he killed his wife because she was seeing other men and was not going to let him visit his children. He stated that Semantha had called his mother that day and told her she was never going to let defendant see his children again, she wished defendant was dead, and she would not even visit defendant's grave if he died. Defendant was then taken to the magistrate'soffice. On the way, defendant commented, “One of the bulle ts was meant for me, and the old man confronted me so I shot him too,” and “I pulled the trigger. I'm guilty. Go ahead and give me the death penalty.” Defendant told the magistrate, “I didn't mean to do it but she kept using the kids against me.”
    Several witnesses testified as to statements defendant made prior to the murder indicating his intention to kill his wife. Benny Hale, owner of Benny's Fishing Lake, testified that defendant was a frequent customer. He noticed a change in defendant in February 1997. Approximately two weeks before Semantha's murder, defendant told Mr. Hale that he was experiencing problems with his wife because she would not let him see his children as often as he wanted. During this conversation, defendant became upset; began to cry; and stated to Mr. Hale, “Benny, I'm thinking about killing the b----.” On 10 April 1997, defendant told Kimberly Fitcher, the Belks' neighbor, that Semantha had served papers at his place of employment and was opposing his efforts to obtain joint custody of their children. Ms. Fitcher testified that defendant said “he would hurt anyone who stood in his way of him being with his kids.” Gordon Arnold, manager of Mount Holly Farm Supply, testified that defendant entered his store on 14 April 1997. When Mr. Arnold asked defendant, “Can I help you?” defendant, who was visibly upset, responded, “You can't help me with my problems. . . . My wife left me. She is running around on me. She won't let me see my kids. I am going to kill her and if her old man gets in my way, I'm going to kill him, too.” Finally, Carl Barker, who had been defendant's supervisor at work for approximately ten years, testified that defendant had not been himself for six months prior to Semantha's murder. On several occasions, including 15 April 1997, defendant told him that “he was going to kill the b----.”
    Dr. Peter Wittenberg, the pathologist at Gaston Memorial Hospital who autopsied Semantha, testified that her death was caused by bleeding fromthe lungs and wounds in her chest. He described her death as not i mmediate and “very painful.” Dr. Timothy Carr, an emergency physician at Gaston Memorial Hospital, treated Mr. Belk on 15 April 1997 and described his injuries as life-threatening. Ronald Marrs, a special agent with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, was accepted as an expert in firearms and tool-mark examinations and identifications. He identified the twenty-gauge shotgun retrieved from defendant's truck as the weapon used in the shootings and determined from examination of Semantha's clothing that defendant was twelve to twenty-one feet away from her when he fired the first shot and six to twelve feet away from her when he fired the second shot.
    Defendant presented evidence at the guilt-innocence phase of his trial to establish a history of tension in his relationship with Semantha. He testified that various individuals told him that she was having affairs and that he had seen her kiss another man during their first separation. He claimed that after their March 1997 separation Semantha attempted to prevent him from seeing his children.
    On the day of the shootings, defendant was upset about his separation from Semantha and his inability to see his children. He consumed beer, vodka, and Xanax to deal with this distress, and as a result could not remember what happened at the Belks' home and thereafter. Numerous witnesses corroborated defendant's claim to have consumed intoxicants, including defendant's father, Tony Anthony; his mother, Diane Kendall; and his stepfather, Johnny Kendall. Vivian Daley, a nurse at the Gaston County jail, testified that when she saw defendant on 16 April 1997, less than twenty-four hours after the shootings, he “was staring straight ahead and he was crying. . . . [I]n my professional opinion, he did not seem to know where he was.” She noted that defendant's eyes were dilated and that he smelled of alcohol. Terry Wellman, a nurse at the Gaston County Police Department, observed defendant on 16 April 1997 shortly after his apparentattempt to commit suicide in jail. Because defendant was cr ying incoherently and his eyes were dilated, she requested a drug test. The results were positive for Xanax even though the test was administered twenty hours after the murder.
    Dr. Roy J. Mathew, who was tendered and accepted as an expert in psychiatry specializing in the fields of addiction medicine and addiction psychiatry, testified as to the effects of Xanax and alcohol on the human brain. Dr. Mathew was of the opinion that defendant's claimed memory loss of the murder was valid, and characterized what happened to defendant as a “black-out.” He also believed that defendant's suicide attempt in the Gaston County jail was consistent with ingestion of Xanax. As to defendant's mental condition on the day of the murder, Dr. Mathew stated, “I think he was significantly impaired. He was significantly intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime with alcohol and Xanax. It's very difficult to separate one from the other because, as I indicated earlier, they do more or less the same thing in the brain.” When asked whether defendant's mind and reason were so completely intoxicated and impaired that he could not form a specific intent to kill, Dr. Mathew responded, “I feel that he was significantly intoxicated by Xanax, alcohol, and both; that it would have been difficult for him to think rationally and clearly.”
    Additional evidence was presented during the capital sentencing proceeding. This evidence will be discussed below as necessary to address sentencing issues.
    [1]We note at the outset that defendant has presented ninety-seven assignments of error. For convenience, clarity, and continuity, we have grouped related assignments of error in our opinion. We also note that, while defendant includes a constitutional component to almost all his assignments of error, in most instances he failed to preserve the constitutional issues at trial and has provided no argument and cited no cases in support of his constitutional arguments here. “Constitutionalissues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be consider ed for the first time on appeal,” State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001), and assignments of error in support of which no argument or authority is stated will be taken as abandoned, id. (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5)). Accordingly, we will consider only his properly preserved arguments.

    Q: Do you have occasion to know of Todd playing ball and things like that?

    A: Well, yes. I coached against Todd years and years ago. I was the coach of one team and he played for this other team in Little League, which he was about ten years old maybe.

    Q: Do you know how Todd felt about his father's inability to participate in those kinds of activities?

        . . . .

    A: Well, I believe it hurt him. I believe it hurt him to -- there were so many kids -- it seemed like maybe their parents did and his didn't. So he was a little envious.

Sheri Broome testified:
    Q: What did you notice about the way [defendant] grew up?

    A: I'm sure Todd had a bad childhood and, more or less, adulthood.

    Q: Why is that?

    A: Well, I know there was a lot of problems with his dad drinking. I remember a lot of them.

Finally, Melody Huff testified:

    A: [Defendant's father] has been an alcoholic for many, many years. He's had a very bad alcohol problem. He's a good person, but he's got a bad problem. He quit drinking years ago, but it'sstill not been good. I mean, the whole time that Todd was growing up, Tom drank and drank heavily.

        . . . .

    Q: Do you know how that affected Todd?

    A: I know that Todd didn't want to have anything to do with alcohol and didn't. I never knew Todd to take a drink, even.

Although this testimony is sufficient to establish that defendant's father had problems with alcohol, it does not support the circumstance that defendant was ashamed and troubled by these problems or was emotionally ill-equipped to handle them. Moreover, the circumstance was subsumed by the mitigating circumstance given to the jury, “[t]hat the defendant came from a broken home, was abused emotionally by parents, was abandoned by mother at age 9, and his father was an alcoholic.” “A trial court's failure or refusal to submit a defendant's proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances separately or independently is not error where requested mitigating circumstances are subsumed in submitted mitigating circumstances.” State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 521, 532 S.E.2d 496, 515 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001). Accordingly, we hold that any error in not submitting this circumstance was harmless.
    As to the requested circumstance that defendant assumed the role of caretaker as he attempted to protect his grandparents from abuse from his father, defendant points to the above-quoted testimony of both Jocyln and Lonnie Broome and to the testimony of Debbie Hampton, a longtime neighbor of defendant's family, who testified:
    Q: Could you tell -- tell the jury what his relationship was with his dad when he was a young child.

    A: Todd -- well, Tom was an alcoholic and Todd was almost like -- well, he -- Mr. and Mrs. Anthony more or less raised Todd, I would say. And Tom, of course, lived there with them, but it was like they were brothers. I mean, my daughter even made a statement one day that she didn't know that Tom and Todd were father and son. She thought they were brothers.

Despite defendant's contention that this testimony supports the profferedcircumstance, we find nothing in the record to indicate that defen dant protected and cared for his alcoholic father. Although Ms. Broome testified that defendant sought to keep his grandparents from hearing defendant's alcoholic father as he ranted, raved, and cursed, this testimony does not support an inference that defendant's father would have abused the grandparents but for defendant's intervention. Because the evidence was insufficient to support submission of this mitigating circumstance, we hold that the trial court properly refused to submit it.
    [37]Finally, as to the requested circumstance that defendant's prospect for rehabilitation is excellent, defendant cites the testimony of Monica Steward, J.R. Hughes, and Tom Bradley, employees of the Gaston County Sheriff's Department who worked in the jail division. All three testified that defendant had been a polite and respectful inmate while at the Gaston County jail. In addition, Ms. Steward described defendant as a “model inmate” who looked out for others in the jail. Mr. Hughes described defendant as a “good, respectable inmate,” and Mr. Bradley testified that defendant “would be helpful of other individuals.”
    This circumstance was subsumed within two circumstances submitted to the jury: “That the defendant was remorseful, regretted his actions, and exhibited good conduct in jail and practiced religious beliefs since his incarceration”; and “That the defendant is unlikely to commit another crime and has support in his community.” Because “[a] trial court's failure or refusal to submit a defendant's proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances separately or independently is not error where requested mitigating circumstances are subsumed in submitted mitigating circumstances,” id., we hold that the trial court's failure to submit this circumstance was not error.
    These assignments of error are overruled.
    [38]In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in light of McKoy v. North Carolina,494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), when it instructe d the jury that it must be unanimous in its answers to Issue Three and Issue Four on the “Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment” form. Defendant argues that the trial court's instructions misled the jury to believe that a life sentence could be imposed only upon the jury's unanimous recommendation.
    Issue Three on the “Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment” form submitted to the jury provided: “Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by you?” As to this issue, the trial court instructed the jury:
        If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances found are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, you would answer Issue 3 “Yes.” If you unanimously fail to do so, you would answer Issue Number 3 “No.” If you answer Issue Number 3 “No,” it would be your duty to recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment. If you answer Issue 3 “Yes,” you must consider Issue Number 4.

    Issue Four on the “Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment” form provided: “Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances you found is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of you?” As to this issue, the trial court instructed the jury:
    [I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by you are sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances found by one or more of you, it would be your duty to answer the issue “Yes.” If you unanimously fail to so find, it would be your duty to answer the issue “No.”

        . . . .

        . . . [I]t is not enough for the State to prove from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more of the aggravating circumstances. It must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty. And before you may answer Issue 4 “Yes,” you must agree unanimouslythat they are.

        If you answer Issue Number 4 “No,” you must recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment. If you answer Issue Number 4 “Yes,” it would be your duty to recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to death.

    These instructions were correct. We analyzed this issue in State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996), where we held:
        In a capital sentencing proceeding, any jury recommendation requiring a sentence of death or life imprisonment must be unanimous. N.C. Const. art. I, § 24; N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) (Supp. 1994). The policy reasons for the requirement of jury unanimity are clear. First, the jury unanimity requirement “is an accepted, vital mechanism to ensure that real and full deliberation occurs in the jury room, and that the jury's ultimate decision will reflect the conscience of the community.” McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 452, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369, 387 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Second, the jury unanimity requirement prevents the jury from evading its duty to make a sentence recommendation. If jury unanimity is not required, then a jury that was uncomfortable in deciding life and death issues simply could “agree to disagree” and escape its duty to render a decision. This Court has refused to make any ruling which would tend to encourage a jury to avoid its responsibility by any such device. For example, we have expressly stated that a jury instruction that a life sentence would be imposed if a jury could not unanimously agree should never be given because it would be “tantamount to 'an open invitation for the jury to avoid its responsibility and to disagree.'” State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 710, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276 (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S.E.2d 87, 92 (1980)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1982). The jury may not be allowed to arbitrarily or capriciously take any such step which will require the trial court to impose or reject a sentence of death. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 33, 292 S.E.2d 203, 227. Thoughtful and full deliberation in an effort to achieve unanimity has only a salutary effect on our judicial system: It tends to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentence recommendations.

        Since the sentence recommendation, if any, must be unanimous under constitutional and statutory provisions, and particularly in light of the overwhelming policy reasons for a unanimity requirement, we conclude that any issue which is outcome determinative as to the sentence a defendant in a capital trial will receive -- whether death or life imprisonment -- must be answered unanimously by the jury. That is, the jury should answer Issues One, Three, and Four on the standard form used in capital cases either unanimously “yes” or unanimously “no.”

State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389-90, 462 S.E.2d at 39 (citations altered). In light of this unambiguous holding, this assignment of error is overruled.    [39]Defendant next argues that the jury failed to consider the statutory mitigating circumstance, “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law was impaired.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6). The trial court submitted this circumstance to the jury, but no juror found the circumstance to exist. Defendant contends that because Dr. Mathew's testimony was uncontested, the jury must have failed to consider the circumstance at all. However, defendant never requested a peremptory instruction on the (f)(6) circumstance. Moreover, the record reveals that the evidence was not uncontroverted. Various witnesses, including Martha Belk, testified that they did not believe defendant was impaired by alcohol or any controlled substance on the day of the shootings. This lay evidence conflicted with Dr. Mathew's testimony. See State v. Payne, 337 N.C. at 534-35, 448 S.E.2d at 110-11 (jury's failure to find (f)(6) mitigating circumstance not arbitrary in light of fact that evidence on that circumstance was controverted and jurors could have found testimony of experts not to be inherently credible). In addition, in weighing Dr. Mathew's testimony, the jury could have considered that Dr. Mathew interviewed defendant for little more than an hour on but one occasion. See id.
    Out of the three statutory circumstances submitted to the jury, the jury found two: that defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1); and that the murder was committed while defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2). These findings indicate that the jury considered the evidence with discrimination and did not, as defendant contends, decide the case arbitrarily. This assignment of error is overruled.
    [40]In related assignments of error, defendant contends that the jury's failure to find three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances wasarbitrary. At trial, the trial court submitted nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to the jury and gave a peremptory instruction as to each. Among the nine circumstances were the following:
        (5) That the defendant has low self esteem and is of low intellect and limited education.

        . . . .

        (7) That the defendant came from a broken home, was abused emotionally by parents, was abandoned by mother at age 9, and his father was an alcoholic.

        . . . .

        (10) That the defendant surrendered himself, was cooperative with law enforcement officers and confessed to the crimes involved.

The jury found all the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted by the judge on defendant's behalf to exist with the exception of the three listed above. Although defendant concedes that the jury may have rejected these circumstances because it found that each lacked mitigating value, defendant argues that it is unconstitutional for a jury to fail to give automatic mitigating value to relevant and uncontested nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, defendant contends, the “jurors' rejection of this mitigating evidence was error, regardless of why they do so.”
    “This Court has reviewed and consistently upheld the constitutionality of a jury rejecting a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance if none of the jurors find facts supporting the circumstance or if none of the jurors deem the circumstance to have mitigating value.” State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. at 647, 536 S.E.2d at 67. In State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 478 S.E.2d 163 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997), we addressed a similar argument and held that
    [a] jury could rationally have rejected these nonstatutory mitigating circumstances on the basis that they had no mitigating value. We believe that the jury's written responses on the Issues and Recommendations form submitted to it show that it considered and rejected the mitigating circumstances. It is not our role to second-guess the jury under these circumstances. In the absence of contradictory evidence, we must assume that thejury comprehended the trial court's instructions and the Issues and Recommendations form. The fact that the jury in this case considered and rejected all of the mitigating circumstances submitted to it does not indicate a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

Id. at 28-29, 478 S.E.2d at 177.
    In this case, a reasonable juror could have concluded that these mitigating circumstances had no mitigating value. The fact that the jury found six out of the nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted supports that it did consider the evidence and circumstances submitted. We will not second-guess the jury's decision.
    These assignments of error are overruled.

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