All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Car olina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be consid ered authoritative.
TIMOTHY H. CRAIG, and the CHATHAM COUNTY AGRIBUSINESS COUNCIL v.
COUNTY OF CHATHAM, CHATHAM COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT and the
CHATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH
1. Counties; Public Health_-local ordinance_-swine farms_health rules--preemption by
state law
The Court of Appeals did not err by concluding that state law preempts the regulation of
swine farms and thus prevents county commissioners and a local board of health from adopting
an ordinance and rules regulating swine farms, because: (1) North Carolina's swine farm
regulations, the Swine Farm Siting Act, and the Animal Waste Management Systems statutes, are
so comprehensive in scope that the General Assembly must have intended that they comprise a
complete and integrated regulatory scheme on a statewide basis leaving no room for further local
regulation; and (2) county commissioners and local boards of health have no authority under
N.C.G.S. § 130A-39(b) to superimpose additional regulations without specific reasons clearly
applicable to a local health need.
2. Zoning-_local ordinance_-swine farms_-validity
The Court of Appeals erred by upholding a local zoning ordinance relating to swine
farms, because: (1) the ordinance seeks to impose regulations on swine farms where the State has
shown an intent to cover the field of swine farm regulation; and (2) the zoning ordinance's
attempt to incorporate the invalid county swine ordinance prevents it from being valid.
3. Zoning-_local ordinance_-regulation of swine farms
The Board of Health may not regulate swine farms under N.C.G.S. § 130A-39 upon
considerations other than health.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, 143 N.C. App. 30, 545 S.E.2d
455 (2001), affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part
an order for summary judgment entered 25 October 1999 by Allen
(J.B., Jr.), J., in Superior Court, Chatham County. On 16 August
2001, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs' conditional petition
for discretionary review as to an additional issue. Heard in the
Supreme Court 14 November 2001.
Ward and Smith, P.A., by Kenneth R. Wooten and Frank H.
Sheffield, Jr., for plaintiff-appellants and -appellees.
The Brough Law Firm, by G. Nicholas Herman and Michael B.
Brough, for defendant-appellants and -appellees.
Southern Environmental Law Center, by Donnell Van Noppen III
and Michelle B. Nowlin; and Environmental Defense, by
Daniel J. Whittle, on behalf of North Carolina Association
of Health Board Directors; Environmental Defense; and
Conservation Council of North Carolina, Inc., amici curiae.
Carlton Law Firm, by J. Phil Carlton on behalf of North
Carolina Agribusiness Council, North Carolina Pork Producers
Council, North Carolina Cattlemen, North Carolina Farm
Bureau, North Carolina Poultry Federation, North Carolina
State Grange, and the North Carolina Citizens for Business
and Industry, amici curiae.
Nicolette G. Hahn on behalf of Waterkeeper Alliance, Cape
Fear Riverkeeper, Neuse Riverkeeper, Neuse River Foundation,
New Riverkeeper, Winyah Rivers Foundation, and the Alliance
for a Responsible Swine Industry, amici curiae.
LAKE, Chief Justice.
The issues raised here on review require the interpretation
of the North Carolina General Statutes and application of North
Carolina case law governing the question of preemption of county
ordinances by the State. Specifically, the primary issues
presented, defendants' first and second issues, relate to the
validity of two Chatham County ordinances passed by the Chatham
County Board of Commissioners and certain rules passed by the
Chatham County Board of Health, all regulating swine farms.
On 6 April 1998, the Chatham County Board of Commissioners
enacted the Chatham County Ordinance Regulating Swine Farms
(the Swine Ordinance) and An Ordinance to Amend the Chatham
County Zoning Ordinance to Provide for Regulation of Swine Farms
(the Zoning Ordinance). The Swine Ordinance regulates swine
farms raising 250 or more animals of the porcine species,
through a permitting system which affects currently existing
farms and those which expand in the future. The Swine Ordinance
is applicable to all such swine farms without regard to whetherthe farm is served by an animal waste management system having a
design capacity of 600,000 pounds steady state live weight
(See footnote 1)
or
greater. Under the Swine Ordinance, the owners of swine farms
are assigned the financial responsibility for future
contaminations that might occur, which responsibility is ensured
through both a written agreement with the Chatham County Health
Department and some form of financial security. The Swine
Ordinance also provides requirements for setback
(See footnote 2)
distances and
buffer
(See footnote 3)
zones for farms and sprayfields,
(See footnote 4)
and semiannual testing
of wells on the farm.
The Zoning Ordinance is applicable only to swine farms that
are served by an animal waste management system having a design
capacity of 600,000 pounds steady state live weight (SSLW) or
greater. The Zoning Ordinance limits swine farms to areas of
the county which are zoned either Light Industrial or Heavy
Industrial. The Zoning Ordinance further requires the swine
farmer to obtain a conditional use permit, with issuance
contingent upon a showing of compliance with the Swine Ordinance. On 28 April 1998, the Chatham County Board of Heal
th enacted
the Chatham County Board of Health Swine Farm Operation Rules
(Health Board Rules), which apply to all swine farms
(See footnote 5)
raising
250 or more animals of the porcine species, without regard to
the design capacity of the farm's animal waste management system.
The Health Board Rules are virtually identical to the Swine
Ordinance.
On 2 September 1998, Timothy H. Craig and the Chatham County
Agribusiness Council (CCAC) filed a complaint against defendants
in superior court seeking a declaration that the Swine Ordinance,
Zoning Ordinance and Health Board Rules were not legally valid.
On 2 September 1999, CCAC filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, and in September 1999, defendants filed an answer and a
motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment and denied CCAC's motion for partial
summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in part and reversed in part the ruling of the
trial court, holding that the Health Board Rules and the Swine
Ordinance are preempted by state law but holding that the trial
court was correct in granting summary judgment to defendants as
to the Zoning Ordinance. This Court subsequently allowed
defendants' petition for discretionary review and plaintiffs'
conditional petition for discretionary review as to an additional
issue. [1]Defendants first contend that the Court of Appeals erred
in concluding that state law preempts the regulation of swine
farms and thus prevents county commissioners and a local board of
health from adopting an ordinance and rules regulating swine
farms.
The enactment and operation of a general, statewide law does
not necessarily prevent a county from regulating in the same
field. However, preemption issues arise when it is shown that
the legislature intended to implement statewide regulation in the
area, to the exclusion of local regulation. See N.C.G.S. § 160A-
174(b)(5) (2001). '[M]unicipal by-laws and ordinances must be
in harmony with the general laws of the State, and whenever they
come in conflict with the general laws, the by-laws and
ordinances must give way.' State v. Williams, 283 N.C. 550,
552, 196 S.E.2d 756, 757 (1973) (quoting Town of Washington v.
Hammond, 76 N.C. 33, 36 (1877)). The law of preemption is
grounded in the need to avoid dual regulation. See, e.g., id. at
554, 196 S.E.2d at 759.
Counties are creatures of the General Assembly and have no
inherent legislative powers. High Point Surplus Co. v.
Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 654, 142 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1965);
DeLoatch v. Beamon, 252 N.C. 754, 757, 114 S.E.2d 711, 714
(1960). They are instrumentalities of state government and
possess only those powers the General Assembly has conferred upon
them. Harris v. Board of Comm'rs of Washington Cty., 274 N.C.
343, 346, 163 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1968); High Point Surplus, 264
N.C. at 654, 142 S.E.2d at 701. Hence, we look to the NorthCarolina General Statutes to see what powers the General Assembly
has delegated broadly to counties on a statewide basis or more
specifically to counties such as Chatham in the area of swine
farm regulation.
The General Assembly, in N.C.G.S. § 153A-121, has delegated
to counties the power and authority to enact ordinances. That
statute provides in part:
(a) A county may by ordinance define, regulate,
prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions
detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its
citizens.
N.C.G.S. § 153A-121(a) (2001). However, N.C.G.S. § 160A-174, as
interpreted and applied by our case law, provides limitations on
the exercise of this power. The relevant portions of N.C.G.S. §
160A-174 state:
(b) A city ordinance shall be consistent with the
Constitution and laws of North Carolina and of the
United States. An ordinance is not consistent with
State or federal law when:
. . . .
(5) The ordinance purports to regulate a
field for which a State or federal
statute clearly shows a legislative
intent to provide a complete and
integrated regulatory scheme to the
exclusion of local regulation.
This Court has held that N.C.G.S. § 160A-174 is applicable to
counties as well as cities. State v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238, 185
S.E.2d 644 (1972).
N.C.G.S. § 130A-39 delegates power to the local board of
health to
adopt a more stringent rule in an area regulated by the
Commission for Health Services or the Environmental
Management Commission where, in the opinion of thelocal board of health, a more stringent rule is
required to protect the public health.
N.C.G.S. § 130A-39(b) (2001). The Commission for Health Services
and the Environmental Management Commission (EMC) are state
agencies. The governor appoints all members serving on the EMC
and a majority of the members serving on the Commission for
Health Services. N.C.G.S. § 143B-283(a) (1999) (amended in
2001); N.C.G.S. § 130A-30(a) (2001). A local board of health is
limited in its rule-making powers in that the regulation must be
related to the promotion or protection of health. City of
Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 124 N.C. App. 578, 587, 478 S.E.2d 528,
533 (1996).
In holding that the Swine Ordinance and the Health Board
Rules were preempted by state law, the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the Chatham County Board of Commissioners and the Chatham
County Board of Health sought to regulate an area in which the
General Assembly had provided a complete and integrated
regulatory scheme of swine farm regulations. Craig v. County of
Chatham, 143 N.C. App. 30, 545 S.E.2d 455 (2001); see also
N.C.G.S. § 160A-174(b)(5). We concur in this assessment.
In determining if the General Assembly intended to provide
statewide regulation to the exclusion of local regulation, we
must decide if it has shown a clear legislative intent to provide
such a complete and integrated regulatory scheme.
Defendants argue that when the General Assembly intends to
preempt the field, it will do so through an express statement of
intent. Furthermore, they argue that without such an expression
of intent, this Court would be merely imposing its own judgmentfor that of the General Assembly in finding that the General
Assembly preempted the field. We disagree.
If the General Assembly were required to provide an express
statement of intent, N.C.G.S. § 160A-174(b)(5) would be
meaningless. The General Assembly can create a regulatory scheme
which, though not expressly exclusory, is so complete in covering
the field that it is clear any regulation on the county level
would be contrary to the statewide regulatory purpose.
In determining the purpose and intent of the General
Assembly in adopting the swine regulation statutes, we must
primarily look to 'the spirit of the act[] and what the act
seeks to accomplish.' State v. Anthony, 351 N.C. 611, 615, 528
S.E.2d 321, 323 (2000) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50,
56, 468 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1996)). Where legislative intent is not
readily apparent from the act, it is appropriate to look at
various related statutes in pari materia so as to determine and
effectuate the legislative intent. Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520,
523-24, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998).
In State v. Williams, this Court relied on a stated purpose
similar to the one in the instant case to find that state law
preempted local regulation in the Town of Mount Airy. 283 N.C.
at 553, 196 S.E.2d at 758. In that case, defendants were
arrested for the possession of an open beer, a violation of a
Mount Airy city ordinance. Id. at 550, 196 S.E.2d at 756-57.
Defendants' motion to quash the warrants was allowed because the
town ordinance which prohibited the possession of an open beer in
public places was in conflict with the general statutory laws ofNorth Carolina, which allowed possession of malt beverages and
unfortified wine by eighteen-year-old consumers without
restriction or regulation. Id. at 554, 196 S.E.2d at 758-59.
When the issue came before this Court, it looked to the purpose
and intent of the pertinent statute:
to establish a uniform system of control over the
sale, purchase . . . of intoxicating liquors . . . to
insure, as far as possible, the proper administration
of this Chapter under a uniform system throughout the
State.
Id. at 553, 196 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 18A-1 (1975))
(emphasis added). This Court concluded that the General Assembly
had shown by this language an intent to prevent local governments
from enacting ordinances regulating malt beverages. Id. at 554,
196 S.E.2d at 759. The ordinance at issue was determined to be
inconsistent with state law because (1) it made unlawful
something that state law held to be lawful, and (2) the ordinance
purported to regulate within a field where the General Assembly
had provided a complete and integrated regulatory scheme. Id.
Similarly, in Greene v. City of Winston-Salem, 287 N.C. 66,
213 S.E.2d 231 (1975), this Court found upon review of an
ordinance enacted by the City of Winston-Salem that there was a
legislative intent to preempt. The City of Winston-Salem enacted
an ordinance which required sprinkler systems in high-rise
buildings. Id. at 67, 213 S.E.2d at 232. The City referred to a
state law which required sprinkler systems in certain buildings
in support of its argument that state law did not give the State
Building Code Council sole regulatory authority in the area. Id.
at 75, 213 S.E.2d at 237. This Court noted that the GeneralAssembly does not have to delegate all or sole authority in the
particular regulatory field to one state agency in order to
establish that there is a complete and integrated regulatory
scheme. Id.
There are two components to the statewide swine farm
regulations found in the North Carolina General Statutes, the
Swine Farm Siting Act and the Animal Waste Management
Systems. In examining each of these, we will look to any
statement of purpose and intent in an effort to determine if
the General Assembly has created a complete and integrated
system for swine farm regulation in the state.
The Swine Farm Siting Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 106-800 to -805
(2001), governs the placement of swine farms and lagoons, and
provides in its section designated Purpose the following:
[C]ertain limitations on the siting of swine houses and
lagoons for swine farms can assist in the development
of pork production, which contributes to the economic
development of the State, by lessening the interference
with the use and enjoyment of adjoining property.
N.C.G.S. § 106-801. This expression of intent is significant in
that it notes pork production is important to the economic
stability of the state, yet recognizes that adjoining landowners
have a right to the use and enjoyment of their land. This stated
intent also shows that the General Assembly was trying to reach a
balance between two very important interests, the economy of
North Carolina and the right of a landowner to enjoy his land
with minimal interference. If each of North Carolina's one
hundred counties is free to create its own particularized
regulations for swine farms, the overall balance which theGeneral Assembly has reached within a uniform plan for the entire
state will be lost. The result could well be that the rights of
adjacent landowners in each individual county would be
substantially elevated above the rights of swine farmers to
workable, nonexcessive regulations. Swine farms would be forced
to comply with both state and county regulations. Furthermore, a
swine farmer with a large farm that crossed the boundaries of one
or more counties in North Carolina conceivably would have to
conform the farm to the regulations established by various
counties and those established by the state. Ultimately, such
farms could be forced to adapt to differing, even conflicting,
regulations. Any such dual regulation would present an excessive
burden on swine farmers and the pork production industry as a
whole.
The Animal Waste Management Systems component of the
statewide regulations, N.C.G.S. §§ 143-215.10A to -215.10M (2001)
(§ 143-215.10C altered in 1999; § 143-215.10B altered in 2001),
provides in pertinent part: It is the intention of the State to
promote a cooperative and coordinated approach to animal waste
management among the agencies of the State. N.C.G.S. § 143-
215.10A (emphasis added). This unequivocal statement makes it
clear that the purpose for creating these statutes was to
regulate animal waste management at the state level. If each
county were allowed to enact its own waste management guidelines,
there could be no statewide coordinated approach. Notably
also, the agencies designated to implement the Animal Waste
Management Systems statutes are exclusively state agencies. N.C.G.S. §§ 143-215.10A to -215.10M (permitting, inspection, and
enforcement are vested in the Division of Water Quality, while
the Soil and Water Conservation Commission is in charge of
designating the technical specialists responsible for inspecting
the waste management plans). The expression of intent further
provides that one of the goals of the Act is minimizing the
regulatory burden. N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10A. Certainly, the
stated goal of limiting or minimizing the burden of the
regulatory scheme for waste management systems on swine farms
would not be attainable if counties could impose additional
burdens on swine farmers to comply with varying regulations.
Thus, from our review of the expressed purpose and
intent of the Swine Farm Siting Act and the Animal Waste
Management statutes, we conclude that these two components of
North Carolina's swine farm regulations show an intention to
cover the entire field of swine farm regulation in North
Carolina.
In addition to the General Assembly's express statements of
purpose and provisions reflecting intent in enacting North
Carolina's swine farm regulations, we consider the breadth and
scope of the applicable general statutes in determining whether
the overall regulatory scheme was designed to be preemptive.
The General Assembly has provided for extensive regulation
of swine farms in North Carolina. The Swine Farm Siting Act is
applicable to tracts of land raising 250 or more swine
(See footnote 6)
andestablishes siting requirements for swine houses
(See footnote 7)
and lagoons
(See footnote 8)
in
relation to surrounding areas. N.C.G.S. § 106-803(a). Swine
houses and lagoons must be located at least 1,500 feet away from
an occupied residence; 2,500 feet away from a school, hospital,
or church; and 500 feet away from any property boundary or
well supplying water to a public water system. N.C.G.S. § 106-
803(a)(1) -(4). The setback requirements where waste has been
applied to the land on the farm provide that the land must be at
least 75 feet away from perennial streams, rivers, or any
property boundary containing an occupied residence. N.C.G.S. §
106-803(a1).
The Swine Farm Siting Act provides for enforcement of its
requirements by establishing who is in a position to enforce the
Act; what kinds of relief are available; and the possibility of
obtaining court costs, attorneys' fees, and expert witnesses'
costs. N.C.G.S. § 106-804. The Swine Farm Siting Act's setback
distances from any occupied residence, school, hospital, or
church can be avoided completely if the farm owner gets the
written permission of the adjacent landowner and records it with
the county Register of Deeds. N.C.G.S. § 106-803(b). The Swine
Farm Siting Act also requires that before locating or
constructing a swine farm with 250 or more swine, proper notice
must be given to any county where the farm is to be located;adjoining property owners; owners of property across a street,
road, or highway from the farm; and the local health department.
N.C.G.S. § 106-805. Proper notice requires service by certified
mail and must include, in part: the address of the local Soil
and Water Conservation District office, the name and address of
the technical specialist that prepared the farm's proposed waste
management plan, and the proposed design capacity of the animal
waste management system. Id.
The Animal Waste Management Systems component regulates
swine farms even more extensively than the Swine Farm Siting Act.
The Animal Waste Management Systems component creates a
permitting program which requires swine farm owners to obtain a
permit before constructing or operating any waste management
system. N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10C(a). An animal waste management
system is defined as practices that provide for the collection,
treatment, storage, or land application of animal waste.
N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10B(3). To obtain the necessary permit, swine
farm owners must submit to the EMC their waste management system
plan, which has been approved by a technical specialist.
N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10C(d). The Animal Waste Management Systems
has detailed specifications as to how each farm's animal waste
management system shall be designed, constructed and operated so
as to prevent pollution. N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10C. It also
provides a time limit upon which the EMC must approve or deny the
permit after a new permit has been applied for or a renewal
permit is sought. N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10C(c). In the event the
EMC does not act in the required ninety days, the permit isconsidered to be approved. Id. The Animal Waste Management
Systems component provides an extensive list of necessary parts
for all animal waste management plans, such as provisions
regarding periodic testing of waste products used on the farm as
nutrient sources and a checklist of potential odor sources and
management practices which are designed to minimize the source of
the odor. N.C.G.S. § 143-125.10C(e). Any established swine farm
waste management plan must require at least annual testing of the
soil at crop sites where the waste has been applied to the land.
N.C.G.S. § 143-215.10C(e)(6).
We conclude from the foregoing specifications that North
Carolina's swine farm regulations, the Swine Farm Siting Act and
the Animal Waste Management Systems statutes are so comprehensive
in scope that the General Assembly must have intended that they
comprise a complete and integrated regulatory scheme on a
statewide basis, thus leaving no room for further local
regulation.
Turning now to the Health Board Rules enacted by the Chatham
County Board of Health, we note that they contain more stringent
rules than those established in the EMC regulations. However,
N.C.G.S. § 130A-39 specifically grants local boards of health the
power to enact rules which are more strict when they are
required to protect the public health. N.C.G.S. § 130A-39(b).
In an effort to protect the environment, the EMC has created a
system of permitting and inspection which regulates waste
management systems on farms, including swine farms of more than
250 swine. See 15A NCAC 2H .0217(a)(1)(A) (Sept. 2001). The pertinent EMC regulation, 15 NCAC 2H .0217 (Rule
.0217),
outlines the procedure for the proper development of an approved
waste management plan. The procedure requires the plan to be
certified by a technical specialist certifying that the practices
established in the plan meet the applicable minimal standards for
a waste management plan. Rule .0217(a)(1)(H)(i)-(ii). Rule
.0217(a)(1)(H)(vii) provides the time when approval of the waste
management system must be obtained for new farms, before any
animals are stocked, and for expanding farms, before any of the
additional animals are added. Rule .0217 also contains
established buffers, such as the requirement that ponds or
lagoons must be located at least one-hundred feet from perennial
waters. 15A NCAC 2H .0217(a)(1)(H)(vi).
The EMC permitting regulation also has an established set of
guidelines which must be followed when a farm has a change in
ownership. 15A NCAC 2H .0217(a)(1)(H)(xii). The new owner must
provide written notification to the Division of Environmental
Management (DEM) of the Department of Environment, Health, and
Natural Resources within sixty days of obtaining ownership. Id.
The new owner must also assure the DEM that he has read the waste
management plan established for the farm, that he understands it,
and that he will continue to ensure that it is implemented. Id.
Rule .0217 also provides for its enforcement. 15A NCAC 2H
.0217(e). When there is a willful failure to comply with the EMC
permitting regulation, Rule .0217, the Secretary of the
Environment, Health, and Natural Resources can assess both fines
and penalties. Id. The General Assembly may provide directly for specific
statewide regulation, as noted above, and it may delegate
regulatory authority to local agencies under sufficient
guidelines, as provided in N.C.G.S. § 130A-39(b). However,
county commissioners and local boards of health have no authority
under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 130A-39(b) to superimpose
additional regulations without specific reasons clearly
applicable to a local health need. The Health Board Rules make
the bare assertion that in some areas, rules more stringent than
those of the Environmental Management Commission are required in
order to protect the public health. The Health Board, however,
does not provide any rationale or basis for making the
restrictions in Chatham County more rigorous than those
applicable to and followed by the rest of the state.
The Health Board Rules require that [n]o person shall
construct or expand a swine farm in Chatham County without having
a swine farm Construction/Expansion permit for 250 or more
swine. However, the EMC permitting regulation already requires
that swine farms with waste management facilities supporting 250
or more swine get permits for construction or operation. 15A
NCAC 2H .0217(a). The Health Board Rules provide procedures for
handling a change in ownership of the swine farm, while the EMC
already addresses this issue, as above set forth. In fact, the
EMC rule is very specific and thorough on the issue of a change
in ownership. The Health Board Rules establish setbacks which
establish minimal distances for new, existing or expanding swine
farms in relation to residences that are either occupied orlisted for rent or sale, nursing homes, child care centers, [and]
office buildings. The setback distances are imposed according
to the size of the swine farm's animal waste management system,
increasing the setback distance with larger systems ranging from
2,500 to 5,500 feet.
(See footnote 9)
The setback distances incorporated into
the EMC rule require 1,500 feet from an occupied residence and
2,500 feet from any school, hospital, national or state park, or
church.
(See footnote 10)
The difference between the setback distances
established by the Health Board Rules and those set by the EMC is
that the Health Board Rules are more stringent. It is apparent
that Chatham County enacted its Health Board Rules in an effort
to place more stringent regulations on swine farmers and has done
so without any showing that such regulations are required to
protect the public health, as specified by N.C.G.S. § 130A-
39(b). This we hold is impermissible.
When we look at the Swine Farm Siting Act, the Animal Waste
Management Systems statutes, and the EMC's regulation together,
as parts of an overall scheme, we conclude that the Swine
Ordinance and the Health Board Rules are incompatible with state
law in that they purport to regulate a field in which the State
has provided a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to theexclusion of local regulation. We therefore affirm the Court of
Appeals in this regard.
[2]We next address the issue of the ordinance to amend the
Zoning Ordinance, which is before us upon plaintiffs' petition
for discretionary review as to an additional issue. Plaintiffs
contend the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Zoning
Ordinance. We agree.
Counties have no inherent authority to enact zoning
ordinances. Jackson v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Adjust., 275 N.C.
155, 162, 166 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1969). N.C.G.S. § 153A-340 is the
statutory grant of power which provides counties with the
authority to zone. There is, however, a specific limitation on
this grant of power as it relates to swine farms:
A county may adopt zoning regulations governing swine
farms served by animal waste management systems having
a design capacity of 600,000 pounds steady state live
weight (SSLW) or greater provided that the zoning
regulations may not have the effect of excluding swine
farms served by an animal waste management system
having a design capacity of 600,000 pounds SSLW or
greater from the entire zoning jurisdiction.
N.C.G.S. § 153A-340(b)(3) (2001).
The Zoning Ordinance, as amended, enacted by Chatham County
requires all swine farms served by an animal waste management
system having a design capacity of 600,000 pounds SSLW or
greater, regardless of the actual number of swine, to be located
in either a Light or Heavy Industrial district. The Zoning
Ordinance further compels applicants to obtain a
Construction/Expansion permit as required by the [Swine
Ordinance].
Plaintiffs contend that in light of the Court of Appeals'determination that the Swine Ordinance is invalid, the Zon
ing
Ordinance's express incorporation of the Swine Ordinance causes
the Zoning Ordinance to fail as well. Specifically, plaintiffs
argue that state preemption of the Swine Ordinance, as it is
incorporated in the Zoning Ordinance, invalidates the Zoning
Ordinance.
The Zoning Ordinance is not per se invalid. However, in
this case, as written, the Zoning Ordinance cannot stand.
The sole restriction on zoning swine farms is that they may
not have the effect of excluding swine farms served by an animal
waste management system having a design capacity of 600,000
pounds SSLW or greater from the entire zoning jurisdiction.
N.C.G.S. § 153A-340(b)(3). Chatham County's Zoning Ordinance
does not exclude all farms with an animal waste management system
of 600,000 SSLW or greater, but merely restricts these farms to
Light or Heavy Industrial districts within the county. The
Zoning Ordinance complies with the restrictions established in
section 153A-340(b)(3).
However, the requirement in the Zoning Ordinance that the
applicant must have a Construction/Expansion permit obtained
through compliance with the Swine Ordinance proves to be fatal.
The Zoning Ordinance requires compliance with only a portion of
the Swine Ordinance; however, that specific portion of the Swine
Ordinance requires compliance with all other sections of the
Swine Ordinance, to the extent the other sections are applicable
to swine farms.
As we noted above, the Swine Ordinance cannot stand becauseit seeks to impose regulations on swine farmers where th
e State
has shown an intent to cover the field of swine farm regulation.
The Zoning Ordinance's attempt to incorporate the Swine Ordinance
prevents us from sustaining its validity. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Zoning Ordinance's incorporation of the Swine
Ordinance invalidates the Zoning Ordinance.
[3]As to defendants' third issue, whether the Board of
Health may regulate swine farms under N.C.G.S. § 130A-39 upon
considerations other than heath, we hold it may not for the
reasons hereinabove set forth.
Upon the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
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