All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the
print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT CHARLES SINAPI
No. 274A04
FILED: 7 APRIL 2005
Searches and Seizures_search warrant for house_marijuana in curbside garbage_criminal
history_probable cause
Magistrates are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied to them
and their determination of probable cause is entitled to great deference. Here, the trial court erred
by suppressing evidence seized from inside defendant's house pursuant to a search warrant that
was based on marijuana plants in a garbage bag taken from defendant's curb, defendant's drug-
related criminal history, and information that defendant was linked to a heroin sale and overdose.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 164 N.C.
App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 822 (2004), affirming an order entered
13 March 2003 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Superior Court,
Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 December 2004.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
John T. Hall and Kyle S. Hall for defendant-appellee.
Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Ann Groninger, for American
Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal
Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae.
BRADY, Justice.
The issue before the Court is whether a search warrant
issued for defendant Robert C. Sinapi's residence was
sufficiently supported by probable cause such that the fruits of
the resulting search were admissible at defendant's trial for
violations of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act. In
particular, this Court must determine whether an affidavit
alleging: (1) a single garbage bag containing eight wilting
marijuana plants recovered by the Raleigh Police Department from
defendant's front yard, (2) defendant's prior criminal history,
and (3) information linking defendant to a heroin sale andoverdose was sufficient to support the finding of probable cause
made by an impartial magistrate who then issued a search warrant
for defendant's residence. We determine that the affidavit was
sufficient to allow the magistrate to make a threshold finding of
probable cause; therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the superior court's grant of defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search
warrant in question.
BACKGROUND
On 30 September 2002, Detective J.G. Hobby of the
Raleigh Police Department submitted a search warrant application
to a Wake County magistrate for defendant's residence at 3300
Pinecrest Drive in Raleigh, North Carolina. The application was
supported by the affidavit of Detective Hobby, which reflected
that on 5 September 2002, he was assigned to follow-up on a
drug inquiry involving a heroin overdose in which defendant was
implicated as the seller of the heroin. Detective Hobby began an
investigation by conducting a criminal records check of
defendant, which revealed that defendant had previously been
arrested twice for drug-related offenses, once for possession of
marijuana and once for possession of methaqualone. The affidavit
also stated that, according to North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles records, defendant resided at 3300 Pinecrest Drive.
According to Detective Hobby's affidavit, after he
finished gathering this information, he and Detective J.D.
Cherry, also of the Raleigh Police Department proceeded to
defendant's residence. They arrived at 3300 Pinecrest Drive at
approximately 8:00 a.m. on 26 September 2002 and performed atrash pick-up . . . . [which] was made during the normal trash
day and time. Pursuant to this trash pick-up:
A single, white plastic garbage bag was
recovered from the front yard/curb line area
at 3300 Pinecrest Drive, beside . . . the
driveway. Inside of the garbage bag
[Detective Hobby] located eight marijuana
plants. The plants appeared to be somewhat
dried up and wilted. The marijuana weighed
approximately 5 ½ ounces. The marijuana was
field tested with a positive result for
marijuana. Based on [Detective Hobby's]
training and experience, this activity is
consistent with a possible marijuana grow
operation and illegal drugs sales.
Detective Hobby then concluded in the affidavit that:
This investigation has included a recent drug
investigation where Robert Sinapi is believed
to be involved in the sell/delivery of an
illicit drug, heroin. Criminal records
indicate that he has prior arrests for
possession of marijuana and methaqualone. An
abundance of marijuana was recovered as a
result of a trash pick-up at the residence.
Based on the facts described above and my
training and experience, I believe that there
is probable cause to believe that the items
to be seized, controlled substances in
violation of G.S. [§] 90-95 and other items
herein, are in the premises and on the person
to be searched.
On 30 September 2002, in accordance with our Founding
Fathers' preference for search warrants, Detective Hobby
presented his affidavit and application for search warrant to a
Wake County magistrate. That impartial magistrate determined
that probable cause existed and issued a search warrant for
defendant's residence at 3300 Pinecrest Drive. On 1 October
2002, Detective Hobby executed the search warrant and seized from
defendant's home,
inter alia, approximately 5 grams of heroin,
approximately 62.4 grams of cocaine, approximately 3.8 grams of
marijuana, and three marijuana plants. As a result of the
seizure, on 6 January 2003, defendant was indicted by a WakeCounty grand jury for manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in
marijuana by possession, trafficking in heroin by possession,
trafficking in cocaine by possession, and maintaining a dwelling
used for keeping and/or selling controlled substances.
On 27 January 2003, defendant filed a pretrial motion
to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the 1 October
2002 search of 3300 Pinecrest Drive. At the 5 February 2003
Criminal Session of Wake County Superior Court a hearing was
conducted on defendant's motion to determine whether the
magistrate properly concluded that probable cause was
established.
During the suppression hearing, Detective Hobby
testified that the refuse collection truck was in defendant's
neighborhood, but the truck had not yet proceeded to Pinecrest
Drive. When asked about the location of the garbage bag,
Detective Hobby stated that [t]he bag was approximately three to
four feet from the driveway at the corner of the lot . . .
approximately four to five feet off the roadway. So it's kind of
sitting in the corner between the driveway and the road, just
like someone were to walk out on the road and put their trash
out. However, Detective Hobby stated that he did not see the
garbage bag being placed on defendant's lawn. Detective Hobby
also testified that, although there was general household
garbage in the garbage bag, there was nothing inside the bag,
such as mail or documents, physically linking the garbage bag to
3300 Pinecrest Drive. On cross-examination, Detective Hobby
acknowledged that the City of Raleigh had back yard pick-up of
garbage at that time but emphasized that, notwithstanding theCity's policy, several other residences in the neighborhood also
had garbage sitting out by the curb.
After the hearing, the superior court judge orally
entered an order granting defendant's motion to suppress all
evidence seized as a result of the 1 October 2002 search of
defendant's residence. On 13 March 2003, the superior court
issued a written order, that contained the following conclusions
of law:
1. The discovery of marijuana in a garbage
bag located near the curb of the street
and adjacent to the driveway at 3300
Pinecrest Drive on a normal garbage pick
up day without any documentation linking
the bag to the residence or the
defendant and without any showing as to
how, when and by whom it was placed
along the curb, does not implicate the
residence located at 3300 Pinecrest
Drive and provides no reasonable basis
to believe that controlled substances
would be found therein or on the
defendant.
2. The affidavit portion of the search
warrant herein did not provide
sufficient facts and circumstances to
establish probable cause to believe that
the items sought were located upon the
premises of 3300 Pinecrest Drive.
. . . .
4. The evidence obtained as a result of the
search conducted on September 30, 2002
at 3300 Pinecrest Drive, together with
the fruits of that search, are
inadmissable at the trial of the
defendant.
The State appealed the order, and on 4 May 2004, a
majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's
order, with Judge McCullough dissenting. State v. Sinapi, 164
N.C. App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 822 (2004). On 7 June 2004, the Statefiled notice of appeal to this Court based upon Judge
McCullough's dissent.
ANALYSIS
This Court must now determine whether the information
contained in the affidavit prepared by Detective Hobby presented
sufficient information to enable a magistrate to make a threshold
determination of probable cause. In so doing, we note that the
parties do not challenge the superior court's findings of fact.
Therefore, the scope of our inquiry is limited to the superior
court's conclusions of law, which are fully reviewable on
appeal.
State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 797, 488 S.E.2d 210, 212
(1997).
As this Court acknowledged in
State v. Beam, when
addressing whether a search warrant is supported by probable
cause, a reviewing court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. 325 N.C. 217, 220-21, 381 S.E.2d 327, 329
(1989);
see also Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238, 76 L. Ed.
2d 527, 548 (1983);
State v. Riggs, 328 N.C. 213, 219-20, 222,
400 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1991);
State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633,
641, 319 S.E.2d 254, 259 (1984).
In applying the totality of the
circumstances test, this Court has stated that an affidavit is
sufficient if it establishes reasonable cause to believe that
the proposed search . . . probably will reveal the presence upon
the described premises of the items sought and that those items
will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender.
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor import
absolute certainty.
Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at
256 (citations omitted). Thus, under the totality of the
circumstances test, a reviewing court must determine whether theevidence as a whole provides a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause exists.
Beam, 325 N.C. at 221, 381 S.E.2d
at 329;
see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548
(concluding that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis' to conclude
that probable cause existed) (citation omitted).
In adhering to this standard of review, we are
cognizant that great deference should be paid a magistrate's
determination of probable cause and that after-the-fact scrutiny
should not take the form of a
de novo review.
Arrington, 311
N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 258. We are also mindful that:
A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts toward warrants is inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant;
courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by
interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner. [T]he resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded
to warrants.
Riggs, 328 N.C. at 222, 400 S.E.2d at 434-35 (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
Most importantly, we note that a magistrate is entitled
to draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied to him
by an applicant for a warrant.
Id. at 221, 400 S.E.2d at 434.
To that end, it is well settled that whether probable cause has
been established is based on 'factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
[persons], not legal technicians, act.'
Id. at 219, 400 S.E.2d
at 433
(quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93
L. Ed 1879, 1890 (1949)) (alteration in original), quoted in
Gates, 462 U.S. at 231, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 544.
Probable cause isa flexible, common-sense standard. It does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false. A practical, nontechnical probability is all that is
required.
State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 262, 322 S.E.2d 140,
146 (1984) (emphasis added).
Here, the magistrate was entitled to rely on his
personal experience and knowledge related to residential refuse
collection to make a practical, threshold determination of
probable cause. Based on the facts before him, the magistrate
was entitled to infer that the garbage bag in question came from
defendant's residence and that items found inside that bag were
probably also associated with that residence. This conclusion is
particularly bolstered by the location of the garbage bag and the
fact that Detective Hobby retrieved it from defendant's yard at
approximately 8:00 a.m. on the regularly scheduled garbage
collection day in defendant's neighborhood.
The marijuana plants gathered from the garbage bag,
taken in conjunction with defendant's drug-related criminal
history and the information obtained by the Raleigh Police
Department linking defendant to a heroin sale and overdose
established, based on the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life, that there was a fair probability that
contraband and evidence of a crime would be found in defendant's
residence. Thus, the information contained in Detective Hobby's
affidavit constituted a substantial basis for the magistrate to
find probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant for
defendant's residence.
For the reasons stated above, the superior court's
conclusion is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of this State,which establishes that a magistrate's [r]easonable inferences
from the available observations, particularly when coupled with
common or specialized experience, long have been approved in
establishing probable cause.
Riggs, 328 N.C. at 221, 400 S.E.2d
at 434. As a result, the search warrant was properly issued and
the superior court erred in granting defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence of the 1 October 2002 search of his
residence.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further remand to the Wake County Superior Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***